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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
The theory of infinitely repeated games is a cornerstone of modern economic analysis. Besides
its tremendous effect on the theory of games itself, it has pervaded economic applications that
stretch from industrial organization, to political economy, to development economics.
We depart from the standard repeated game model by considering strategic interactions
among dynasties. This is appealing whenever the ongoing strategic interaction can be thought
of as one between entities that outlive any individual player. For instance, firms, in some
cases, may be appropriately modeled as “placeholders” for successive generations of decision-
makers (owners or managers). The interaction between political parties also seems suited to
this view, as are some instances of religious strife and tribal or family disputes.
We analyze “dynastic” repeated games. A stage game is repeatedly played by successive
generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. Each individual has preferences
that replicate those of the infinitely-lived players of a standard discounted infinitely repeated
game: his payoff is a weighted sum of his current (stage) payoff and that of his successors in
the same dynasty. The case of almost-infinite patience in the standard model is re-interpreted
as a world with almost-complete altruism (towards successors in the same dynasty).
Suppose that all players observe the past history of play. An application of the one-shot
deviation principle is enough to show that the standard repeated game and the dynastic game
are equivalent, both in terms of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (henceforth SPE) strategies and
consequently of equilibrium payoffs. This is so regardless of the “demographic structure” of
the dynastic game. In other words, the equivalence holds regardless of the process governing
birth and death of successive generations of players, provided that extinction of any dynasty
is ruled out.
We focus on the case in which the players are not able to observe directly the history of
play that took place before their birth (or more loosely, before they began participating in
the game). Instead, our players rely on messages from their predecessors to fathom the past.
In fact, in many situations of economic interest, postulating that communication is the
only way to convey information about the past seems a good assumption. For instance, if the
dynasties are competing firms in an oligopolistic market, the current decision makers may of
course have access to accounts and a host of other past records. But, in some cases at least, it
seems compelling to say that these should be modeled as messages from past players, rather
than direct observation of the past.
In this paper we characterize the set of Sequential Equilibria (henceforth SE) of dynastic
repeated games in which all players live one period, and have to rely on private messages from
their immediate predecessors about the previous history of play. Our results would remain
intact if public messages were allowed alongside private ones.
Of course, one would like to know what happens when the demographics of the model
are generalized, and what would be the effects of the presence of an imperfect but non-null
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physical footprint of the past history of play, which we assume away. We return to these and
other issues in Section 10 below, which concludes the paper.
1.2. Results
Our results indicate that that there are stark differences between the dynastic repeated games
with private communication that we analyze here and the standard repeated game model.
We show that, under very general conditions, in a dynastic repeated game with private
communication there are equilibria that yield the dynasties (possibly even all dynasties) a
payoff below their minmax value in the stage game. In short, we find that in a very broad class
of games (which includes the n ≥ 3-player version of the Prisoners’ Dilemma), as the players
become more and more altruistic (patient), all (interior) payoff vectors in the convex hull of
the payoffs of the stage game can be sustained as an SE of the dynastic repeated game with
private communication. For some stage games, the ability to sustain all (interior) payoffs also
implies that, in some of the SE of the dynastic repeated game with private communication,
one or more players will receive payoffs that are higher than the maximum they could receive
in any SPE of the standard repeated game.
Each player in a dynasty controls directly (through his own actions in the stage game)
only a fraction of his dynastic payoff; the rest is determined by the action profiles played by
subsequent cohorts of players. As the players become more and more altruistic towards their
descendants, the fraction of their dynastic payoff that they control directly shrinks to zero.
This reassures us that it is not impossible that a player’s payoff in the dynastic repeated game
be below his minmax level in the stage game. The fact that this can indeed happen in an
SE of the dynastic repeated game, in which the interests of players in the same dynasty by
assumption are aligned, is the subject of this study.
A closer look at some of the SE that we find in this paper reveals an interesting fact.
There is an obvious sense in which, following some histories of play, in equilibrium, beliefs
are “mismatched” across players of the same cohort. This phenomenon, in turn, can be
traced back to the fact that following some histories of play, the structure of the equilibrium
does not permit a player to communicate to his successor some information about the past
that is relevant for future play. Below, we formalize this notion via a condition that we term
“Inter-Generational Agreement.” The mismatch in beliefs is equivalent to saying that an SE
violates Inter-Generational Agreement.
We are able to show that the mismatching phenomenon we have just described charac-
terizes fully the difference between the set of SE of the dynastic repeated game and the set
of SPE of the standard repeated game. Any SPE of the standard repeated game can be
replicated as an SE of the dynastic repeated game that displays Inter-Generational Agree-
ment. Conversely any SE of the dynastic repeated game that yields a payoff vector that is
not sustainable as an SPE of the standard repeated game must violate Inter-Generational
Agreement.
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2. Outline
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 3 we lay down the notation and
details of the Standard Repeated Game and of the Dynastic Repeated Game. In Section 4 we
define what constitutes an SE for the Dynastic Repeated Game. In Section 5 we present our
first result asserting that all payoffs that can be sustained as SPE of the Standard Repeated
Game can be sustained as SE of the Dynastic Repeated Game. Section 6 is devoted to our
first “extended” Folk Theorem for the Dynastic Repeated Game. This result applies to the
case of three or more dynasties. In Section 7 we present our second extended Folk Theorem.
The result we state there applies to the case of four dynasties or more. In Section 8 we report
a result that completely characterizes the features of an SE of the Dynastic Repeated Game
that make it possible to sustain payoff vectors that are not sustainable as SPE of the Standard
Repeated Game. Section 9 reviews some related literature, and Section 10 concludes.
For ease of exposition, and for reasons of space, no formal proofs appear in the main body
of the paper. The main ingredients (public randomization devices, strategies and trembles)
for the proofs of our two extended Folk Theorems (Theorems 2 and 3) appear in Appendix
A and Appendix B respectively. The complete proof of Theorem 4 appears in Appendix C.
In the numbering of equations, Lemmas etc. a prefix of “A,” “B” or “C” or means that the
item is located in the corresponding Appendix.
A technical addendum to the paper contains the rest of the formal proofs.1 In particular,
the technical addendum contains the proof of Theorem 1 and the analysis of “consistency”
and “sequential rationality” that closes the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3. In the numbering of
equations, Lemmas etc. a prefix of “T.X”means that the item is located in Section X of the
technical addendum.2
3. The Model
3.1. A Standard Repeated Game
We first describe a standard, n-player repeated game. We will then augment this structure
to describe the dynastic repeated game with communication from one cohort to the next.
The standard repeated game structure is of course familiar. We set it up below simply to
establish the basic notation.
Since in our main results below we will make explicit use of public randomization devices
we build these in our notation right from that start.
The stage game is described by the array G = (A, u; I) where I = {1, . . . , n} is the
set of players, indexed by i. The n-fold cartesian product A = ×i∈IAi is the set of pure
action profiles a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A, assumed to be finite. Stage game payoffs are defined by
u = (u1, . . . , un) where ui : A → IR for each i ∈ I. Let σi ∈ ∆(Ai) denote a mixed strategy
1The technical addendum is available via http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/la2/Folktheorem.htm.
2For ease of reference, pages and footnotes are also numbered separately in the technical addendum. Their
numbers have a prefix “T.”
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for i, with σ denoting the profile (σ1, . . . , σn).
3 The symbol σi(ai) represents the probability
of pure action ai given by σi, so that for any a = (a1, . . . an), with a minor abuse of notation,
we can let σ(a) = Πi∈Iσi(ai) denote the probability of pure action profile a that σ induces.
The corresponding payoff to player i, is defined in the usual way: ui(σ) =
∑
a∈A σ(a)ui(a).
Dropping the i subscript and writing u(σ) gives the entire profile of payoffs.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we denote by V the convex hull of the set of payoff
vectors from pure strategy profiles in G. We let intV denote the (relative) interior of V .4
We assume that all players observe the outcome of a public randomization device. We
model this as a random variable x˜ taking values in a finite set X, so that its distribution is a
point in ∆(X). Each player can condition his choice of mixed strategy on the realization of
x˜, denoted by x.5 Player i chooses a mixed strategy σi ∈ ∆(Ai) for each x ∈ X.
In the repeated game, time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . The pure (realized)
action profile played at time t is denoted by at. In each period there is a new public random-
ization device x˜t. These devices are i.i.d. across periods; we write x˜ to indicate the random
variable of which all the x˜ts are independent “copies.” We refer to x˜ as the action-stage
randomization device.6 A history of length t ≥ 1, denoted by ht, is an object of the form
(x0, a0, . . . , xt−1, at−1). The “initial” history h0 is of course the “null” history ∅. The set of
all possible histories of length t is denoted by H t, while H = ∪∞t=0H t denotes the collection
of all possible histories of play.
A strategy for player i in the repeated game is denoted by gi and can be thought of as a
collection (g0i , g
1
i , . . . , g
t
i , . . .) with each g
t
i a function from H
t ×X into ∆(Ai). The profile of
repeated game strategies is g = (g1, . . . , gn), while g
t indicates the time-t profile (gt1, . . . , g
t
n).
Given a profile g, recursing forward as usual, we obtain a probability distribution over
action profiles a0 played in period 0, then a probability distribution over profiles a1 to be
played in period 1, then in period 2, and so on without bound, so that we have a distribution
over the profile of actions to be played in every t ≥ 0. Of course, this forward recursion yields
a probability distribution P(g) over the set of all possible sequences (a0, . . . , at, . . .) (which
can be seen as a probability distribution over the set of possible actual histories of play H).
The players’ common discount factor is denoted by δ ∈ (0, 1). Given a profile g, player
3As standard, here and throughout the paper and the technical addendum, given any finite set Z, we let
∆(Z) be the set of all probability distributions over Z.
4Of course, when V has full dimension (n) the relative interior of V coincides with the interior of V . In
general, intV is simply the set of payoff vectors that can be achieved placing strictly positive weight on all
payoff vectors obtained from pure action profiles in G. We use the qualifier “relative” since we will not be
making explicit assumptions on the dimensionality of V , although the hypotheses of many of our results will
imply that V should satisfy certain dimensionality conditions that we will point out below.
5It should be made clear at this stage that at no point in the paper do we assume that mixed strategies
are observable.
6Throughout, we restrict attention to action-stage randomization devices that have full support. That is,
we assume that x˜ takes all values in the finite set X with strictly positive probability. This seems reasonable,
and keeps us away of a host of unnecessary technicalities.
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i’s expected payoff in the repeated game is denoted by vi(g) and is given by
7
vi(g) = EP(g)
{
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δt ui(a
t)
}
(1)
Given a profile g and a particular finite history ht, we recurse forward as above to find the
distribution over infinite sequences (a0, . . . , at, . . .), this time conditional on history ht and
the realization xt having taken place. We denote this distribution by P(g, ht, xt). This allows
us to define the continuation payoff to player i, conditional on the pair (ht, xt). This will be
denoted by vi(g|ht, xt) and is given by
vi(g|ht, xt) = (1− δ)
{
ui(g
t(ht, xt)) + EP(g,ht,xt)
[ ∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t ui(aτ )
]}
(2)
As before, dropping the subscript i in either (1) or (2) will indicate the entire profile.
At this point we note that, as is standard, given (1) and (2) we know that the continuation
payoffs in the repeated game follow a recursive relationship. In particular we have that
vi(g|ht, xt) = (1− δ)ui(gt(ht, xt)) + δ Egt(ht,xt),x˜t+1
{
vi(g|ht, xt, gt(ht, xt), x˜t+1)
}
(3)
where (ht, xt, gt(ht, xt), x˜t+1) is the (random) history generated by the concatenation of (ht, xt)
with the realization of the mixed strategy profile gt(ht, xt) and the realization of x˜t+1. The
expectation is then taken with respect to the realization of the mixed strategy profile gt(ht, xt)
and of x˜t+1.
A Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium, g∗, for the repeated game is defined in the usual way: for
each i, and each finite history (ht, xt), and each strategy gi for i, we require that vi(g
∗|ht, xt) ≥
vi(gi, g
∗
−i|ht, xt).8
We denote by GS(δ, x˜) the set of SPE strategy profiles, and by ES(δ, x˜) the set of SPE
payoff profiles of the repeated game when randomization device x˜ is available and the common
discount factor is δ. We also let ES(δ) = ⋃x˜ ES(δ, x˜) with the union being taken over the set
of all possible finite random variables that may serve as public randomization devices.
The standard model of repeated play we have just sketched out may be found in a myriad
of sources. See, for example, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) and the references contained
therein. Hereafter, we refer to the standard model above as the standard repeated game.
We conclude our discussion of the standard repeated game noting that the one-shot devi-
7Clearly, vi(g) depends on δ as well. To lighten the notation, this will omitted whenever doing so does not
cause any ambiguity.
8As is standard, here, and throughout the rest of the paper and the technical addendum, a subscript or a
superscript of −i indicates an array with the i-th element taken out.
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ation principle gives an immediate way to check, subgame by subgame, whether a profile g∗
is an SPE. Since it is completely standard, we state the following without proof.
Remark 1. One-Shot Deviation Principle: A profile of strategies g∗ is in GS(δ, x˜) if and only
if for every i ∈ I, ht ∈ H, xt ∈ X and any σi ∈ ∆(Ai) we have that
vi(g
∗|ht, xt) ≥ vi(σi, g−t∗i , g∗−i|ht, xt) (4)
where, in keeping with the notational convention we adopted above, g−t∗i stands for the profile
(g0∗i , . . . , g
t−1∗
i , g
t+1∗
i , . . .).
3.2. The Dynastic Repeated Game: Full Memory
The first dynastic repeated game that we describe is a straw-man. It turns out to be equiv-
alent, in both payoffs and strategies, to the standard repeated game. It fulfills purely an
expository function in our story.
Assume that each i ∈ I indexes an entire progeny of individuals. We refer to each of
these as a dynasty. Individuals in each dynasty are assumed to live one period. At the end of
each period t (the beginning of period t+1), a new individual from each dynasty — the date
(t+1)-lived individual — is born and replaces the date t lived individual in the same dynasty.
Hence, ui(a
t) now refers to the payoff directly received by the date t individual in dynasty i.
Each date t individual is altruistic in the sense that his payoff includes the discounted sum of
the direct payoffs of all future individuals in the same dynasty. Date t individual in dynasty
i gives weight 1 − δ to ui(at), and weight (1 − δ)δτ to ui(at+τ ) for every τ ≥ 1. All cohorts
in all dynasties can observe directly the past history of play. So all individuals in cohort t,
can observe ht = (x0, a0, . . . , xt−1, at−1). It follows that gti as above can now be interpreted as
the strategy of individual i in cohort t (henceforth, simply “player 〈i, t〉”) in the full memory
dynastic repeated game.
Therefore, in the full memory dynastic repeated game, given a profile of strategies g (now
interpreted as an array giving a strategy for each player 〈i, t〉) the overall payoff to player
〈i, t〉 conditional on history (ht, xt) can be written exactly as in (2) above.
Denote by GF (δ, x˜) the set of SPE strategy profiles, and by EF (δ, x˜) the set of (dynastic)
SPE payoff profiles for t = 0 players of the dynastic repeated game when the randomization
device x˜ is available and the common discount factor is δ.9 Now observe that from Remark
1 we know that a profile g constitutes an SPE of the standard repeated game if and only
if when we interpret g as a strategy profile in the full memory dynastic repeated game, no
player 〈i, t〉 can gain by unilaterally deviating. Hence the equilibrium sets of the standard
repeated game and of the full memory dynastic repeated game must be the same. Purely for
completeness we state the following formally, but we omit any further proof.
9Here for SPE, and later for SE, it is immediate to show that any dynastic equilibrium payoff vector for
the t = 0 cohort is also a (dynastic) equilibrium payoff vector for players in any subsequent (t ≥ 1) cohort.
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Theorem 0. Dynastic Interpretation of the Standard Repeated Game: Let any stage game
G, any δ ∈ (0, 1) and any public randomization device x˜ be given. Then the standard
repeated game and the full memory dynastic repeated game are equivalent in the sense that
GS(δ, x˜) = GF (δ, x˜) and ES(δ, x˜) = EF (δ, x˜).
3.3. The Dynastic Repeated Game: Private Communication
We are now ready to drop the assumption that individuals in the t-th cohort observe the
previous history of play. The players’ dynastic preferences are exactly as in the full memory
dynastic repeated game described in Subsection 3.2 above.
Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005) analyzed the case in which each individual in the t-cohort
has to rely on publicly observable messages from the previous cohort for any information
about the previous history of play.10
In this paper, we assume that each player 〈i, t〉 receives a private message from player
〈i, t− 1〉 about the previous history of play. It should be noted at this point that our results
would survive intact if we allowed public messages as well as private ones. All the equilibria
we construct below would still be viable, with the public messages ignored. We return to this
issue in Section 10 below.11
For simplicity, the set of messages M t+1i available to each player 〈i, t〉 to send to player
〈i, t+ 1〉 is the set H t+1 of finite histories of length t+ 1 defined above.12 The message sent
by player 〈i, t〉 will be denoted by mt+1i , so that player 〈i, t〉 is the recipient of message mti.
We also introduce a new public randomization device in every period, which is observable
to all players in the t-th cohort at the stage in which they select the messages to be sent to
the t+ 1-th cohort.13
10See Section 9 below for a brief discussion of the results in Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005) and other related
papers.
11Dealing explicitly with both private and public messages would be cumbersome, and make our results
considerably less transparent. Analyzing the model with private messages only is the most economical way
to put our main point across, and hence this is how we proceed.
12As will be apparent from our proofs, smaller messages spaces — even ones that stay bounded in size
through time — would suffice for our purposes. Taking the message spaces to coincide with the sets of
previous histories of play seems the natural canonical modeling choice.
13Three points are worth emphasizing at this stage. First of all, in general, we consider the availability
of a public randomization device (a publicly observable finite random variable) a weak assumption in just
about any game. To reiterate an obvious fact, the device simply has to be available for the players to observe;
whether or not the players decide to condition their play on its realization is an attribute of the equilibrium
of the model. Second, the assumption we are now making that a second public randomization device is
available seems a natural one in the model we are setting up. The players in the t-th cohort each take two
successive decisions: what to play and then what to say. Given that a public randomization device is available
when play is decided, it seems natural, in fact compelling, that the circumstances should be the same when
messages are sent to the next cohort of players. Third, and most importantly, all our theorems survive
literally unchanged (with the proof of Theorem 2 being the only one that needs modification) if we assume
that both randomization devices are simultaneously observable to all players in the t-th cohort at the time
they are called upon to choose their actions in the stage game. In this case, clearly a single randomization
device would suffice.
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We let a finite random variable y˜t taking values in a finite set Y be realized in every
period. A typical realization of y˜t is denoted by yt. We take these random variables to be
mutually independent across any two time periods. We write y˜ to indicate the finite random
variable of which all the y˜t are independent “copies,” and we refer to y˜ as the message-stage
randomization device.14
To summarize, we take the time-line of events, observations and decisions within each
time period t to be as follows. At the beginning of each time period t, each player 〈i, t〉
receives a private message mti ∈ H t from player 〈i, t− 1〉.15 Next, the random variable x˜t is
realized. Its realization xt is observed by all players 〈i, t〉 in the t-th cohort. After observing
xt, each 〈i, t〉 in the t-th cohort selects a mixed strategy σti ∈ ∆(Ai) for the stage game G.
These choices are simultaneous. Subsequently, all players 〈i, t〉 in the t-th cohort observe the
realized action profile at, which is of course the realization of the mixed strategy profile σt.
After the profile at is observed, the random variable y˜t is realized and all players 〈i, t〉 in the
t-th cohort observe its realization yt. Finally, after observing yt, each player 〈i, t〉 in the t-th
cohort selects a probability distribution φti ∈ ∆(H t+1) over messages mt+1i in the set H t+1.
The realized message from this distribution is then sent to player 〈i, t+1〉, who observes it.16
In terms of notation, we distinguish between the action strategy of player 〈i, t〉, denoted
by gti , and the message strategy of player 〈i, t〉, denoted by µti. Since we take the space of
possible messages that player 〈i, t〉 may receive to be M ti = H t, formally gti is exactly the
same object as in the standard repeated game of Subsection 3.1 and the full memory dynastic
repeated game of Subsection 3.2 above. In particular gti takes as input a message m
t
i ∈ H t
and a value xt ∈ X and returns a mixed strategy σti ∈ ∆(Ai).
The message strategy µti of player 〈i, t〉 takes as inputs a message mti, the realization xt,
the realized action profile at, the realized value yt, and returns the probability distribution φti
over messages mt+1i ∈ H t+1. In what follows, we will often write µti(mti, xt, at, yt) to indicate
the (mixed) message φti ∈ ∆(H t+1) that player 〈i, t〉 sends player 〈i, t+1〉 after observing the
quadruple (mti, x
t, at, yt).
In denoting profiles and sub-profiles of strategies we extend the notational conventions we
established for the standard repeated game and the full memory dynastic repeated game. In
other words we let gi denote the i-th dynasty profile (g
0
i , g
1
i , . . . , g
t
i , . . .), while g
t will indicate
the time t profile (gt1, . . . , g
t
n) and g the entire profile of action strategies (g1, . . . , gn). Similarly,
we set µi = (µ
0
i , µ
1
i , . . . , µ
t
i, . . .), as well as µ
t = (µt1, . . . , µ
t
n) and µ = (µ1, . . . , µn). The pair
(g, µ) therefore entirely describes the behavior of all players in the dynastic repeated game
14Throughout, we restrict attention to message-stage randomization devices that have full support. That
is, we assume that y˜ takes all values in the finite set Y with strictly positive probability. See also footnote 6
above.
15When t = 0, we assume that player 〈i, 0〉 receives the “null” message m0i = ∅.
16 Notice that we are excluding the realized value of yt from the set of histories Ht+1, and hence from the
message space of player 〈i, t〉. This is completely without loss of generality. All our results remain intact
if the set of messages available to each player 〈i, t〉 is augmented to include the realized values {yτ}tτ=0. A
formal proof of this claim can be obtained as a minor adaptation of the proof of Lemma T.2.1 in the technical
addendum.
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with private communication. Since no ambiguity will ensue, from now on we refer to this
game simply as the dynastic repeated game.
4. Sequential Equilibrium
It is reasonably clear what one would mean by the statement that a pair (g, µ) constitutes a
Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (WPBE) of the dynastic repeated game described above.
However, it is also clear that the off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs of the players may be
crucial in sustaining a given profile as a WPBE. To avoid “unreasonable” beliefs, the natural
route to take is to restrict attention further, to the set of SE of the model. This is a widely
accepted benchmark, in which beliefs are restricted so as to be consistent with a fully-fledged,
common (across players) “theory of mistakes.” We return to a discussion of this point in
Section 10 below.
The original definition of Sequential Equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982), of course, does
not readily apply to our dynastic repeated game since we have to deal with infinitely many
players.
As it turns out only a minor adaptation of the SE concept is needed to apply it to our
set-up. We spell this out in detail for the sake of completeness and because we believe it
makes the proofs of many of our results below considerably more transparent.
We begin with the observation that the beliefs of player 〈i, t〉 can in fact be boiled down to
a simpler object than one might expect at first sight, because of the structure of the dynastic
repeated game. Upon receiving message mti, in principle, we would have to define the beliefs
of player 〈i, t〉 over the entire set of possible past histories of play. However, when player 〈i, t〉
is born, an entire cohort of new players replaces the t− 1-th one, and hence the real history
leaves no trace other than the messages (mt1, . . . ,m
t
n) that have been sent to cohort t. It
follows that, without loss of generality, after player 〈i, t〉 receives message mti we can restrict
attention to his beliefs over the n−1-tuplemt−i of messages received by other players in cohort
t.17 This probability distribution, specifying the beginning-of-period beliefs of player 〈i, t〉,
will be denoted by ΦtBi (m
t
i) throughout the rest of the paper and the technical addendum.
When the dependence of this distribution on mti can be omitted from the notation without
causing any ambiguity we will write it as ΦtBi . The notation Φ
tB
i (·) will indicate the entire
array of possible probability distributions ΦtBi (m
t
i) as m
t
i ∈M ti varies.
Consider now the two classes of information sets at which player 〈i, t〉 is called upon to
play: the first defined by a pair (mti, x
t) when he has to select a mixed strategy σti , and the
second defined by a quadruple (mti, x
t, at, yt) when he has to select a probability distribution
φti over the set of messages H
t+1.
17It should be made clear that the beliefs of player 〈i, t〉 over mt−i will in fact depend on the relative
likelihoods of the actual histories of play that could generate different n − 1-tuples mt−i. What we are
asserting here is simply that once we know the player’s beliefs over mt−i, we have all that is necessary to
check that his behavior is optimal given his beliefs.
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The same argument as above now suffices to show that at the (mti, x
t) information set we
can again restrict attention to he beliefs of player 〈i, t〉 over the n− 1-tuple mt−i of messages
received by other players in cohort t. Moreover, since all players observe the same xt and this
realization is independent of what happened in the past, player 〈i, t〉 beliefs over mt−i must
be the same as when he originally received message mti.
Finally, at the information set identified by the quadruple (mti, x
t, at, yt), we can restrict
attention to the beliefs of player 〈i, t〉 over the n − 1-tuple mt+1−i of messages that the other
players in cohort t are about to send to cohort t+ 1. Just as before, since all players are re-
placed by a new cohort and time-t payoffs have already been realized, this is all that could ever
matter for the payoff to player 〈i, t〉 from this point on. This probability distribution, specify-
ing the end-of-period beliefs of player 〈i, t〉, will be denoted by ΦtEi (mti, xt, at, yt) throughout
the rest of the paper and the technical addendum. When the dependence of this distribution
on (mti, x
t, at, yt) can be omitted from the notation without causing any ambiguity we will
write it as ΦtEi . The notation Φ
tE
i (·) will indicate the entire array of possible probability
distributions ΦtEi (m
t
i, x
t, at, yt) as the quadruple (mti, x
t, at, yt) varies.
During the proofs of our main results, we will also need to refer to the (revised) end-of-
period beliefs of player 〈i, t〉 on the n−1-tuple of messages mt−i after he observes not only mti,
but also (xt, at, yt). These will be indicated by ΦtRi (m
t
i, x
t, at, yt), with the arguments omitted
when this does not cause any ambiguity. The notation ΦtRi (·) will indicate the entire array
of possible probability distributions ΦtRi (m
t
i, x
t, at, yt) as the quadruple (mti, x
t, at, yt) varies.
Throughout the rest of the paper we refer to the array Φ = {ΦtBi (·),ΦtEi (·)}t≥0,i∈I as a
system of beliefs. Following standard terminology we will also refer to a triple (g, µ,Φ), a
strategy profile and a system of beliefs, as an assessment. Also following standard terminol-
ogy, we will say that an assessment (g, µ,Φ) is consistent if the system of beliefs Φ can be
obtained (in the limit) using Bayes’ rule from a sequence of completely mixed strategies that
converges pointwise to (g, µ). Since this is completely standard, for reasons of space we do
not specify any further details here.
Definition 1. Sequential Equilibrium: An assessment (g, µ,Φ) constitutes an SE for the dy-
nastic repeated game if and only if (g, µ,Φ) is consistent, and for every i ∈ I and t ≥ 0
strategy gti is optimal for player 〈i, t〉 given beliefs ΦtBi (·), and strategy µti is optimal for the
same player given beliefs ΦtEi (·).
We denote by GD(δ, x˜, y˜) the set of SE strategy profiles, and by ED(δ, x˜, y˜) the set of
(dynastic) SE payoff profiles for t = 0 players of the dynastic repeated game when the
randomization devices x˜ and y˜ are available and the common discount factor is δ.18 As
previously, we let ED(δ) = ⋃x˜,y˜ ED(δ, x˜, y˜), with the union ranging over all possible pairs of
finite random variables x˜ and y˜.
18See footnote 9 above.
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5. A Basic Inclusion
The first question we ask is whether all SPE of the standard repeated game survive as SE of
the dynastic repeated game. The answer is affirmative.
We pursue this question separately from our limiting (as δ → 1) Folk Theorems for the
dynastic repeated game presented below for several distinct reasons.
First of all Theorem 1 below does not require any assumptions on the stage game. Second,
it asserts that the SPE of the standard repeated game survive as SE of the dynastic repeated
game regardless of the discount factor δ. Third, Theorem 1 asserts that the actual strategies
that form an SPE in the standard game will be (the action component of) some SE of the
dynastic repeated game, thus going beyond any statement concerning equilibrium payoffs.
Theorem 1 also fulfils a useful expository function. Running through an intuitive outline
of its proof helps an initial acquaintance with some of the mechanics of the SE of the dynastic
repeated game. Before going any further, we proceed with a definition and a formal statement
of the result.
Definition 2. Truthful Message Strategies: A communication strategy µti for player 〈i, t〉 in
the dynastic repeated game is said to be truthful if and only if µti(m
t
i, x
t, at, yt) = (mti, x
t, at)
for all mti, x
t, at and yt.19 The profile µ is called truthful if all its components µti are truthful.
Theorem 1. Basic Inclusion: Fix a δ, an x˜ and any profile g∗ ∈ GS(δ, x˜). Then for every
finite random variable y˜ there exists a profile µ∗ of truthful message strategies such that
(g∗, µ∗) ∈ GD(δ, x˜, y˜).
It follows that ES(δ) ⊆ ED(δ) for every δ ∈ (0, 1). In other words, the set of SE payoffs for
the dynastic repeated game contains the set of SPE payoffs of the standard repeated game.
The argument we use to prove Theorem 1 in the technical addendum (Sections T.3 and
T.4) is not hard to outline. Begin with an action-stage strategy profile g∗ ∈ GS(δ). Now
consider a message-stage strategy profile µ∗ that is “truthful” in the sense of Definition 2.
Now suppose that each player 〈i, t〉, upon receiving any message mti, on or off the equilib-
rium path, believes that all other time-t players have received exactly the same message as
he has. Then it is not hard to see that since the action-stage strategy profile g∗ is an SPE of
the standard repeated game, it will not be profitable for any player 〈i, t〉 to deviate from the
prescriptions of either gt∗i or µ
t∗
i in the dynastic repeated game.
So, why should player 〈i, t〉 hold such beliefs in an SE? Suppose for instance that player
〈i, t〉 receives a message that specifies a history of play that is “far away” from the equilibrium
path, say a node that requires 1, 000 past action-stage deviations to be reached. Of course
19 Notice that we are defining as truthful a message strategy that ignores the value of yt. This is consistent
with the fact that we are excluding the realizations of y˜t from the set of possible messages. As we remarked
before, all our results would be unaffected if these were included in the players’ message spaces. See also
footnote 16 above.
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he needs to weigh the possibility that he really is at such node against, for instance, the
possibility that his immediate predecessor has deviated from µt−1∗i and has sent him the
message he observes, but no action-stage deviation has ever occurred.
In an SE, these relative likelihood considerations are embodied in the sequence of com-
pletely mixed strategies that support the beliefs, in the limit, via Bayes’ rule. The core of
the argument behind Theorem 1 is to show that the sequence of completely mixed strategies
converging to the equilibrium strategies can be constructed in such a way that the likelihood
of a single past deviation from equilibrium at the message stage compared to the likelihood
of all players in every previous cohort deviating at the action stage shrinks to zero in the
limit. Of course, there is more than one way to achieve this. Our formal argument in the
technical addendum relies on “trembles” defining the completely mixed strategies with the
following structure. The probability of deviating at the message stage stays constant (at ε
→ 0) through time. On the other hand, the order of the infinitesimal of the probability of n
deviations at the action stage decreases exponentially through time.20 In this way it is possi-
ble to ensure that the probability that all players in every cohort deviate at the action stage
shrinks to zero slower than does the probability of a single-player deviation at the message
stage. Hence, the beliefs we have described above are consistent, and Theorem 1 follows.
6. Three Dynasties or More
In this Section we present our first result asserting that the set of payoffs that are possible
in a SE of the dynastic game is larger than the set of SPE payoffs of the standard repeated
game, in the limit as δ approaches 1. The increase is in fact quite dramatic.
We postpone any further discussion and proceed with a formal statement of our next
result and a couple of remarks on its scope. The proof of Theorem 2 begins in Appendix A,
and continues in the technical addendum to the paper (Sections T.5 through T.8).
Theorem 2. Dynastic Folk Theorem: Three Dynasties or More: Let any stage gameG with
three or more players be given. Assume thatG is such that we can find two pure action profiles
a∗ and a′ in A with
ui(a
∗) > ui(a′) > ui(a∗i , a
′
−i) ∀ i ∈ I (5)
Then for every v ∈ intV there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ > δ implies v ∈ ED(δ).
Remark 2. Boundary Points: The statement of Theorem 2 is framed in terms of interior
payoff vectors v ∈ intV mostly to facilitate the comparison with the statement of Theorem 3
below dealing with the case of four dynasties or more. However, from the proof of Theorem
2 it is immediately apparent that a stronger statement is in fact true. The condition that
20In particular, in equation T.3.3 in the proof of Theorem 1 below, we set the total probability of deviations
from equilibrium at the action stage from the part of player 〈i, t〉 to be equal to ε 1(n+1)2t+1 .
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v ∈ intV can be replaced with the weaker requirement that v is any weighted average of payoff
vectors that are feasible in G, which gives strictly positive weight to u(a∗). Clearly, depending
on the position of u(a∗) within V this may include vectors that are on the boundary of V .
Remark 3. Generalized Prisoners’ Dilemma: Whenever the stage game G is a version of
the n-player Prisoners Dilemma (with n ≥ 3), Theorem 2 guarantees that all interior feasible
payoff vectors can be sustained as an SE of the dynastic repeated game, provided that δ is
near 1.
To see this, observe that if we label Ci the “cooperate” action and Di the “defect” action
for player i, in an n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma we obviously have that ui(C) > ui(D) >
ui(Ci, D−i) for every i ∈ I. Hence identifying a∗ and a′ of the statement of Theorem 2 with
the profiles C and D respectively, immediately yields the result.
Moreover, notice that Theorem 2 applies equally immediately to any stage game that is
“locally” like an n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma. In other words, the result applies to any stage
game G in which we can identify any pair of profiles C and D as above, regardless of how
many other actions may be available to any player, and of which payoff vectors they may
yield.
Before outlining the argument behind Theorem 2, it is necessary to clear-up a preliminary
issue that concerns both the proof of Theorem 2 and the proof of Theorem 3 below.
For simplicity, in both cases, we work with message spaces that are smaller than the
applicable set of finite histories H t. As Lemma T.2.1 demonstrates, enlarging message spaces
from the ones we use in these two proofs back to H t will not shrink the set of SE payoffs. This
is because we can “replicate” any SE of the dynastic repeated game with restricted message
spaces as an SE of the dynastic repeated game with larger message spaces by mapping each
message in the smaller set to a finite set of messages in the larger message space. A choice
of message in the smaller message space corresponds to a (uniform) randomization over the
entire corresponding set in the larger message space. A player receiving one of the randomized
messages in the larger message space acts just like the corresponding player who receives the
corresponding message in the smaller message set. It is then straightforward to check that the
new strategies constitute an SE of the dynastic repeated game with larger message spaces,
provided of course that we started off with an SE of the dynastic game with restricted message
spaces in the first place.
In the SE that we construct to prove Theorems 2 and 3, player 〈i, t − 1〉 may want to
communicate to player 〈i, t〉 that dynasty i is being punished for having deviated, but will be
unable to do so in an effective way. Given that in both cases we work with message spaces
that are smaller than H t, one may be tempted to conclude that this is due to the fact that
player 〈i, t − 1〉 “lacks the message” to communicate effectively to his successor 〈i, t〉 that
he should respond in an appropriate way. This is misleading. When the message spaces
coincide with H t, it clearly cannot be that this inability to communicate is due to a shortage
of possible messages. Given the argument (the proof of Lemma T.2.1) that we sketch out
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above the correct interpretation is that in equilibrium there is no message (in H t) that player
〈i, t〉 might possibly interpret in the way that 〈i, t− 1〉 would like.21
We are now ready for an actual outline of the proof of Theorem 2. The intuition can be
divided into two parts. First, we will argue that if δ is close to one, it is possible to sustain
the payoff vector u(a∗) as an SE of the dynastic repeated game using u(a′) as “punishment”
payoffs. Notice that u(a∗) could well already be below the minmax payoff for one or more
players. We call this the “local” part of the argument. Second, we will argue that via a judi-
cious use of the action-stage randomization device it is possible to go from the local argument
to a “global” one and sustain every feasible payoff vector as required by the statement of the
theorem.
Our construction relies on every player 〈i, t〉 having a message space with three elements.
So, set M ti = {m∗,mA,mB} for every i and t. Notice also that the assumptions made in
Theorem 2 obviously guarantee that a∗i 6= a′i for every i ∈ I.
We begin with the local part of the argument. So, suppose that δ is close to one and that
we want to implement the payoff v = u(a∗) as an SE of the dynastic repeated game. The
strategy of every player 〈i, 0〉 at the action stage is to play a∗i . The strategy of each player
〈i, t〉 with t ≥ 1 at the action stage is to play a∗i after receiving message m∗ and to play action
a′i after receiving message m
A or message mB. If no player deviates from the prescriptions
of his equilibrium strategy at the action and message stages, then play follows a path that
involves the message profile (m∗, . . . ,m∗) and the action profile a∗ in every period. Moreover,
even after deviations, if the message profile ever returns to being equal to (m∗, . . . ,m∗), then
the path of play returns to being as above. We call this the equilibrium phase.
Play starts in the equilibrium phase. Suppose now that some player deviates to playing
action a′i (deviations by two or more players are ignored). This triggers what we call the
temporary punishment phase. During the temporary punishment phase all players 〈i ∈ I, t〉
condition the messages they send to their successors on the realization yt of the message-
stage randomization device. The message-stage randomization device takes value y(1) with
probability γ(δ) and value y(0) with probability 1− γ(δ). If yt = y(1) then all players send
message m∗, and hence play returns to the equilibrium phase. If on the other hand yt = y(0)
then all players send messagemA, and play remains in the temporary punishment phase. That
is all players now play a′i, and continue to coordinate their messages as we just described.
Play remains in the temporary punishment phase until the realization of the message-stage
randomization device is y(1), at which point play goes back to the equilibrium phase.
Any other deviation, taking place in either the equilibrium phase or in the temporary
punishment phase, triggers the permanent punishment phase. Suppose that any player 〈i, t〉
deviates to playing any action ai different from both a
∗
i and a
′
i during the equilibrium phase
or that he deviates from playing a′i during the temporary punishment phase (deviations by
21At this point it is legitimate of course to wonder whether the concept of “neologism-proof” equilibrium
(Farrell 1993) has any impact on what we are saying here. While neologism-proofness in its current form
does not apply to our model, we return to this point at some length in Section 10 below.
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Figure 1: Three Phases of Play
two or more players are again ignored). Then all players 〈i ∈ I, t〉 send message mB to their
successors. From this point on the prescriptions of the equilibrium strategies are that all
subsequent players should send message mB, and that they should play action a′i. Figure 1
is a schematic depiction of the three phases of play we have outlined.
To check that the strategies we have described constitute an SE of the dynastic repeated
game, the players’ beliefs need to be specified. All players in the t = 0 cohort of course have
correct beliefs. All other players, after receiving message m∗ believe that all other players
have also received message m∗ with probability one. Similarly, after receiving message mA all
time-t ≥ 1 players believe that all other players have received message mA with probability
one. So, when play is either in the equilibrium phase all players believe that this is indeed
the case, and the same is true for the temporary punishment phase. Not surprisingly, it is
possible to sustain these beliefs via a sequence of completely mixed strategies using Bayes’
rule, as required for an SE.
After receiving message mB, all time-t ≥ 1 players have non-degenerate beliefs as follows.
With probability β(δ) they believe that play is in the equilibrium phase so that all other
players have in fact received message m∗. With probability 1 − β(δ) they believe that play
is in the permanent punishment phase, so that all other players have received message mB.
So, when play is in the permanent punishment phase the players’ beliefs assign positive
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probability to something that is in fact not taking place. Why is this possible in an SE? The
intuition is not hard to outline. Upon receiving message mB, player 〈i, t〉 needs to compare
two possibilities: am I receiving message mB because some action-deviations have occurred
that triggered the permanent punishment path, or is it simply the case that play is in the
equilibrium phase and my immediate predecessor has sent message mB when he should have
sent m∗? Clearly the answer depends on the probability of a message-deviation relative to the
probability of action-deviations that could have triggered the permanent punishment phase.
By a careful use of infinitesimals of different orders in the sequence of completely mixed
strategies, it is then possible to sustain the beliefs we have described via Bayes’ rule.
Given the beliefs we have specified, we can now argue that no player has an incentive do
deviate, either at the action or at the message stage, from the strategies we have described.
We distinguish again between the three phases of play identified above.
If play is in the equilibrium phase it is not hard to see that no player 〈i, t〉 has an incentive
to deviate. If he adheres to the equilibrium strategy, player 〈i, t〉 gets a payoff of ui(a∗).
Since δ is close to 1, and player 〈i, t〉 takes the strategies of all other players (including his
successors) as given, any deviation may produce an instantaneous gain, but will decrease the
overall payoff of player 〈i, t〉.
If play is in the temporary punishment phase and player 〈i, t〉 does not deviate then
play will eventually go back to the equilibrium phase. Hence, since δ is close to one, the
dynastic payoff to player 〈i, t〉 in this case is close to (but below) ui(a∗). Therefore, the same
argument as for the equilibrium phase applies to show that he will not want to deviate during
the temporary punishment phase.
Suppose now that play is in the permanent punishment phase. Begin with the action
stage. Recall that at this point, that is after receiving message mB, player 〈i, t〉 has the
non-degenerate beliefs we described above giving positive probability to both the event that
play is the equilibrium phase and to the event that play is in the permanent punishment
phase.
If play were in the equilibrium phase, since δ is close to one, for an appropriate choice of
γ(δ), player 〈i, t〉 would prefer taking action a∗i to taking action a′i, and would prefer the latter
to taking any other action ai different from both a
∗
i and a
′
i. This is because his continuation
payoff (from the beginning of period t + 1 onwards) is higher in the equilibrium phase than
in the temporary punishment phase, and lowest in the permanent punishment phase. Notice
that if γ(δ) were too close to one, then the continuation payoff in the equilibrium phase and
in the temporary punishment phase could be so close as to reverse (via an instantaneous gain
in period t from playing a′i) the preference of player 〈i, t〉 between a∗i and a′i. On the other
hand if γ(δ) were too low, then the continuation payoff in the temporary punishment phase
and in the permanent punishment phase could be so close as to reverse (via an instantaneous
gain in period t from playing some action ai different from both a
∗
i and a
′
i) the preference of
player 〈i, t〉 between a′i and some other action ai.
If play were in the permanent punishment phase then clearly player 〈i, t〉 would prefer
taking action a′i to taking action a
∗
i . This is simply because by assumption ui(a
′) > ui(a∗i , a
′
−i).
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Of course, it is possible that some other action(s) ai would be preferable to a
′
i.
So, in one of two cases that player 〈i, t〉 entertains with positive probability after receiving
messagemB action a∗i is preferable to action a
′
i which in turn is preferable to any other action,
while in the other case action a′i is preferable to a
∗
i , but some other action(s) may be preferable
to both. What is critical here is that there is no action (a∗i or any other one) that is preferable
to a′i with probability one. As it turns out, this is sufficient to show that for some value of
β(δ) action a′i is in fact optimal for player 〈i, t〉. Therefore he does not want to deviate
from the equilibrium strategy we have described at the action stage during the permanent
punishment phase.
Finally, consider the choice of player 〈i, t〉 at the message stage when play is in the
permanent punishment phase. Notice that after receiving message mB, player 〈i, t〉 will
discover that play is in the permanent punishment phase during the action stage of period t.
This is so even if some other time-t player were to deviate from his prescribed action in period
t. The reason is our assumption that n ≥ 3. The fact that n − 2 or more players 〈j, t〉 play
a′j is sufficient to tell player 〈i, t〉 that play is in fact in the permanent punishment phase.22
Clearly, it is at this point that player 〈i, t〉 would like to “communicate effectively” to player
〈i, t + 1〉 that play is in the permanent punishment phase but is unable to do so, as in our
discussion above concerning message spaces. In fact a′i could be very far from being a best
response from a′−i in the stage game.
23 Yet, given the strategies of all other players, inducing
all his successors to play a myopic best-response to a′−i is simply not an option that is open
to player 〈i, t〉 even after he discovers that play is in the permanent punishment phase. Given
that, by assumption, ui(a
′) > ui(a∗i , a
′
−i) the best that player 〈i, t〉 can do at this point is to
send message mB as required by his equilibrium strategy.
The argument we have just outlined suffices to show that the payoff vector u(a∗) can be
sustained as an SE of the dynastic repeated game. We now argue that this fact can be used
as a “local anchor” for our global argument that shows that any interior payoff vector can
be sustained as an SE. Fix any v∗ ∈ intV to be sustained in equilibrium. Since v∗ is interior
it is obvious that it can be expressed as v∗ = qu(a∗) + (1 − q)v for some q ∈ (0, 1) and
some v ∈ V .24 The construction we put forward uses the payoffs v′ = qu(a′) + (1 − q)v as
“punishments.” Clearly, v∗i > v
′
i for every i ∈ I.
We use the action stage randomization device to combine the local part of the argument
with the global one. The possible realizations of x˜t are (x(1), . . . , x(||A||)), with the probability
22If we had n = 2 players the following problem would arise with our construction. Suppose that each player
were to monitor the action of the other to decide whether play is in the equilibrium phase or in the permanent
punishment phase. Then, after receiving mB , say for instance player 〈1, 1〉, could find it advantageous to play
a∗1 instead of a
′
1. This is because this deviation, together with player 〈1, 1〉 sending message m∗, would put
the path of play back in the equilibrium phase with probability one.
23Note that this would necessarily be the case if, for instance, ui(a∗) were below i’s minmax payoff in the
stage game.
24In fact, depending on the position of u(a∗) within V , we may be able to express some v∗ vectors that are
on the boundary of V in this way as well. See Remark 2 above.
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that x˜t = x(1) equal to q.25 Whenever the realization of x˜t is x(1), the action and message
strategies of all players are just as we described above. The action strategies of all players
do not depend on the message received whenever xt 6= x(1). Moreover, the probability law
governing x˜t and the action strategies of all players for the case xt 6= x(1) are such that the
per-period expected payoff (conditional on xt 6= x(1)) is vi for every i ∈ I. Whenever xt 6=
x(1), any deviation from the prescription of the equilibrium strategies triggers the permanent
punishment phase, as described above. It is not hard to verify that the latter is enough to
keep all players from deviating at any point.
One point that is worth emphasizing here is that, in contrast to what happens in the local
argument above, if play is in the permanent punishment phase, so that player 〈i, t〉 receives
message mB, and xt 6= x(1), then player 〈i, t〉 does not discover from at whether play is in
the equilibrium phase or in the permanent punishment phase. Both at the beginning and at
the end of period t he believes with probability β(δ) that play in is the equilibrium phase,
and with probability 1 − β(δ) that play is in the permanent punishment phase. However,
he does know that any deviation to an action different from the prescribed one will trigger
the permanent punishment phase for sure. Given that δ is close to one, he is then better-off
not deviating. This ensures that the first of his successors who observes a realization of the
action randomization device equal to x(1) will play action a′i, which is in fact optimal given
the beliefs that player 〈i, t〉 has.
7. Four Dynasties or More
We now turn to the case in which the stage game G has four or more players. We need
to introduce some further notation to work towards our next main result. We begin by
constructing what we will refer to as the restricted correlated minmax.
Given a stage game G = (A, u, I), we indicate by A˜ ⊆ A a typical set of pure action profiles
with a product structure. In other words, we require that there exist an array (A˜1, . . . , A˜n)
with A˜ = ×i∈IA˜i. Given a product set A˜, we let V (A˜) be the convex hull of the set of payoff
vectors that can be achieved in G using pure action profiles in A˜. As before, intV (A˜) will
denote the (relative) interior of V (A˜).
Definition 3. Restricted Correlated Minmax: Let a product set A˜ ⊆ A be given. Now let
ωi(A˜) = min
z−i∈∆(A˜−i)
max
ai∈A˜i
∑
a−i∈A˜−i
z−i(a−i) ui(ai, a−i) (6)
where z−i is any probability distribution over the finite set A˜−i (not necessarily the product
of independent marginals), and z−i(a−i) denotes the probability that z−i assign to the profile
a−i.
We then say that ωi(A˜) is the restricted (to A˜) correlated minmax for i in G.
25 Throughout the paper, we adopt the standard notational convention by which ||·|| denotes the cardinality
of a set.
A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 19
Roughly speaking, the restricted (to A˜) correlated minmax payoff for i is the best payoff
that i can achieve when he is restricted to choosing an element of A˜i, while all other players
are choosing a profile of correlated mixed strategies with support at most A˜−i.26
We are now ready to state our next result. The proof of Theorem 3 begins in Appendix
B, and continues in the technical addendum to the paper (Sections T.9 through T.12).
Theorem 3. Dynastic Folk Theorem: Four Dynasties or More: Let a stage game G with
four or more players be given. Assume that G is such that we can find a product set A˜
⊆ A and an array of n + 1 payoffs vectors vˆ, v1, . . . , vn for which the following conditions
hold.
(i) For every i ∈ I, the set A˜i contains at least two elements.
(ii) vˆ ∈ intV (A˜), and vi ∈ V (A˜) for every i ∈ I.
(iii) ωi(A˜) < v
i
i < v
j
i and v
i
i < vˆi for every i ∈ I and every j 6= i.
Then for every v ∈ intV there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ > δ implies v ∈ ED(δ).
Before any discussion of the argument behind Theorem 3 we proceed with a remark
concerning its scope.
Remark 4. Theorem 3 and the “Standard” Folk Theorem: Suppose that the stage game G
has four or more players. Suppose further that G is such that the standard Folk Theorem
(Fudenberg and Maskin 1986, Theorems 2 and 5) guarantees that, as δ approaches one,
the standard repeated game has at least one SPE payoff vector that strictly dominates the
standard minmax.27 Then Theorem 3 guarantees that, as δ approaches one, all (interior)
feasible payoff vectors can be sustained as an SE of the dynastic repeated game.
To see this, assume that V contains a payoff vector that yields all players more than their
(standard) minmax vi and that V has full dimension. Next, observe that (see footnote 26) if
we set A˜ = A we know that ωi(A) ≤ vi for every i. Therefore, using the full-dimensionality
26Recall that the “standard minmax” for player i is defined as vi = minσ−i∈Πj 6=i∆(Aj) maxai∈Ai ui(ai, σ−i),
where Πj 6=i∆(Aj) is the set of (independent) mixed strategy profiles for −i.
It is then straightforward to see that the restricted correlated minmax of Definition 3 is a “stronger” concept
than the standard minmax in the following sense. Given any G = (A, u, I), if we let the standard minmax
payoff for i be denoted by vi we obviously have that ωi(A) ≤ vi for every i ∈ I.
Of course, the relationship between the restricted correlated minmax and the standard minmax also depends
on the “size” of product set A˜ relative to A. In particular, let two product sets A˜ and A˜′ be given. It is
then straightforward to check that if A˜−i ⊆ A˜′−i and A˜′i ⊆ A˜i then ωi(A˜′) ≤ ωi(A˜). Therefore, in general,
depending on A˜, the value of ωi(A˜) could be below, equal or above vi.
27Notice that there is an open set of stage games for which the standard Folk Theorem does not imply
any multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs. To see this, consider, for instance, a game G in which every player
i has a strictly dominant strategy a∗i and such that the standard minmax value is ui(a
∗) for every i ∈ I.
Clearly, these conditions can be satisfied even when u(a∗) is not (weakly) Pareto-dominated by any other
payoff vector in V . Moreover, if these conditions are satisfied, they are also satisfied for an entire open set of
games around G.
A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 20
of V , it is straightforward to see that setting A˜ = A all the hypotheses required by Theorem
3 are in fact satisfied.
It is important to emphasize at this point that Theorem 3 implies that all (interior) payoff
vectors may be sustained as SE of the dynastic repeated game as δ goes to one, even when the
standard Folk Theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) does not imply any multiplicity of
payoffs. This is because of the two critical features that distinguish the Restricted Correlated
Minmax of Definition 3 from the standard minmax: the correlation that it allows, and the
restriction to the product set A˜.
To appreciate the role of correlation, consider a stage game G with four or more players,
each with at least two pure actions, and with V of full dimension. Recall that (see footnote
26) we know that it is possible that ωi(A) < vi. If the latter condition is satisfied for all
players, it is clearly possible that no payoff vector in V gives all players more than vi, but at
the same time all the hypotheses of Theorem 3 are in fact satisfied.28
To see the role of the restriction to A˜, notice that, as in Theorem 2, the necessary con-
ditions listed in the statement of Theorem 3 are “local.” In other words (see footnote 26),
it is clearly possible that no payoff vector in V gives all players more than vi, but that by
excluding one or more pure strategies for one or more players we obtain a product set A˜ for
which conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 3 are in fact satisfied.
Similarly to the case of Theorem 2, the construction we use to prove Theorem 3 relies on
message spaces that are smaller than the appropriate set of finite histories H t. Also similarly
to Theorem 2, it is convenient to divide the argument behind Theorem 3 into a local one and
a global one. As before, we begin with the local part of the argument.
Consider a product set A˜ satisfying the hypotheses of Theorem 3. Let V (A˜) be the convex
hull of payoff vectors generated with action profiles in A˜. For simplicity, assume that the
payoff vectors v1, . . . , vn can all be obtained from pure profiles of actions in A˜. Also for
simplicity, assume that each of the payoffs ωi(A˜) can be obtained from some (pure) profile
of actions in A˜.29 The local part of the argument behind Theorem 3 shows that, for δ close
enough to one the payoff vector vˆ ∈ V (A˜) of the statement of the Theorem can be sustained
as an SE of the dynastic repeated game.
28The example we provided in footnote 27 may prompt the following question. Is it the case that whenever
the standard Folk Theorem does not yield any payoff multiplicity it must necessarily be the case that every
player has a dominant strategy in G? The answer is no. This observation is relevant to the role of correlation
we are discussing here. If all players have a dominant strategy in G, then the correlated minmax ωi(A) is in
fact the same as the standard minmax vi for every i. Clearly, what we are saying here has real content only
when G is such that the standard Folk Theorem does not yield any payoff multiplicity and it is not the case
that all players have a dominant strategy.
29Clearly, when ωi(A˜) is achieved via a pure action profile in A˜ the restricted correlated minmax is the
same as the standard minmax restricted to A˜. It is still obviously the case that if A˜ is a strict subset of A,
then it is possible that ωi(A˜) would be below the standard (unrestricted) minmax vi.
A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 21
The equilibrium path generated by the strategies we construct consists of n+ 1 phases.30
We call the first one the standard equilibrium phase, the second one the diversionary-1 equi-
librium phase, through to the diversionary-n equilibrium phase.
If all players 〈i ∈ I, t〉 receive message m∗ then play is in the standard equilibrium phase.
For simplicity again we proceed with our outline of the construction assuming that the equi-
librium prescribes that the players 〈i ∈ I, t〉 play a pure action profile during the standard
equilibrium phase, denoted by a′. The associated payoff vector is v′.
If all players j 6= i in the t-th cohort receive message m˘i, and player 〈i, t〉 receives any
message mi,τ in a finite setM(i, t) = {mi,1, . . . ,mi,T} ⊂M ti , then play is in the diversionary-i
phase.31 Let ai be the vector of actions (pure, for simplicity) for which i receives his restricted
correlated minmax payoff ωi(A˜). During the diversionary-i equilibrium phase player 〈i, t〉
plays action aii. For all players j 6= i, let a˘ij be any action in A˜j that is not equal to aij.
Such action can always be found since, by assumption, each A˜j contains at least two actions.
During the diversionary-i equilibrium phase, any player j 6= i plays action a˘ij. The (per-
period) payoff vector associated with the diversionary-i equilibrium phase is denoted by u˘i.
If in period t play is in any of the equilibrium phases we have just described, and no
deviation occurs at the action stage, at the end of period t all players use the realization yt
of the message-stage randomization device to select the message to send to their successors.
The possible realizations of y˜t are (y(0), y(1), . . . , y(n)). The probability that yt = y(0) is
1 − η and the probability that yt = y(i) is η/n for every i ∈ I. Consider now the end of
any period t in any equilibrium phase, and assume that no deviation has occurred. If yt =
y(0) then all players 〈i ∈ I, t〉 send message m∗ to their successors, so play in period t+ 1 is
in the standard equilibrium phase. If yt = y(i), then all players j 6= i send message m˘i to
their successors and player 〈i, t〉 sends a (randomly selected) message mi,τ ∈M(i, t) to player
〈i, t+ 1〉. So, in this case in period t+ 1 play is in the diversionary-i equilibrium phase.
The profiles to be played in each diversionary-i equilibrium phase may of course be entirely
determined by the (need to differ from the) correlated minmax action profiles, so we have
no degrees of freedom there. However, we are free to choose the profile a′ in constructing
the standard equilibrium phase. Recall that we take a′ to be pure solely for expositional
simplicity. Using the action-stage randomization device, clearly we could select correlated
actions for the standard equilibrium phase that yield any payoff vector v′ in V (A˜). Since vˆ
30The formal proof of Theorem 3 (see Appendix B and the technical addendum to the paper) actually
treats period 0 differently from all other periods. In period 0, in equilibrium, the players use the action-stage
randomization device to play actions that yield exactly vˆ. This payoff vector is achieved in expected terms
(across different equilibrium phases) on the equilibrium path by the construction we outline here.
31In the formal proof of Theorem 3, presented in Appendix B and the technical addendum, the set of
messages M(i, t) actually does depend on the time index t because not all messages are available for the first
T periods of play. This is so in order to avoid any message space M ti having a cardinality that exceeds that
of Ht.
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∈ intV (A˜) we can be sure that for some v′ ∈ V (A˜) and some η ∈ (0, 1)
vˆ = (1− η)v′ + η
n
n∑
i=1
u˘i (7)
So that (modulo our expositional assumption that v′ = u(a′)) when play is in any equilibrium
phase the expected (across all possible realizations of y˜t) continuation payoff to any player
〈i, t〉 from the beginning of period t+ 1 onward is vˆi.
The strategies we construct also define (off the equilibrium path) n punishment phases,
one for each i ∈ I and n terminal phases, again one for each dynasty i. In the punishment-i
phase, in every period player i receives his restricted correlated minmax payoff ωi(a˜) payoff,
and the phase lasts T periods. In the terminal-i phase in every period the players receive
the vector of payoffs vi. The transition between any of the equilibrium phases and any of
the punishment or terminal phases is akin to the benchmark construction in Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986). In other words, a deviation by dynasty i during any of the equilibrium, any
of the punishment phases or any of the terminal phases triggers the start (or re-start) of the
punishment-i phase (deviations by two players or more are ignored). The terminal-i phase
begins after play has been, without subsequent deviations, in the punishment-i phase for T
periods. For an appropriately chosen (large) T , as δ approaches 1, with one critical exception,
the inequalities in (iii) of the statement of Theorem 3 are used in much the same way as in
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) to guarantee that no player deviates from the prescriptions of
the equilibrium strategies.
In Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), during the punishment-i phase player i plays a myopic
best response to the actions of other players. Critically, this is not the case here. During
the punishment-i phase dynasty i plays a best response to the (correlated) strategy of others
restricted to the set of pure actions in A˜i. Clearly this could be very far away (in per-period
payoff terms) from an unconstrained best reply chosen at will within Ai. To understand how
this can happen in an SE we need to specify what message profiles mark the beginning of the
punishment-i phase and what the players’ beliefs are.
Suppose that player 〈i, t〉 deviates from the prescriptions of the equilibrium strategy and
triggers the start of the punishment-i phase as of the beginning of period t + 1. Then all
players 〈j ∈ I, t〉 send message mi,T to their successors. These messages are interpreted as
telling all players 〈j 6= i, t+ 1〉 that the punishment-i phase has begun, and that there are T
periods remaining. We return to the beliefs of player 〈i, t+1〉 shortly. In the following period
of the punishment-i phase all players 〈j ∈ I, t+ 1〉 send message mi,T−1, then mi,T−2 and so
on, so that the the index τ in a message mi,τ is effectively interpreted (by dynasties j 6= i) as
a “punishment clock,” counting down how many periods remain in the punishment-i phase.
The players’ beliefs in the SE we construct are “correct” in all phases of play except for the
beliefs of player 〈i, t〉 whenever play is in the punishment-i phase at time t. Upon receiving
any message mi,τ ∈ M(i, t), player 〈i, t〉 believes that play is in the punishment-i phase with
probability zero. Instead he believes that play is in the i-diversionary equilibrium phase with
A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 23
probability one. This is possible in an SE because player 〈i, t〉 receives the same message in
both cases and play is in the diversionary-i phase with positive probability on the equilibrium
path, while the punishment-i phase is entirely off the equilibrium path. It follows easily that
player 〈i, t〉 does not want to deviate from the equilibrium strategies we have described when
play is in the punishment-i phase.
Notice moreover that if at time t play is in the punishment-i phase, after the profile at is
observed, player 〈i, t〉 will discover that play is in fact in the punishment-i phase, contrary to
his beginning-of-period beliefs, even if a new deviation occurs at the action stage of period
t. This is because, by construction, all players 〈j 6= i, t〉 play an action (namely a˘ij) in the
diversionary-i equilibrium phase that is different from what they play in the punishment-i
phase (namely aij). This, coupled with the assumption assumption that n ≥ 4 will ensure
that 〈i, t〉 will discover the truth, and the identity of any deviator.32
Therefore any player 〈i, t〉 who knows that in period t+1 play will be in the punishment-i
phase would like would like to “communicate effectively” to player 〈i, t + 1〉 that play is in
the punishment-i phase but is unable to do so, as in our discussion above concerning message
spaces. After receiving mi,τ and discovering that play is in the punishment-i phase, sending
any message to player 〈i, t + 1〉 that is not mi,τ−1 may cause him, or some of his successors,
to deviate and hence to re-start the punishment-i phase.33 Sending mi,τ−1 will cause player
〈i, t + 1〉 and his successors to play a best response among those that can be induced by
any available message. This is because aii is in fact a best response to the the correlated
minmax of the other players within the set A˜i. Therefore, given the inequalities in (iii) of the
statement of Theorem 3, given that T is sufficiently large, and that δ is close enough to one,
no profitable deviation is available to player 〈i, t〉.
The argument we have just outlined suffices to show that the payoff vector vˆ of the
statement of the theorem can be sustained as an SE of the dynastic repeated game. Similarly
to Theorem 2, we now argue that this fact can be used as a “local anchor” for an argument
that shows that any interior payoff vector can be sustained as an SE.
Fix any v∗ ∈ intV to be sustained in equilibrium. Since v∗ is interior it is obvious that it
can be expressed as v∗ = qvˆ + (1 − q)z for some q ∈ (0, 1) and some z ∈ V . The “global”
argument then consists of using the action-stage randomization device so that in each period
with probability q play proceeds as in the construction above, while with probability 1 − q
the (expected) payoff vector is z. The latter is achieved with action-stage strategies that do
not depend on the messages received. A deviation by i from the (correlated) actions needed
32Clearly, if 〈i, t〉 could not be guaranteed to discover that play is in the punishment-i phase, or the identity
of any deviator at time t, then we could not construct strategies that guarantee that if 〈j 6= i, t〉 deviates
during the punishment-i phase then play switches to the punishment-j phase, as required.
33It is worth emphasizing here that checking sequential rationality at the message stage is somewhat more
involved than may appear from our intuitive outline of the argument given here. This is because a deviation
at the message stage may trigger multiple deviations; that is deviations at the action and/or message stage
by more than one successor of any given player. The core of the argument dealing with this case is Lemma
T.10.4.
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to implement z triggers the punishment-i phase. With one proviso to be discussed shortly,
it is not hard to then verify that this is sufficient to keep all players from deviating at any
point, and hence that v∗ can be sustained as an SE payoff vector of the dynastic repeated
game for δ sufficiently close to one.
The difficulty with the global argument we have outlined that needs some attention is easy
to point out. The periods in which the action-stage randomization device tells the players to
implement the payoff vector z cannot be counted as real punishment periods. They in fact
stochastically interlace all phases of play, including any punishment-i phase. However, the
length of effective punishment T has to be sufficiently large to deter deviations. The solution
we adopt is to ensure that the punishment clock does not decrease in any period in which
(with probability 1− q) the payoff vector z is implemented at the action stage. In effect, this
makes the length of any punishment-i phase stochastic, governed by a punishment clock that
counts down only with probability q in every period.
8. Inter-Generational (Dis)Agreement
Some of the SE of the dynastic repeated game we have identified in Theorems 2 and 3 above
clearly do not correspond in any meaningful sense to any SPE of the standard repeated game.
This is obvious if we consider an SE of the dynastic repeated game in which one or more
players receive a payoff below their standard minmax value.
An obvious question to raise at this point is then the following. What is it that makes
these SE viable? To put it another way, can we identify any properties of an SE of the
dynastic repeated game which ensure that it must correspond in a meaningful sense to an
SPE of the standard repeated game? The answer is yes, and this is what this section of the
paper is devoted to.
The critical properties of an SE that we identify concern the players’ beliefs. These
properties characterize entirely the set of SE yielding payoffs outside the set of SPE of the
standard repeated game. Therefore, if one wanted to attempt to “refine away” the equilibria
yielding payoffs outside the set of SPE, our results in this section pin down precisely which
belief systems the proposed refinement would have to rule out.
The first of the properties we identify is that a player’s (revised) beliefs at the end of
the period over the messages received by other players at the beginning of the period should
be the same as at the beginning of the period. This is equation (8) below. The second is
that the end-of-period beliefs of a player (over messages sent by his opponents) should be
the same as the beginning-of-period beliefs of his successor (over messages received by his
opponents). This is equation (9) below. In fact we will be able to show that if this property
holds for all players (and all information sets) in an SE of the dynastic repeated game, then
this SE must be payoff-equivalent to some SPE of the standard repeated game.34 For want of
34As will be clear from the proof of Theorem 4 we are able to show that there is an, appropriately defined,
strategic equivalence between such SE of the dynastic repeated game and the SPE of the standard repeated
game.
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a better term, when an SE of the dynastic repeated game has the two properties (of beliefs)
that we just described informally, we will say that it displays Inter-Generational Agreement.
Definition 4. Inter-Generational Agreement: Let an SE triple (g, µ,Φ) of the dynastic re-
peated game be given.
We say that this SE displays Inter-Generational Agreement if and only if for every i ∈ I,
t ≥ 0, mti ∈ H t, xt ∈ X, at ∈ A and yt ∈ Y we have that
ΦtRi (m
t
i, x
t, at, yt) = ΦtBi (m
t
i) (8)
and for every mt+1i in the support of µ
t
i(m
t
i, x
t, at, yt)
ΦtEi (m
t
i, x
t, at, yt) = Φt+1Bi (m
t+1
i ) (9)
We are now ready to state our last result.
Theorem 4. SE of the Dynastic and SPE of the Standard Repeated Game: Fix a stage ga-
me G, any δ ∈ (0, 1), and any x˜ and y˜. Let (g, µ,Φ) be an SE of the dynastic repeated game.
Assume that this SE displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Definition 4. Let v∗ be the
vector of (dynastic) payoffs for t = 0 players in this SE.
Then v∗ ∈ ES(δ).
The proof of Theorem 4 is in Appendix C. Before proceeding with an intuitive outline of
the proof, we state a remark on the implications of the theorem.
Clearly, Theorem 4 implies that if a payoff vector v ∈ ED(δ) is not sustainable as an SPE
so that v 6∈ ES(δ), then it must be the case that no SE which sustains v in the dynastic
repeated game displays Inter-Generational Agreement.
Remark 5. SE and SPE Payoffs: Observe that the SE that we construct in the proof of
Theorem 1 all in fact satisfy Inter-Generational Agreement. In other words, we know that if
a payoff vector v is in ES(δ) then there is an SE of the dynastic repeated game that displays
Inter-Generational Agreement which sustains v.
Together with Theorem 4, this gives us a complete characterization in payoff terms of the
relationship between the SE of the dynastic and the SPE of the standard repeated game as
follows.
Fix any stage game G and any δ ∈ (0, 1). Then a payoff vector v ∈ ED(δ) is in ED(δ)/ES(δ)
if and only if no SE which sustains v in the dynastic repeated game displays Inter-Generational
Agreement.
To streamline the exposition of the outline of the argument behind Theorem 4, make the
following two simplifying assumptions. First, assume that at the message stage the players do
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not condition their behavior at the message-stage on the randomization device. The simplest
way to fix ideas here is to consider a message-stage randomization device with a singleton Y
(the set of possible realizations). Second, assume that all message-strategies µti are pure. In
other words, even though they may randomize at the action stage, all players at the message
stage send a single message, denoted µti(m
t
i, x
t, at), with probability one.35
Now consider an SE (g, µ,Φ) of the dynastic repeated game that satisfies Inter-Genera-
tional Agreement as in Definition 4. Fix any history of play ht = (x0, a0, . . . , xt−1, at−1).
For each dynasty i, using the message strategies of players 〈i, 0〉 through to 〈i, t− 1〉, we can
now determine the message mti that player 〈i, t − 1〉 will send to his successor, player (i, t).
Denote this message by mti(h
t). Notice that mti(h
t) can be determined simply by recursing
forward from period 0. Recall that at the beginning of period 0 all players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉 receive
message m0i = ∅. Therefore, given h1 = (x0, a0), using µ0i , we know m1i (h1). Now using µ1i we
can compute m2i (h
2) = µ1i (m
1
i (h
1), x1, a1), and so recursing forward the value of mti(h
t) can
be worked out.
Because the SE (g, µ,Φ) satisfies Inter-Generational Agreement it must be the case that,
after any actual history of play (on or off the equilibrium path) ht, and therefore after receiving
message mti(h
t), player 〈i, t〉 believes that his opponents have received messages (mt1(ht), . . . ,
mti−1(h
t), mti+1(h
t), . . . ,mtn(h
t)) with probability one.
To see why this is the case, we can recurse forward from period 0 again. Consider the end
of period 0. Since all players in the t = 0 cohort receive message ∅, after observing (x0, a0),
player 〈i, 0〉 knows that any player 〈j 6= i, 0〉 is sending message m1j(x0, a0) = µ0j(∅, x0, a0) to
his successor player 〈j, 1〉.
Equation (9) of Definition 4 guarantees that the beginning-of-period beliefs of player 〈i, 1〉
must be the same as the end-of-period beliefs of player 〈i, 0〉. So, at the beginning of period
1, player 〈i, 1〉 believes with probability one that every player 〈j 6= i, 1〉 has received message
m1j(x
0, a0) as above.
Equation (8) of Definition 4 guarantees that player 〈i, 1〉 will not revise his beginning-
of-period beliefs during period 1. Therefore, after observing any (x1, a1), player 〈i, 1〉 still
believes that every player 〈j 6= i, 1〉 has received message m1j(x0, a0) as above. But this,
via the message strategies µ1j implies that player 〈i, 1〉 must believe with probability one
that every player 〈j, 1〉 sends message m2j(h2) = m2j(x0, a0, x1, a1) = µ1j(m1j(h1), x1, a1) to his
successor 〈j, 2〉. Continuing forward in this way until period t we can then see that the
beginning-of-period beliefs of player 〈i, t〉 are as we claimed above.
Before we proceed to close the argument for Theorem 4, notice that both conditions
35Note that we are somewhat abusing notation here. Recall that for every player 〈i, t〉, both gti(mti, xt)
and µti(m
t
i, x
t, at, yt) denote probability distributions (over actions and messages respectively). Here and
throughout the rest of the paper and the technical addendum, we will sometimes construct strategies in which
a single action is played with probability one and/or a single message is sent with probability one. Abusing
notation slightly, we will write gti(m
t
i, x
t) = ai to mean that the distribution gti(m
t
i, x
t) assigns probability
one to ai. Similarly, we will write µti(m
t
i, x
t, at, yt) = mt+1i to mean that the distribution µ
t
i(m
t
i, x
t, at, yt)
assigns probability one to mt+1i .
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of Definition 4 are necessary for our argument so far to be valid. Intuitively, the forward
recursion argument we have outlined essentially ensures that the “correct” (because all its
members receive a given message m0i = ∅) beliefs of the first cohort “propagate forward” as
follows. At the beginning of period t = 1 each player 〈i ∈ I, 1〉 must have correct beliefs
since the end-of-period beliefs of all players in period 0 are trivially correct, and equation (9)
of Definition 4 tells us that the end-of-period beliefs must be the same as the beginning-of-
periods beliefs of the next cohort. Now some pair (x1, a1) is observed by all players 〈i ∈ I, 1〉.
If this pair is consistent with their beginning-of-period beliefs, then clearly no player 〈i ∈ I, 1〉
can possibly revise his beliefs on the messages received by others at the beginning of period
1. However, if (x1, a1) is not consistent with the beliefs of players 〈i ∈ I, 1〉 and their action
strategies, some players in the t = 1 cohort may be “tempted” to revise their beginning-of-
period beliefs. This is because an observed “deviation” from what they expect to observe
in period 1 can always be attributed to two distinct sources. It could be generated by
an actual deviation at action stage of period 1, or it could be the result of one (or more)
players in the t = 0 cohort having deviated at the message stage of period 0. Equation
(8) of Definition 4 essentially requires that the t = 1 players should always interpret an
“unexpected” pair (x1, a1) as an actual deviation at the action stage. The same applies to all
subsequent periods. So, while equation (9) of Definition 4 ensures that the initially correct
beliefs are passed on from one generation to the next, equation (8) of Definition 4 guarantees
that actual deviations will be treated as such in the beliefs of players who observe them.
The beliefs of players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉 are correct and the end-of-period beliefs of any cohort are
guaranteed to be the same as the beginning-of-period beliefs of the next cohort by equation
(9). However, without equation (8) following an action deviation from the equilibrium path
the end-of-periods beliefs of some players 〈i, t〉 could be incorrect, and be passed on to the
next cohort intact.
Now recall that the punch-line of the forward recursion argument we have outlined is that
if the SE (g, µ,Φ) satisfies Inter-Generational Agreement then we know that after any actual
history of play ht, player 〈i, t〉 believes that his opponents have received messages (mt1(ht), . . . ,
mti−1(h
t), mti+1(h
t), . . . , mtn(h
t)) with probability one. To see how we can construct an SPE of
the standard repeated game that is equivalent to the given SE, consider the strategies gt∗i for
the standard repeated game defined as gt∗i (h
t, xt) = gti(mi(h
t), xt). Clearly, these strategies
implement the same payoff vector that is obtained in the given SE of the dynastic repeated
game. Now suppose that the strategy profile g∗ we have just constructed is not an SPE of
the standard repeated game. Then, by the one-shot deviation principle (Remark 1 above) we
know that some player i in the standard repeated game would have an incentive do deviate
in a single period t after some history of play ht. However, given the property of beliefs in the
SE (g, µ,Φ) with Inter-Generational Agreement that we have shown above, this implies that
player 〈i, t〉 would have an incentive to deviate at the action stage in the dynastic repeated
game. This of course contradicts the fact that (g, µ,Φ) is an SE of the dynastic repeated
game. Hence the argument is complete. The proof of Theorem 4 that appears in Appendix C
of course does not rely on the two simplifying assumptions we made here. However, modulo
some additional notation and technical issues, the argument presented there runs along the
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same lines as the sketch we have given here.
9. Relation to the Literature
The infinitely repeated game model is a widely used construct in economics. Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986), Aumann (1981), and Pearce (1992) are all standard references for the
benchmark model.36 When it is assumed that all individuals have full and direct knowledge of
the past history of play, the standard model and the one we have studied here are equivalent.
Some recent papers have asked what happens to the equilibrium set when the full memory
assumption is relaxed. The question posed then is: to what extent can intergenerational
communication substitute for memory? Recent papers by Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005),
Kobayashi (2003), and Lagunoff and Matsui (2004) all posit dynastic game models to address
this question.
Among these, Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005) is the closest and, in many ways, the most
direct predecessor of the current paper. Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005) examines this dynastic
model when each player 〈i, t〉 receives a public messages from the player 〈j ∈ I, t− 1〉 about
the previous history of play. If the public messages from all player in the previous cohort
are simultaneous, then a Folk Theorem in the sense of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) can
be obtained. Namely, if there are three or more players, all individually rational feasible
payoffs can be sustained as an SE. Intuitively, this is because a version of a well known
“cross-checking” argument that goes back to Maskin (1999) can be applied in this case.37 By
contrast, the present paper studies the model in which private communication (within each
dynasty) may occur. We show that the difference between purely public and possible private
communication is potentially large. Equilibria that sustain payoffs below some dynasty’s
minmax exist, but they require inter-generational “disagreement.”
Our model is substantially different from the OLG games analyzed by Kandori (1992a),
Salant (1991) and Smith (1992) among others (all three prove versions of the standard Folk
Theorem).38 In these papers there is no dynastic component to the players’ payoffs and full
memory is assumed.39
Kobayashi (2003) and Lagunoff and Matsui (2004) examine OLG games with a dynastic
payoff component. As in Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005), these models assume entrants have no
prior memory, and they also allow for communication across generations. Though substantive
differences exist between each of the models, they both prove standard (for OLG games) Folk
36Pearce (1992) is also an excellent source for further references.
37Baliga, Corchon, and Sjostrom (1997) use a similar type of mechanism in another model of communication
when there are three or more players.
38See also the early contribution by Cremer (1986). Notice also that this literature has focused, among
other things, on the role of dimensionality assumptions on the stage game, which can be dispensed with in
some cases. This is not the case in our model (see footnote 4 above).
39As he points out, the results in Kandori (1992a) generalize to less than full memory of the past, although
some direct memory is required. Bhaskar (1998) examines a related OLG model with no dynastic payoffs and
very little, albeit some, direct memory by entrants. He shows that very limited memory is enough to sustain
optimal transfers in a 2-period consumption-loan smoothing OLG game.
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Theorems. Interestingly, both Folk Theorems make use of intra-generational disagreement of
beliefs in the equilibrium continuations following deviations. Nevertheless, the constructed
equilibria in both papers leave no room for inter-generational disagreement at the message
stage.
The role of public messages has been studied in other repeated game contexts such as
in games with private monitoring. Models of Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996), Compte
(1998), and Kandori and Matsushima (1998) all examine communication in repeated games
when players receive private signals of others’ past behavior. As in Anderlini and Lagunoff
(2005), these papers exploit cross-checking arguments to sustain the truthful revelation of
one’s private signal in each stage of the repeated game.
Recent works by Schotter and Sopher (2001a), Schotter and Sopher (2001b), and Chaud-
huri, Schotter, and Sopher (2001) examine the role of communication in an experimental
dynastic environment. These papers set up laboratory experiments designed to mimic the
dynastic game. The general conclusion seems to be that the presence of private communica-
tion has a significant (if puzzling) effect, even in the full memory game.
It is also worth noting the similarity between the present model and games with imperfect
recall.40 Each dynastic player could be viewed as an infinitely lived player with imperfect
recall (e.g., the “absent-minded driver” with “multiple selves” in Piccione and Rubinstein
(1997)) who can write messages to his future self at the end of each period.
By contrast, the present model is distinguishable from dynamic models that create mem-
ory from a tangible “piece” of history. For instance, Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005) extend
the analysis to the case where history may leave “footprint,” i.e, hard evidence of the past
history of play. Incomplete but hard evidence of the past history of play is also present in
Johnson, Levine, and Pesendorfer (2001) and Kandori (1992b). In another instance, mem-
ory may be created from a tangible but intrinsically worthless asset such as fiat money. A
number of contributions in monetary theory (e.g., Kocherlakota (1998), Kocherlakota and
Wallace (1998), Wallace (2001), and Corbae, Temzelides, and Wright (2001)) have all shown,
to varying degrees, the substitutability of money for memory.
10. Concluding Remarks
We posit a dynastic repeated game populated by one-period-lived individuals who rely on
private messages from their predecessors to fathom the past. The set of equilibrium payoffs
expands dramatically relative to the corresponding standard repeated game. Under extremely
mild conditions, as the dynastic players care more and more about the payoffs of their suc-
cessors, all interior payoff vectors that are feasible in the stage game are sustainable in an SE
of the dynastic repeated game.
We are able to characterize entirely, via a property of the players’ beliefs, when an SE
of the dynastic repeated game can yield a payoff vector not sustainable as an SPE of the
40See the Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior (1997) on Games with Imperfect Recall for
extensive references.
A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 30
standard repeated game: the SE in question must display a failure of what we have termed
Inter-Generational Agreement.41
It is natural to ask why we focus on SE as opposed to other solution concepts. The answer
it two-fold. First the concept of SE is an extremely widely accepted and used benchmark in
the literature. Hence it seems an appropriate point to start. Second, the surprising features of
some of the equilibria of our dynastic repeated game arise from a failure of Inter-Generational
Agreement. Broadly speaking, failures of Inter-Generational Agreement can be traced back
to the fact that, upon receiving an unexpected private message from his predecessor, a player
always has to weigh two sets of possibilities. The message he observes could have been
generated by a deviation at the action stage, or it could have been generated by a deviation
at the message stage. The concept of SE requires all players to have a complete (and common
across players) theory of the mistakes that might have caused deviations from equilibrium.
Therefore, it seems like a prime candidate to require that the players’ beliefs should be
plausible in an intuitive sense in the dynastic repeated game we analyze.
It is important to comment further on the relationship between our results and the idea
of “neologism-proofness” that has been put forth in the literature (Farrell 1993, Mattehws,
Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite 1991, among others). As we mentioned above, at least in
its current form, neologism-proofness simply does not apply to our framework. The reason
is simple. Roughly speaking, neologism-proofness builds into the solution concept the idea
that in a sender-receiver game, provided the appropriate incentive-compatibility constraints
are satisfied, a player’s exogenous type (in the standard sense of a “payoff type”) will be
able to create a “neologism” (use an hitherto unused message) to distinguish himself from
other types. The point is that in our dynastic game there are no payoff types for any of
the players. It would therefore be impossible to satisfy any standard form of incentive-
compatibility constraints. The different “types” of each player in our dynastic repeated
game are only distinguished by their beliefs, which in turn are determined by equilibrium
strategies together with a complete theory of mistakes as in any SE. To see that the logic
of neologism-proofness can be conceptually troublesome in our context, consider for instance
the construction we use to prove Theorem 3 above. Suppose that some player 〈i, t〉 deviates
so as to trigger the punishment-i phase. At the end of period t player 〈i, t〉 may want to
communicate to player 〈i, t + 1〉 that play is in the punishment-i phase so that he can can
play a best response to the actions of others in period t + 1. For a “neologism” to work at
this point player 〈i, t+1〉 would have to believe it. He would have to believe what player 〈i, t〉
is saying: I have made a mistake, therefore respond appropriately to the punishment that
follows (there are no exogenous types to which 〈i, t〉 can appeal in his “speech”). However,
as always in a dynastic game, whether 〈i, t + 1〉 believes or not what he is told, depends on
41The logic of our Theorems 1 and 4 extends easily to finite games played by dynastic players who rely on
private messages. Thus the appearance of “new” equilibria as a result of the presence of dynastic players is
not uniquely a feature of infinitely repeated dynastic games. In all cases the new equilibria can be traced to
the mis-match in beliefs that we have analyzed here. The fact that all feasible payoff vectors can be sustained
in equilibrium is obviously not true in general for finite games.
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the relative likelihood that he assigns to mistaken actions and mistaken messages; both are
possible after all.42 So, for the neologism to work it would have to be “trusted” more as
a message than the one prescribed in equilibrium. But, since there are no exogenous types
to which to appeal, there do not seem to be compelling reasons for this to be the case. As
with other possible refinements, our characterization of the new equilibria that appear in the
dynastic repeated game in terms of Inter-Generational Agreement also seals the question of
what bite a possible adaptation of neologism-proofness could have at a more general level.
The new equilibria of the dynastic repeated game can be ruled out (without ruling out any
of the traditional ones) if and only if beliefs that violate Inter-Generational Agreement can
be ruled out. Whether this is the case or not is largely a matter of intuitive appeal.
While our results apply only to the actual formal model we have set forth, it is natural
to ask which ones are essential and which ones are not. We have several remarks to make.
As we noted already, the absence of public messages alongside private ones is completely
inessential to what we do here. Public messages could be added to our model without altering
our results. It is always possible to replicate the SE of this model in another model with public
messages as well; the public messages would be ignored by the players’ equilibrium strategies
and beliefs.
We make explicit use of public randomization devices both at the action and at the
message stage of the dynastic repeated game. While the use of two separate devices is not
essential for our results (see footnote 13 above), the use of some public randomization device
probably is.43,44 In our constructions it is essential that the players should be able to correlate
the messages they send to the next cohort. Without this it is hard to see how play could
switch between the different phases on which our constructions depend.
We have stipulated a very specific set of “demographics” for our dynastic repeated game:
all players live one period and are replaced by their successor at the end of their lives. We
believe that this is not essential to the qualitative nature of our results, although some features
of the demographic structure of the model play an important role. We conjecture that results
similar to ours would hold in a dynastic repeated game in which all players are simultaneously
replaced by their successors in the same dynasty with positive probability, thus ensuring that
looking forward from any point in time total replacement happens with probability one at
some future date.
The actual history of play leaves no visible trace in our model. To what extent would our
results change if a (noisy or incomplete, or both) “footprint” of the past history of play were
available to the players? Intuitively this would make failures of Inter-Generational Agreement
42By contrast, in a sender-receiver game the sender communicates to the receiver his exogenous type, which
is chosen by Nature, and not by the sender himself.
43This is in contrast with Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) in which “time averaging” across different pure
action profiles in each period can (approximately) substitute for a randomization device.
44We have examples showing that even without any randomization devices it is possible to display SE that
push one or more dynasties below their minmax in the stage game. Whether a “Super” Folk Theorem is
available in this case is an open question at this point.
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harder to generate in equilibrium. Does the set of equilibria of the dynastic repeated game
shrink as the direct information about the past history of play that is available to the players
becomes more and more precise? While it seems plausible to conjecture that our results
would change across this range of possibilities, we have no option but to say that the topic
is worthy of future research.
Our Folk Theorems for the dynastic repeated game assume three or more dynasties in one
case, and four or more in another. Is this essential to our results? (It clearly is essential to our
construction in both cases.) It is not hard to construct examples of dynastic repeated games
with two dynasties that admit SE in which the players’ payoffs are below their minmax in the
stage game. Thus, it seems that there is no definite need to have more than two dynasties
to generate SE payoffs in the dynastic repeated game that are not sustainable as SPE of the
corresponding standard repeated game. Whether and under what conditions a Folk Theorem
like the ones presented here is available for the case of two dynasties is an open question. We
leave the characterization of the equilibrium set in this case for future work.
Lastly, our Folk Theorems for the dynastic repeated game show that, as δ approaches one,
the set of SE payoffs includes “worse” vectors that push some (or even all) players below their
minmax payoffs in the stage game. We do not have a full characterization of the SE payoffs
for the dynastic repeated game when δ is bounded away from one. However, it is possible to
construct examples showing that the set of SE payoffs includes vectors that Pareto-dominate
those on the Pareto-frontier of the set of SPE payoffs in the standard repeated game when δ is
bounded away from one. Intuitively, this is because some “bad” payoff vectors (pushing some
players below the minmax) are sustainable in an SE when δ is bounded away from one. Thus,
“harsher” punishments are available as continuation payoffs in the dynastic repeated game
than in the standard repeated game. Using these punishments, higher payoffs are sustainable
in equilibrium in the dynastic repeated game.
Appendix A: The Basics of the Proof of Theorem 2
A.1. Outline
Our proof is constructive. It runs along the following lines. Given a v∗ ∈ int(V ) and a δ ∈ (0, 1) we construct
a randomization device x˜, a randomization device y˜(δ), and an assessment (g, µ,Φδ), which implements v∗,
and which for δ sufficiently large constitutes an SE of the dynastic repeated game.
Notice that the profile (g, µ) is defined independently of δ, as is x˜. On the other hand, the probability
distribution of the message-stage randomization device y˜(δ) and the system of beliefs Φδ are defined using
δ as a parameter. This is simply a property of our construction. Given that our task is to show that there
exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ > δ implies v∗ ∈ ED(δ) = ⋃x˜,y˜ ED(δ, x˜, y˜), if (g, µ) and x˜ were also dependent
on δ this would not matter at all. Sometimes, when it does not cause any ambiguity, δ will be dropped from
the notation for the message-stage randomization device and/or the system of beliefs.
Throughout the argument, we assume that the message space for any player 〈i, t〉 consists of three elements
only. Formally, we let M ti = {m∗,mA,mB}. Since we assume that n ≥ 3 and that ||Ai|| ≥ 2 for every i, it is
obvious that ||Ht|| > 3 for every t ≥ 1. Therefore we can think of each M ti as a “restricted message space” in
the sense of Definition T.2.1. It then follows from Lemma T.2.1 that proving the result for these restricted
message spaces is sufficient to prove our claim for the case M ti = H
t, as required by the statement of the
theorem.
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In Section A.2 we define formally the randomization devices x˜ and y˜(δ) and the profile (g, µ). In Section
A.3 we define the completely mixed strategies that generate the SE beliefs Φδ. In Section T.5 we define
formally the system of beliefs Φδ. In Section T.6 we check that the assessment (g, µ,Φδ) satisfies sequential
rationality when δ is close to one. Finally in Section T.7 we verify the consistency of the equilibrium beliefs.
Throughout the argument, v∗ ∈ int(V ) is the vector of payoffs to be sustained as an SE, and a∗ and a′
are two action profiles as in the statement of the theorem.
A.2. Strategies and Randomization Devices
Definition A.1: Let (a(1), . . . , a(`), . . . , a(||A||)) be a list of all possible outcomes in G. Without loss of
generality assume that the first element of this list is a∗ so that a(1) = a∗. We can then define a set of
weights {p (a(`))}||A||`=1 adding up to one and such that
v∗ =
||A||∑
`=1
p (a(`))u(a(`)) (A.1)
Notice that since v∗ ∈ int(V ), we can assume that p (a(`)) > 0 for all ` = 1, . . . , ||A||.
Since it will play a special role, we assign a separate symbol to p(a(1)) (the weight of a∗ in equation
(A.1)). In what follows we set p(a(1)) = q.
Definition A.2. Action-Stage Randomization Device: Given v∗, the action-stage randomization device x˜ is
defined as follows. The set X consists of ||A|| elements denoted by (x(1), . . . x(`), . . . x(||A||)). We then set
Pr(x˜ = x(`)) = p (a(`)) (A.2)
where each p (a(`)) is as in Definition A.1.
Definition A.3: Let ui = mina∈A ui(a) and ui = maxa∈A ui(a).
45 Let also α be a real number in (0, 1) such
that
α <
ui(a′)− ui(a∗i , a′−i)
ui(a′)− ui(a∗i , a′−i) + ui − ui
∀ i ∈ I (A.3)
Definition A.4. Message-Stage Randomization Device: Given δ the message-stage randomization device
y˜(δ) is defined as follows. The set Y consists of two elements, y(0) and y(1).
Let α be as in Definition A.3. Now define
γ(δ) =
(1− δ) (1− α)
α δ
(A.4)
Notice that, given α, as δ increases towards one, clearly γ(δ) is between zero and one. We then take it to be
the case that
Pr[y˜(δ) = y(0)] = 1− γ(δ)
Pr[y˜(δ) = y(1)] = γ(δ)
(A.5)
45Throughout the rest of the paper and the technical addendum, we will use the symbols ui and ui with the meaning we have
just defined.
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Definition A.5. Action-Stage Strategies: Let {a(`)}||A||`=1 be an enumeration of the strategy profiles in G as
in Definition A.1, and let x˜ be as in Definition A.2. Recall that at the beginning of period 0 all players receive
the null message m0i . For all players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉 define
g0i (m
0
i , x
0) = ai(`) if x0 = x(`) (A.6)
and for any player 〈i, t〉 with t ≥ 1 define
gti(m
t
i, x
t) =

a∗i if m
t
i = m
∗ and xt = x(1)
a′i if m
t
i ∈ {mA,mB} and xt = x(1)
ai(`) if xt = x(`) with ` ≥ 2
(A.7)
Definition A.6. Message-Stage Strategies: Let {a(`)}||A||`=1 be an enumeration of the strategy profiles in G as
in Definition A.1. Let x˜ be as in Definition A.2. Let y˜ be as in Definition A.4, where the dependence on δ
has been suppressed for notational convenience.
To describe the message-stage strategies it is convenient to distinguish between two cases.46
For any player 〈i, t〉, whenever xt = x(1) let47
µti(m
t
i, x(1), a
t, yt) =

mA if yt = y(0) and at = (a′j , a
∗
−j) for some j ∈ I
mA if mti = m
A, yt = y(0) and at = a′
mA if mti = m
A, yt = y(0) and at = (a∗j , a
′
−j) for some j ∈ I
mB if mti = m
B and at = a′
mB if mti = m
B , and at = (a∗j , a
′
−j) for some j ∈ I
mB if atj 6∈ {a∗j , a′j} for some j ∈ I
m∗ otherwise
(A.8)
For any player 〈i, t〉, whenever xt = x(`) with ` ≥ 2 let
µti(m
t
i, x(`), a
t, yt) =

m∗ if mti = m
∗, and at = a(`)
m∗ if mti = m
A, yt = y(1) and at = a(`)
mA if mti = m
A, yt = y(0) and at = a(`)
mB otherwise
(A.9)
A.3. Completely Mixed Strategies
Definition A.7: Throughout this section we let ε denote a small positive number, which parameterizes
the completely mixed strategies that we construct. It should be understood that our construction of beliefs
involves the limit ε→ 0.
46In the interest of brevity, we avoid writing down the message-stage strategies for players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉 separately. Equations
(A.8) and (A.9) that follow can be interpreted as defining the profile µ0 by re-defining m0i to be equal to m
∗ for all players
〈i ∈ I, 0〉.
47Notice that to distinguish between the first and the fifth case, and between the first and the last case, on the right-hand
side of (A.8), player 〈i, t〉 must be able to distinguish between an action profile of the type (a′j , a∗−j) and an action profile of the
type (a∗j , a
′
−j). This is always possible because of our assumption that n ≥ 3, and because our assumptions about a∗ and a′
obviously imply that a∗j 6= a′j for every j ∈ I.
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For every t ≥ 0, given ε, define
εt =
1[
max
i∈I
||Ai||
]2 ε
1
n2t (A.10)
Notice also that in Definition A.9 below we make use of the quantity ψi(δ) that is defined in equation
(T.7.1). What needs to be specified at this point is that, for δ sufficiently close to one, ψi(δ) is a real number
in (0, 1) for every i ∈ I. (See Remark T.7.1.)
Definition A.8. Completely Mixed Action Strategies: Given ε, and εt as in (A.10), the completely mixed
strategies for all players 〈i, t〉 at the action stage are denoted by gti,ε and are defined as follows.
After receiving message m0i and observing the realization x
t of the action-stage randomization device
any player 〈i, 0〉 plays the action prescribed by the proposed equilibrium strategy described in (A.6) with
probability 1− εt(||Ai|| − 1) and plays all other actions in Ai with probability εt each.
After receiving message m∗i and observing the realization x
t of the action-stage randomization device
any player 〈i, t〉 plays the action prescribed by the proposed equilibrium strategy described in (A.7) with
probability 1− εt(||Ai|| − 1) and plays all other actions in Ai with probability εt each.
After receiving any message mti 6= m∗i and observing the realization xt of the action-stage randomization
device any player 〈i, t〉 plays the action prescribed by the proposed equilibrium strategy described in (A.7)
with probability 1−√εt(||Ai|| − 1) and plays all other actions in Ai with probability √εt each.
Definition A.9. Completely Mixed Message Strategies: Given ε, the completely mixed strategies for all
players 〈i, t〉 at the message stage are denoted by µti,ε and are defined as follows.48
Suppose that player 〈i, t〉 receives messagem∗i and that after observing (xt, at, yt) the proposed equilibrium
strategy described in Definition A.6 prescribes that he should send message m∗. Then player 〈i, t〉 sends
message m∗ with probability 1− ε2t −ψi(δ)εt, sends message mA with probability ε2t , and sends message mB
with probability ψi(δ)εt.
Suppose that player 〈i, t〉 receives messagem∗i and that after observing (xt, at, yt) the proposed equilibrium
strategy described in Definition A.6 prescribes that he should send message mA. Then player 〈i, t〉 sends
message mA with probability 1− εt − ε2t , sends message m∗ with probability εt, and sends message mB with
probability ε2t .
Suppose that player 〈i, t〉 receives messagem∗i and that after observing (xt, at, yt) the proposed equilibrium
strategy described in Definition A.6 prescribes that he should send message mB . Then player 〈i, t〉 sends
message mA with probability 1− εt − ε2t , sends message m∗ with probability εt, and sends message mA with
probability ε2t .
Finally, after receiving any message mti 6= m∗ and observing (xt, at, yt), player 〈i, t〉 sends the message
prescribed by the equilibrium strategy described in Definition A.6 with probability 1 − 2εt, and sends each
of the other two messages with probability εt.
48In the interest of brevity, we avoid an explicit distinction between the t = 0 players and all others. What follows can be
interpreted as applying to all players re-defining m0i to be equal to m
∗ for players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉.
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Appendix B: The Basics of the Proof of Theorem 3
B.1. Outline
Once again, our proof is constructive. It runs along the following lines. Given a v∗ ∈ int(V ), we construct a
randomization device x˜, a randomization device y˜, and an assessment (g, µ,Φ), which implements the vector
of payoffs v∗, and which for δ sufficiently large constitutes an SE of the dynastic repeated game.
Notice that all the elements of our construction are defined independently of δ. The sequential rationality
of the strategy profile given the postulated beliefs holds when δ is sufficiently close to one.
Throughout the argument, we assume that the message space for any player 〈i, t − 1〉 consists of a set
smaller than the set Ht. Therefore we can think of each M ti as a “restricted message space” in the sense
of Definition T.2.1. It then follows from Lemma T.2.1 that proving the result for these restricted message
spaces is sufficient to prove our claim for the case M ti = H
t, as required by the statement of the theorem.
In Section B.2 we define formally the randomization devices x˜ and y˜, the players’ message spaces M ti and
the profile (g, µ). In Section B.3 we define the completely mixed strategies that generate the SE beliefs Φ. In
Section T.9 we define formally the system of beliefs Φ. In Section T.10 we check that the assessment (g, µ,Φ)
satisfies sequential rationality when δ is close to one. Finally in Section T.11 we verify the consistency of the
equilibrium beliefs.
In what follows, v∗ ∈ int(V ) is the vector of payoffs to be sustained as an SE as in the statement of the
theorem. Throughout the argument, A˜ is a product set and vˆ and v1 through vn are vectors of payoffs as in
the statement of the theorem. Of course, these are fixed throughout the proof.
B.2. Strategies, Randomization Devices and Message Spaces
Definition B.1: As in Definition A.1, let (a(1), . . . , a(`), . . . , a(||A||)) be a list of all possible outcomes in
G. Without loss of generality, assume that the first ||A˜|| ≤ ||A|| elements in this enumeration are the strategy
profiles in the product set A˜. This enumeration will be taken as fixed throughout the rest of the argument.
Remark B.1: From Definition 3, for each i ∈ I we can find a set of of profiles of actions A˜i ⊂ A˜ corresponding
to a set of indices (i1, . . . , i`, . . . , i||A˜i||) in the enumeration of Definition B.1, and a set of positive weights
{pi(a(i`))}||A˜
i||
`=1 adding up to one and such that
ωi(A˜) = max
ai∈A˜i
||A˜i||∑
`=1
pi(a(i`))ui(ai, a−i(i`)) =
||A˜i||∑
`=1
pi(a(i`))ui(a(i`)) (B.1)
Without loss of generality, we can take it to be the case that for every i`, ai(i`) is the same action in A˜i. We
denote this by aii so that ai(i`) = a
i
i for ` = 1, . . . , ||A˜i||.
For convenience, since A˜ is fixed throughout the argument, in what follows we will use the following
notation for the payoffs of each i corresponding to the weights {pj(a(j`))}||A˜
j ||
`=1 .
ωji =
||A˜j ||∑
`=1
pj(a(j`))ui(a(j`)) (B.2)
Of course, we have that ωii = ωi(A˜).
Definition B.2: Let A˜i be as in Remark B.1. For each i ∈ I and for each element a(i`) of A˜i, construct a
new action profile a˘i(i`) as follows. For all j 6= i, set a˘ij(i`) to satisfy a˘ij(i`) 6= aj(i`) and a˘ij(i`) ∈ A˜j . Notice
that this is always possible since, by assumption, A˜j contains at least two elements for every j ∈ I. Finally,
set a˘ii(i`) = a
i
i(i`) = a
i
i.
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In what follows, for every i and j in I we will let
u˘ji =
||A˜j ||∑
`=1
pj(a(j`))ui(a˘j(j`)) (B.3)
Remark B.2: Since each of the payoff vectors vj must only satisfy strong inequalities (see (iii) of the
statement of the theorem), without loss of generality we can take it to be the case that vj ∈ int(V (A˜)), for
each j ∈ I. It then follows that for every j ∈ I we can find a set of positive weights {pj(a(`))}||A˜||`=1 adding up
to one and such that for every i ∈ I
vji =
||A˜||∑
`=1
pj(a(`))ui(a(`)) (B.4)
Remark B.3: Since the payoff vector vˆ is in int(V (A˜)), we can find an η ∈ (0, 1) and a set of positive weights
{pˆ (a(`))}||A˜||`=1 adding up to one and such that for every i ∈ I
vˆi = (1− η)
||A˜||∑
`=1
pˆ (a(`))ui(a(`)) +
η
n
n∑
j=1
u˘ji (B.5)
Definition B.3: Throughout the rest of the argument we let
ˆˆv i =
||A˜||∑
`=1
pˆ (a(`))ui(a(`)) (B.6)
where the weights {pˆ (a(`))}||A˜||`=1 are as in Remark B.3.
Remark B.4: Since the payoff vector v∗ is in int(V ), we can find a q ∈ (0, 1) and a set of positive weights
{p∗(a(`))}||A||`=1 adding up to one and such that for every i ∈ I
v∗i = (1− q)
||A||∑
`=1
p∗(a(`))ui(a(`)) + q vˆi (B.7)
In what follows we will let zi =
∑||A||
`=1 p
∗(a(`))ui(a(`)).
Remark B.5: Recall that by assumption the payoff vector v∗ is in int(V ). Therefore, we can find a set of
positive weights {p0(a(`))}||A||`=1 adding up to one and such that for every i ∈ I
v∗i =
||A||∑
`=1
p0(a(`))ui(a(`)) (B.8)
Definition B.4. Action-stage Randomization Device: The action stage randomization device x˜ is defined as
follows. The set X consists of ||A|| ||A˜||n+1 ∏i∈I ||A˜i|| + ||A||2 elements.
Let (x(1), . . . , x(κ), . . . , x(||X||) be an enumeration of the elements ofX, and let κ = ||A|| ||A˜||n+1 ∏i∈I ||A˜i||.
Each of the first κ elements of X can be identified by a string of 1 + (n + 1) + n = 2n + 2 indices as
follows. With a slight abuse of notation, for κ ≤ κ, we will write x(κ) = x(`0, ˆ`, `1, . . . , `n, 1`, . . . , i`, . . . , n`)
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with `0 running from 1 to ||A||, ˆ`and each of the indices `1 through `n running from 1 to ||A˜||, and each of the
n indices i`, each with ` running from 1 to ||A˜i||. Obviously, the last ||X|| − κ elements of X can be identified
by a pair of indices `00 and `
∗ both running from 1 to ||A||. In this case, with a slight abuse of notation again,
we will write x(κ) = x(`00, `∗).
We are now ready to define the probability distribution governing the realization of x˜. For κ ≤ κ let
Pr(x˜ = x(`0, ˆ`, `1, . . . , `n, 1`, . . . , i`, . . . , n`)) =
q
[
p0(a(`0)) pˆ(a(ˆ`)) p1(a(`1)) · · · pn(a(`n)) p1(a(1`)) · · · pi(a(i`)) · · · pn(a(n`))
] (B.9)
and for κ = κ + 1, . . . , ||X|| let
Pr(x˜ = x(`00, `∗)) = (1− q)
[
p0(a(`00))p∗(a(`∗))
]
(B.10)
Definition B.5. Message-Stage Randomization Device: The message stage randomization device y˜ is de-
fined as follows. The set Y consists of n + 1 elements, which we denote (y(0), y(1), . . . , y(n)). The random
variable y˜ takes value y(0) with probability 1− η, and each of the other possible values with probability η/n.
Definition B.6: Throughout the rest of the argument, we let T be an integer sufficiently large so as to
guarantee that the following inequality is satisfied for all i ∈ I.
T (vii − ωii) > ui − ui (B.11)
Definition B.7. Message Spaces: For each j ∈ I and each t = 1, . . . , T − 1 let
M(j, t) = {mj,T−t+1,mj,T−t+2, . . . ,mj,T } (B.12)
and for every t ≥ T let
M(j, t) = M(j, T ) = {mj,1, . . . ,mj,T } (B.13)
Define alsoM = {m1, . . . ,mn}, and M˘ = {m˘1, . . . , m˘n}, and recall that according to our notational convention
when we write M˘−i we mean {m˘1, . . . , m˘i−1, m˘i+1, m˘n}.
Recall that M ti denotes the set of messages that a player 〈i, t− 1〉 can send to player 〈i, t〉. For any t =
1, . . . , T let
M ti = {m∗} ∪ M˘−i ∪M(1, t) ∪ . . . ∪M(n, t) (B.14)
For any t ≥ T + 1 let
M ti = {m∗} ∪ M˘−i ∪M(1, t) ∪ . . . ∪M(n, t) ∪M (B.15)
Definition B.8. Action-Stage Strategies: Let k be an element of I, and j be an element of I not equal to i.
Let (a(1), . . . , a(||A||)) be the enumeration of the elements of A of Definition B.1 and consider the index-
ation of the elements of X in Definition B.4, according to whether x(κ) has κ ≤ κ or not.
Recall that at the beginning of period 0 all players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉 receive message m0i = ∅. For all players
〈i ∈ I, 0〉 then define
g0i (m
0
i , x
0) =
{
ai(`0) if x0 = x(`0, · · ·)
ai(`00) if x0 = x(`00, ·) (B.16)
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Now consider any player 〈i, t〉 with t ≥ 1. It is convenient to distinguish between the two cases xt = x(κ)
with κ ≤ κ and with κ > κ.
For any i ∈ I and t ≥ 1 whenever xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ define49
gti(m
t
i, x
t) =

ai(ˆ`) if mti = m
∗ and xt = x(·, ˆ`, · · ·)
a˘ji (j`) if m
t
i = m˘j and x
t = x(· · ·, j`, · · ·)
ai(`k) if mti = m
k and xt = x(· · ·, `k, · · ·)
ai(k`) if mti ∈M(k, t) and xt = x(· · ·, k`, · · ·)
(B.17)
For any i ∈ I, t ≥ 1 and mti, whenever xt = x(κ) with κ > κ define
gti(m
t
i, x
t) = ai(`∗) if xt = x(·, `∗) (B.18)
Definition B.9. Message-Stage Strategies: Let k be any element of I, and j be any element of I not equal
to i.
We begin with period t = 0. Recall that m0i = ∅ for all i ∈ I. Let also g0(m0, x0) = (g01(m01, x0), . . . ,
g0n(m
0
n, x
0)), and define g0−k(m
0, x0) in the obvious way.
We let
µ0i (m
0
i , x
0, a0, y0) =

m˘j if a0 = g0(m0, x0) and y0 = y(j)
mi,T if a0 = g0(m0, x0) and y0 = y(i)
mk,T if a0−k = g
0
−k(m
0, x0) and a0k 6= g0k(m0, x0)
m∗ otherwise
(B.19)
For the periods t ≥ 1 it is convenient to distinguish between several cases. Assume first that xt = xt(κ)
with κ > κ. Let
µti(m
t
i, x
t, at, yt) =

mti if x
t = x(·, `∗) and at = a(`∗)
mk,T if xt = x(·, `∗), at−k = a−k(`∗) and atk 6= ak(`∗)
m∗ otherwise
(B.20)
Now consider the case xt = xt(κ) with κ ≤ κ. We divide this case into several subcases, according to
which message player 〈i, t〉 has received. We begin with mti = m∗. Let50
µti(m
∗, xt, at, yt)=

m˘j if xt = x(·, ˆ`, · · ·), at = a(ˆ`) and yt = y(j)
ν(M(i, t+ 1)) if xt = x(·, ˆ`, · · ·), at = a(ˆ`) and yt = y(i)
mk,T if xt = x(·, ˆ`, · · ·), at−k = a−k(ˆ`) and atk 6= ak(ˆ`)
m∗ otherwise
(B.21)
Our next subcase of κ ≤ κ is that of mti = m˘j . With the understanding that j′ is any element of I not equal
to i, we let
µti(m˘
j , xt, at, yt)=

m˘j
′
if xt = x(· · ·, j`, · · ·), at = a˘j(j`) and yt = y(j′)
ν(M(i, t+ 1)) if xt = x(· · ·, j`, · · ·), at = a˘j(j`) and yt = y(i)
mk,T if xt = x(· · ·, j`, · · ·), at−k = a˘j−k(j`) and atk 6= a˘jk(j`)
m∗ otherwise
(B.22)
49Notice that the third case in (B.17) can only possibly apply when t ≥ T + 1.
50Throughout the paper we adopt the following notational convention. Given any finite set, we denote by by ν(·) the uniform
probability distribution over the set. So, if Z is a finite set, ν(Z) assigns probability 1/ ||Z|| to every element of Z.
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Still assuming κ ≤ κ we now deal with the subcase mti ∈ M(i, t). For any mi,τ ∈M(i, t), we let
µti(m
i,τ , xt, at, yt)=

m˘j if xt = x(· · ·, j`, · · ·), at = a˘i(i`) and yt = y(j)
ν(M(i, t+ 1)) if xt = x(· · ·, j`, · · ·), at = a˘i(i`) and yt = y(i)
mk,T if xt = x(· · ·, j`, · · ·), at−k = a˘i−k(i`) and atk 6= a˘ik(i`)
mk,T if xt = x(· · ·, j`, · · ·), at−k = ai−k(i`) and atk 6= aik(i`)
mi,τ−1 if xt = x(· · ·, j`, · · ·) and at = a(i`)
m∗ otherwise
(B.23)
where we set mi,0 = mi. Notice that player 〈i, t〉 may need to distinguish between the third and fourth cases
of (B.23) since clearly they may be generated by different values of the index k ∈ I. To verify that this
distinction is always feasible, recall that, by construction (see Definition B.2), a˘−i(i`) differs from a−i(i`) in
every component, and that of course n ≥ 4.
The next subcase of κ ≤ κ we consider is that of mti ∈ M(j, t). For any mj,τ ∈M(j, t), we let
µti(m
j,τ , xt, at, yt) =

mj,τ−1 if xt = x(· · ·, j`, · · ·) and at = a(j`)
mk,T if xt = x(· · ·, j`, · · ·), at−k = a−k(j`) and atk 6= ak(j`)
m∗ otherwise
(B.24)
where we set mj,0 = mj .
Finally, still assuming that κ ≤ κ, we consider the case in which mti = mk
′
for some k′ ∈ I. We let
µti(m
k′ , xt, at, yt) =

mk
′
if xt = x(· · ·, `k′ , · · ·) and at = a(`k′)
mk,T if xt = x(· · ·, `k′ , · · ·), at−k = a−k(`k′) and atk 6= ak(`k′)
m∗ otherwise
(B.25)
B.3. Completely Mixed Strategies
Definition B.10: Throughout this section we let ε denote a small positive number, which parameterizes
the completely mixed strategies that we construct. It should be understood that our construction of beliefs
involves the limit ε→ 0.
Definition B.11. Completely Mixed Action Strategies: Given ε, the completely mixed strategies for all play-
ers 〈i, t〉 at the action stage are denoted by gti,ε and are defined as follows.51
After receiving a message m ∈ {m∗} ∪ M˘−i ∪M(i, t) and observing the realization xt of the action-stage
randomization device, any player 〈i, t〉 plays the action prescribed by the action-stage strategy described in
Definition B.8 with probability 1− ε2(||A||i − 1) and plays all other actions in Ai with probability ε2 each.
After receiving any message m 6∈ {m∗}∪M˘−i∪M(i, t) and observing the realization xt of the action-stage
randomization device, any player 〈i, t〉 plays the action prescribed by the action-stage strategy described in
Definition B.8 with probability 1− ε(||A||i − 1) and plays all other actions in Ai with probability ε each.
Definition B.12. Completely Mixed Message Strategies: Given ε, the completely mixed strategies for all
players 〈i, t〉 at the message stage are denoted by µti,ε and are defined as follows.
Player 〈i, t〉 sends the message prescribed by the message-stage strategy described in Definition B.9 with
probability 1− ε2n+1(||M t+1i || − 1) and sends all other messages in M t+1i with probability ε2n+1 each.
51In the interest of brevity, we avoid an explicit distinction between the t = 0 players and all others. What follows can be
interpreted as applying to all players re-defining m0i to be equal to m
∗ for players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉.
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Appendix C: The Proof of Theorem 4
Definition C.1: Let a profile of message strategies µ be given. Fix an “augmented history” κt = (x0, a0, y0,
. . . , xt−1, at−1, yt−1). In other words, fix a history ht, together with a sequence of realizations of the message-
stage randomization device (y0, . . . , yt−1). In what follows, κ0 will denote the null history ∅, and for any
τ ≤ t, κτ will denote the appropriate subset of κt.
For every i ∈ I let M0i (m0i |κ0, µi) = 1. Then, recursively forward, define
Mti(mti|κt, µi) =
∑
mt−1i ∈Ht−1
µt−1i (m
t
i|mt−1i , xt−1, at−1, yt−1)Mt−1i (mt−1i |κt−1, µi) (C.1)
So that Mti(mti|κt, µi) is the probability that player 〈i, t − 1〉 sends message mti given κt and the profile µi.
We also let Mt−i(mt−i|κt, µ−i) = Mt−i((mti, . . . ,mti−1,mti+1, . . . ,mtn)|κt, µ−i) = Πj 6=iMtj(mtj |κt, µj).
Lemma C.1: Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1), any x˜ and any y˜. Fix any SE of the dynastic repeated game (g, µ,Φ).
Assume that it displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Definition 4.
Let any augmented history κt as in Definition C.1 be given. Let also any i ∈ I and any mti such that
Mti(mti|κt, µi) > 0 be given.
Then for any mt−i
ΦtBi (m
t
−i|mti) = Mt−i(mt−i|κt, µ−i) (C.2)
Proof:We proceed by induction. Given the fixed κt, let κ0 = ∅ and κτ with τ = 1, . . . , t be the augmented
histories comprising the first three components (x0, a0, y0) of κt, the first six components (x0, a0, y0, x1, a1, y1)
of κt and so on. First of all notice that setting τ = 0 yields
Φ1Bi (m
0
−i|m0i ) = M1−i(m0−i|κ0, µ−i) = 1 (C.3)
which is trivially true given that all players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉 receive the null message by construction.
Our working hypothesis is now that the claim is true for an arbitrary τ − 1 < t − 1, and our task is to
show that it holds for τ .
Consider any message mτi in Supp (Mτi (·|κτ , µi)).52 Then there must exist a message mτ−1i such that
µτ−1i (m
τ
i |mτ−1i , xτ−1, aτ−1, yτ−1)Mτ−1i (mτ−1i |κτ−1, µi) > 0 (C.4)
Therefore, using (9) we can write
ΦτBi (m
τ
−i|mτi ) = Φτ−1Ei (mτ−i|mτ−1i , xτ−1, aτ−1, yτ−1) (C.5)
Notice that in any SE it must be the case that the right-hand side of (C.5) is equal to
∑
mτ−1−i
Φτ−1Ri (m
τ−1
−i |mτ−1i , xτ−1, aτ−1, yτ−1)
∏
j 6=i
µτ−1j (m
τ
j |mτ−1j , xτ−1, aτ−1, yτ−1)
 (C.6)
Using (8), we know that (C.6) is equal to
∑
mτ−1−i
Φτ−1Bi (m
τ−1
−i |mτ−1i )
∏
j 6=i
µτ−1j (m
τ
j |mτ−1j , xτ−1, aτ−1, yτ−1)
 (C.7)
52Supp (·) denotes the support of a probability distribution.
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Our working hypothesis can now be used to assert that (C.7) is in turn equal to
∑
mτ−1−i
Mτ−1−i (mτ−1−i |κτ−1, µ−i)
∏
j 6=i
µτ−1j (m
τ
j |mτ−1j , xτ−1, aτ−1, yτ−1)
 (C.8)
Rearranging terms (C.8) we find that it can also be written as
∏
j 6=i
∑
mτ−1j
Mτ−1j (mτ−1j |κτ−1, µj)µτ−1j (mτj |mτ−1j , xτ−1, aτ−1, yτ−1)
 (C.9)
Using now (C.1), it is immediate that (C.9) is equal to∏
j 6=i
Mτj (mτj |κτ , µj) = Mτ−i(mτ−i|κτ , µ−i) (C.10)
and hence the claim is proved.
Definition C.2: Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1), any x˜ and any y˜. Fix any strategy profile, (g, µ), for the dynastic
repeated game.
Consider the standard repeated game with the same common discount factor δ, and with the following
action-stage randomization device ˆ˜x. The random variable ˆ˜x takes values in the finite set Y × X (the sets
in which y˜ and x˜ take values respectively), and the probability that ˆ˜x is equal to xˆ = (y, x) is Pr(y˜ = y)
Pr(x˜ = x). For notational convenience we will denote the realization xˆt of ˆ˜x
t
by the pair (yt−1, xt).
Recall that a history in the standard repeated game with randomization device ˆ˜x is an object of the
type ht = (xˆ0, a0, . . . , xˆt−1, at−1). Therefore, using our notational convention about time superscripts of the
realizations of ˆ˜x
t
we have that any pair (ht, xˆt) can be written as a triple (y−1, κt, xt), where κt corresponds
to ht in the obvious way.
We say that the strategy profile g∗ for the standard repeated game with randomization device ˆ˜x is derived
from the dynastic repeated game profile (g, µ) as above if and only if it is defined as follows.
gt∗i (h
t, xˆt) = gt∗i (y
−1, κt, xt) =
∑
mti
Mti(mti|κt, µi)gti(mti, xt) (C.11)
Lemma C.2: Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1), any x˜ and any y˜. Consider any SE, (g, µ), of the dynastic repeated game
that displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Definition 4.
Now consider the strategy profile g∗ for the standard repeated game with randomization device ˆ˜x that is
derived from (g, µ) as in Definition C.2.
Given g∗, fix any pair (ht, xˆt) representing a history and realized randomization device for the standard
repeated game. For any at−i ∈ A−i, let Pg∗|ht,xˆt(at−i) be the probability that the realized action profile for
all players but i at time t is at−i.
Given the pair (ht, xˆt), consider the corresponding triple (y−1, κt, xt) as in Definition C.2. Then
Pg∗|ht,xˆt(at−i) =
∏
j 6=i
∑
mtj
Mtj(mtj |κt, µj) gtj(atj |mtj , xt)
 (C.12)
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Proof: The claim is a direct consequence of (C.11) of Definition C.2.
Lemma C.3: Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1), any x˜ and any y˜. Consider any SE (g, µ,Φ) of the dynastic repeated game
that displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Definition 4.
Fix any pair (ht, xˆt) representing a history and realized randomization device for the standard repeated
game. Given the pair (ht, xˆt), consider the corresponding triple (y−1, κt, xt) as in Definition C.2. Given the
last two elements of this triple (κt, xt), now use (C.1) to find a message mti such that Mti(mti|κt, µi) > 0.
Finally, consider the following alternative action-stage and message-stage strategies (gti, µ
t
i) for player
〈i, t〉. Whenever mti 6= mti, set gti = gti and µti = µti. Then define
gti(m
t
i, x
t) =
∑
mti
Mti(mti|κt, µi)gti(mti, xt) (C.13)
and
µti(m
t
i, x
t, at, yt) =
∑
mti
Mti(mti|κt, µi)µti(mti, xt, at, yt) (C.14)
Then53
vti(g, µ|mti, xt,ΦtBi ) = vti(gti, g−ti , g−i, µti, µ−ti , µ−i|mti, xt,ΦtBi ) (C.15)
Proof: The claim is a direct consequence of Lemma C.1 and of (8) of Definition 4. The details are omitted
for the sake of brevity.
C.1. Proof of the Theorem
Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1), any x˜ and any y˜. Consider any SE triple (g, µ,Φ) for the dynastic repeated game. Assume
that this SE displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Definition 4.
Now consider the strategy profile g∗ for the standard repeated game with common discount δ and ran-
domization device ˆ˜x that is derived from (g, µ) as in Definition C.2.
Since (g, µ) and g∗ obviously give rise to the same payoff vector, to prove the claim it is enough to show
that g∗ ∈ GS(δ, ˆ˜x). By way of contradiction, suppose that g∗ 6∈ GS(δ, ˆ˜x).
By Remark 1 (One-Shot Deviation Principle) this implies that there exist an i, an ht, an xˆt and a σi such
that
vi(σi, g−t∗i , g
∗
−i|ht, xˆt) > vi(g∗|ht, xˆt) (C.16)
Given the pair (ht, xˆt), consider the corresponding triple (y−1, κt, xt) as in Definition C.2. Given the last
two elements of this triple (κt, xt), now use (C.1) to find a message mti such that Mti(mti|κt, µi) > 0.
Using Lemmas C.1 and C.2 we can now conclude that (C.16) implies that
vti(σi, g
−t
i , g−i, µ
t
i, µ
−t
i , µ−i|mti, xt,ΦtBi ) > vti(gti, g−ti , g−i, µti, µ−ti , µ−i|mti, xt,ΦtBi ) (C.17)
where σi is the profitable deviation identified in (C.16) and gti and µ
t
i are the alternative action-stage and
message-stage strategies of Lemma C.3.
53Here and throughout the rest of the paper and the technical addendum, we denote by vti(g, µ|mti, xt,ΦtBi ) the continuation
payoff to player 〈i, t〉 given the profile (g, µ), after he has received message mti has observed the realization xt, and given that
his beliefs over the n− 1-tuple mt−i are ΦtBi . See also our Point of Notation T.1.1.
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However, using (C.15) of Lemma C.3, the inequality in (C.17) clearly implies that
vti(σi, g
−t
i , g−i, µ
t
i, µ
−t
i , µ−i|mti, xt,ΦtBi ) > vti(g, µ|mti, xt,ΦtBi ) (C.18)
But since (C.18) contradicts the fact that (g, µ,Φ) is an SE of the dynastic repeated game, the proof is now
complete.
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A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games: Technical Addendum
T.1. Notation
Point of Notation T.1.1: Abusing the notation we established for the standard repeated game, we adopt
the following notation for continuation payoffs in the dynastic repeated game. Let an assessment (g, µ,Φ) be
given.
Recall that we denote by vti(g, µ|mti, xt,ΦtBi ) the continuation payoff to player 〈i, t〉 given the profile
(g, µ), after he has received message mti, has observed the realization x
t, and given that his beliefs over the
n− 1-tuple mt−i are ΦtBi (see footnote 53). In view of our discussion at the beginning of Section 4, it is clear
that the only component of the system of beliefs Φ that is relevant to define this continuation payoff is in fact
ΦtBi . Our discussion there also implies that the argument m
t
i is redundant once Φ
tB
i has been specified. We
keep it in our notation since it helps streamline some of the arguments below.
We let vti(g, µ|mti, xt, at, yt,ΦtEi ) denote the continuation payoff (viewed from the beginning of period
t + 1) to player 〈i, t〉 given the profile (g, µ), after he has received message mti, has observed the triple
(xt, at, yt), and given that his beliefs over the n − 1-tuple mt+1−i are given by ΦtEi . In view of our discussion
at the beginning of Section 4, it is clear that once ΦtEi has been specified, the arguments (m
t
i, x
t, at, yt) are
redundant in determining the end-of-period continuation payoff to player 〈i, t〉. Whenever this does not cause
any ambiguity (about ΦtEi ) we will write v
t
i(g, µ|ΦtEi ) instead of vti(g, µ|mti, xt, at, yt,ΦtEi ).
As we noted in the text all continuation payoffs clearly depend on δ as well. To keep notation down this
dependence will be omitted whenever possible.
Point of Notation T.1.2: We will abuse our notation for ΦtBi (·), ΦtEi (·) and ΦtRi (·) slightly in the following
way. We will allow events of interest and conditioning events to appear as arguments of ΦtBi , Φ
tE
i and Φ
tR
i ,
to indicate their probabilities under these distributions.
So, for instance when we write ΦtBi (m
t
−i = (z, . . . , z)|mti) = c we mean that according to the beginning-of-
period beliefs of player 〈i, t〉, after observing mti, the probability that mt−i is equal to the n−1-tuple (z, . . . , z)
is equal to c.
Point of Notation T.1.3: Whenever the profile (g, µ) is a profile of completely mixed strategies, the beliefs
ΦtBi (·), ΦtEi (·) and ΦtRi (·) are of course entirely determined by what player 〈i, t〉 observes and by (g, µ) using
Bayes’ rule. In this case, we will allow the pair (g, µ) to appear as a “conditioning event.”
So, for instance, ΦtBi (m
t
−i|mti, g, µ) is the probability of the n− 1-tuple mt−i, after mti has been received,
obtained from the completely mixed profile (g, µ) via Bayes’ rule. Events may appear as arguments in this
case as well, consistently with our Point of Notation T.1.2 above.
Moreover, since the completely mixed pair (g, µ) determines the probabilities of all events, concerning
for instance histories, messages of previous cohorts and the like, we will use the notation Pr to indicate such
probabilities, using the pair (g, µ) as a conditioning event.
So, given any two events L and J , the notation Pr(L|J, g, µ) will indicate the probability of event L,
conditional on event J , as determined by the completely mixed pair (g, µ) via Bayes’ rule.
T.2. A Preliminary Result
Definition T.2.1: Consider the dynastic repeated game described in full in Section 3. Now consider the
dynastic repeated game obtained from this when we restrict the message space of player 〈i, t〉 to be M t+1i ⊆
Ht+1, with all other details unchanged.
We call this the restricted dynastic repeated game with message spaces {M ti }i∈I,t≥1. For any given
δ ∈ (0, 1), x˜ and y˜, we denote by GD(δ, x˜, y˜, {M ti }i∈I,t≥1) the set of SE strategy profiles, while we write
ED(δ, x˜, y˜, {M ti }i∈I,t≥1) for the set of SE payoff profiles of this dynastic repeated game with restricted message
spaces.
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Lemma T.2.1: Let any δ ∈ (0, 1), x˜ and y˜ be given. Consider now any restricted dynastic repeated game
with message spaces {M ti }i∈I,t≥1. Then ED(δ, x˜, y˜, {M ti }i∈I,t≥1) ⊆ ED(δ, x˜, y˜).
Proof: Let a profile (g∗, µ∗) ∈ GD(δ, x˜, y˜, {M ti }i∈I,t≥1) with associated beliefs Φ∗ be given. To prove the
statement, we proceed to construct a new profile (g∗∗, µ∗∗) ∈ GD(δ, x˜, y˜) and associated beliefs Φ∗∗ that are
consistent with (g∗∗, µ∗∗), and which gives every player the same payoff as (g∗, µ∗).
Denote a generic element ofM ti by z
t
i . SinceM
t
i ⊆Ht, we can partitionHt into ||M ti || non-empty mutually
exclusive exhaustive subsets, and make each of these subsets correspond to an element zti of M
t
i . In other
words, we can find a map ρti :M
t
i → 2H
t
such that ρti(z
t
i) 6= ∅ for all zti ∈M ti , ρti(zt′i ) ∩ ρti(zt′′i ) = ∅ whenever
zt′i 6= zt′′i , and
⋃
zti∈Mti ρ(z
t
i) = H
t.
We can now describe how the profile (g∗∗, µ∗∗) is obtained from the given (g∗, µ∗). We deal first with the
action stage. For any player 〈i, t〉, and any zti ∈ M ti , set
gt∗∗i (m
t
i, x) = g
t∗
i (z
t
i , x) ∀mti ∈ ρti(zti) (T.2.1)
At the message stage, for any player 〈i, t〉, any (zti , xt, at, yt), any mti ∈ ρti(zti), and any zt+1i ∈ Supp(µt∗i (zti ,
xt, at, yt)), set
µt∗∗i (m
t+1
i |mti, xt, at, yt) =
1∣∣∣∣ρt+1i (zt+1i )∣∣∣∣µt∗i (zt+1i |zti , xt, at, yt) ∀mt+1i ∈ ρt+1i (zt+1i ) (T.2.2)
Next, we describe Φ∗∗, starting with the beginning-of-period beliefs. For any player 〈i, t〉, any zti ∈ M ti
and any zt−i ∈ M t−i, set
ΦtB∗∗i (m
t
−i|mti) =
ΦtB∗i (z
t
−i|zti)
Πj 6=i
∣∣∣∣ρtj(ztj)∣∣∣∣ ∀mti ∈ ρti(zti), ∀mt−i ∈ Πj 6=iρtj(ztj) (T.2.3)
Similarly, concerning the end-of-period beliefs, for any player 〈i, t〉, any (zti , xt, at, yt) and any zt+1−i ∈ M t+1−i ,
set
ΦtE∗∗i (m
t+1
−i |mti, xt, at, yt) =
ΦtE∗i (z
t+1
−i |zti , xt, at, yt)
Πj 6=i
∣∣∣∣ρt+1j (zt+1j )∣∣∣∣ ∀mti ∈ ρti(zti), ∀mt+1−i ∈ Πj 6=iρt+1j (zt+1j )
(T.2.4)
Since the profile (g∗, µ∗) is sequentially rational given Φ∗, it is immediate from (T.2.1), (T.2.2), (T.2.3)
and (T.2.4) that the profile (g∗∗, µ∗∗) is sequentially rational given Φ∗∗, and we omit further details of the
proof of this claim.
Of course, it remains to show that (g∗∗, µ∗∗,Φ∗∗) is a consistent assessment.
Let (g∗ε , µ
∗
ε) be parameterized completely mixed strategies which converge to (g
∗, µ∗) and give rise, in the
limit as ε → 0, to beliefs Φ∗ via Bayes’ rule.
Given any ε > 0, let (g∗∗ε , µ
∗∗
ε ) be a profile of completely mixed strategies obtained from (g
∗
ε , µ
∗
ε) exactly
as in (T.2.1) and (T.2.2).
We start by verifying the consistency of the beginning-of-period beliefs. Observe that for any given zt =
(zti , z
t
−i), from (T.2.2) we know that whenever m
t = (mti,m
t
−i) ∈ Πj∈Iρtj(ztj)
Pr(mti,m
t
−i|g∗∗ε , µ∗∗ε ) =
Pr(zti , z
t
−i|g∗ε , µ∗ε)
Πj∈I
∣∣∣∣ρtj(ztj)∣∣∣∣ (T.2.5)
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Similarly, using (T.2.2) again we know that whenever mti ∈ ρti(zti)
Pr(mti|g∗∗ε , µ∗∗ε ) =
Pr(zti |g∗ε , µ∗ε)
||ρti(zti)||
(T.2.6)
Taking the ratio of (T.2.5) and (T.2.6) and taking the limit as ε → 0 now yields that for any any zti ∈ M ti
and any zt−i ∈ M t−i
lim
ε→0
ΦtB∗∗i (m
t
−i|mti, g∗∗ε , µ∗∗ε ) =
ΦtB∗i (z
t
−i|zti)
Πj 6=i
∣∣∣∣ρtj(ztj)∣∣∣∣ ∀mti ∈ ρti(zti), ∀mt−i ∈ Πj 6=iρtj(ztj) (T.2.7)
Hence we have shown that the beginning-of-period beliefs as in (T.2.3) are consistent with (g∗∗, µ∗∗).
The proof that the end-of-period beliefs as in (T.2.4) are consistent with (g∗∗, µ∗∗) runs along exactly the
same lines, and we omit the details.
T.3. Proof of Theorem 1: Preliminaries
Lemma T.3.1: Let (g, µ) be a strategy profile in the dynastic repeated game and assume µ is truthful
according to Definition 2.
Then there exists a system of beliefs Φ that is consistent with (g, µ) and such that for every i ∈ I, t ≥ 0,
mti ∈ Ht, xt ∈ X, at ∈ A and yt ∈ Y we have that
ΦtBi [m
t
−i = (m
t
i, . . . ,m
t
i) |mti] = 1 (T.3.1)
and
ΦtEi [m
t+1
−i = ((m
t
i, x
t, at), . . . , (mti, x
t, at)) | (mti, xt, at, yt)] = 1 (T.3.2)
In other words, Φ is such that every player 〈i, t〉 at the beginning of the period believes with probability one
that all other players in his cohort have received the same message as he has, and at the end of the period
believes that all other players in his cohort are sending the same (truthful and hence pure) message as he is.
Proof: We construct a sequence of completely mixed strategies in which deviations at the action stage are
much more likely than deviations at the message stage. We parameterize the sequence of perturbations by a
small positive number ε, which will eventually be shrunk to zero.
Given ε, the completely mixed strategy for player 〈i, t〉 at the action stage is denoted by gti,ε. Recall that
gti(m
t
i, x
t) is itself a mixed strategy in ∆(Ai). Then gti,ε is given by
T.1
gti,ε(m
t
i, x
t) = (1− ε 1(n+1)2t+1 ) gti(mti, xt) + ε
1
(n+1)2t+1 ν(Ai) (T.3.3)
Given ε, the completely mixed strategy for player 〈i, t〉 at the message stage is denoted by µti,ε. Recall
that µti(m
t
i, x
t, at, yt) is itself a mixed strategy in ∆(Ht+1). Then µti,ε is given by
µti,ε(m
t
i, x
t, at, yt) = (1− ε)µti(mti, xt, at, yt) + ε ν(Ht+1) (T.3.4)
In words, at the action stage, player 〈i, t〉 deviates from gti with probability ε
1
(n+1)2t+1 and all deviations
are equally likely. At the message stage, player 〈i, t〉 deviates from µti with probability ε, again with all
T.1ν(·) stands for the the uniform distribution. See also footnote 50.
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deviations equally likely. Denote by (gε, µε) the profile of completely mixed strategies we have just described.
Clearly, as ε→ 0 the profile (gε, µε) converges pointwise to (g, µ) as required.
Of course, to prove (T.3.1) it is enough to show that
lim
ε→0
ΦtBi [m
t
−i = (m
t
i, . . . ,m
t
i) |mti, gε, µε] = 1 (T.3.5)
Notice now that (T.3.5) follows almost immediately from the way we have defined the completely mixed
profile (gε, µε) in (T.3.3) and (T.3.4) above.
To see this, notice if mtj 6= mti for some j 6= i then it must be that at least one player 〈k ∈ I, τ〉 with τ
= 0, 1, . . . , t− 1 has “lied” his successor in the same dynasty. Given (T.3.4) this happens with a probability
that is an infinitesimal in ε of order 1 or higher.T.2 This needs to be compared with the overall probability
of observing mti. Clearly many paths of play could have generated this outcome. However, one way in which
mti can arise is certainly that the true history h
t is equal to mti and that no player has ever deviated from
truth-telling. In the worst case the true history being equal to mti will involve all players 〈j ∈ I, τ〉 deviating
from gτj in every τ ≤ t− 1. Using (T.3.3) this is an infinitesimal in ε of order at most n
∑t−1
τ=0 1/(n+ 1)2
τ+1
< n/(n + 1). Hence, the overall probability of observing mti cannot be lower than an infinitesimal of order
n/(n+ 1). Since 1 > n/(n+ 1), equation (T.3.5) now follows.T.3
The proof of (T.3.2) is the exact analogue of the proof of (T.3.1) we have just given, and hence we omit
the details.
T.4. Proof of Theorem 1
Fix a δ ∈ (0, 1), a x˜ and any profile g∗ ∈ GS(δ, x˜). Then there exists a profile µ∗ of message strategies which
are truthful in the sense of Definition 2 and such that (g∗, µ∗) ∈ GD(δ, x˜, y˜) for every finite random variable
y˜.
Since the strategies µ∗ are truthful, we know from Lemma T.3.1 that there is a system of beliefs Φ∗
that is consistent with (g∗, µ∗) for which (T.3.1) and (T.3.2) hold. We will show that beliefs Φ∗ support the
strategies (g∗, µ∗) as an SE of the dynastic repeated game regardless of y˜. Indeed, notice that since µt∗i is
truthful for every player 〈i, t〉, we know from Definition 2 that all players in fact ignore the realization of the
message-stage randomization device. Hence our argument below is trivially valid for any y˜.
We simply check that no player 〈i, t〉 has an incentive to deviate either at the action or at the communi-
cation stage.
Consider player 〈i, t〉 at the communication stage, after observing (mti, xt, at, yt). If he sends message
mt+1i = (m
t
i, x
t, at) as prescribed by µt∗i , given that his beliefs are Φ
tE∗
i his expected continuation payoff is
Ex˜t+1vi(g∗|mti, xt, at, x˜t+1). Notice that by construction we know that this continuation payoff is equal to
Ex˜t+1vi(g∗|ht+1, x˜t+1) when we set ht+1 = (mti, xt, at), namely the expected continuation payoff to player
i given g∗ in the standard repeated game after history ht+1 = (mti, x
t, at) has taken place, and before the
realization of x˜t+1 has been observed.
We now need to check that player 〈i, t〉 cannot gain by deviating and sending any other (mixed) message
φti ∈ ∆(Ht+1). Given that the strategies µ∗ are truthful and that his beliefs are ΦtE∗i , his expected contin-
uation payoff following such deviation clearly cannot be above maxgi Ex˜t+1vi(gi, g
∗
−i|ht+1, x˜t+1) when we set
ht+1 = (mti, x
t, at). In other words it cannot exceed the maximum (by choice of gi) expected continuation
payoff that player i can achieve in the standard repeated game after history ht+1 = (mti, x
t, at) given that all
T.2Throughout, we use the words “infinitesimal in ε of order z” to indicate any quantity that can be written as a constant
times εz . Similarly, we use the words “infinitesimal of order higher than z” to mean any quantity that can be written as a
constant times εz
′
, with z′ > z.
T.3It is instructive to notice essentially the same argument we are following here is enough to show that in fact, upon receiving
mti player 〈i, t〉 will assign probability one to the event that the true history of play is equal to mti. Formally this would be
expressed as limε→0 Pr (ht = mti| mti, gε, µε) = 1.
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other players are playing according to g∗−i. However, since g
∗ ∈ GS(δ, x˜) we know that Ex˜t+1vi(g∗|ht+1, x˜t+1)
= maxgi Ex˜t+1vi(gi, g
∗
−i|ht+1, x˜t+1). Hence, we can conclude that no player 〈i, t〉 cannot gain by deviating in
this way.
Now consider player 〈i, t〉 at the action stage, after observing (mti, xt). If player 〈i, t〉 follows the prescri-
ption of gt∗i given that his beliefs are Φ
tE∗
i his expected continuation payoff is given by vi(g
∗|mti, xt). If he
deviates to playing any other σi ∈ ∆(Ai), given his beliefs, his expected continuation payoff is vi(σi, g−ti ,
g∗−i|mti, xt). Since g∗ ∈ GS(δ, x˜), by (4) of Remark 1 we can then conclude that he cannot gain by deviating
in this way.
T.5. Proof of Theorem 2: Beliefs
Definition T.5.1: Using the notation of Defintion A.1, let
vˆ =
1
1− q
||A||∑
`=2
p (a(`))u(a(`)) (T.5.1)
and
v′ = qu(a′) + (1− q)vˆ (T.5.2)
Remark T.5.1: Let vˆ and v′ be as in Lemma T.5.1, then
v∗ = qu(a∗) + (1− q)vˆ (T.5.3)
and
v∗ − v′ = q[u(a∗)− u(a′)] (T.5.4)
so that using our assumptions about a∗ and a′
v∗i − v′i > 0 ∀ i ∈ I (T.5.5)
Remark T.5.2: Given that α ∈ (0, 1) is such that such that (A.3) of Definition A.3 holds, then simple
algebra shows that the interval(
ui − ui
(1− α) (v∗i − v′i)
,
ui (a′)− ui
(
a∗i , a
′
−i
)
α (v∗i − v′i)
)
(T.5.6)
is not empty for every i ∈ I.
Definition T.5.2: Using Remark T.5.2, for each i ∈ I, define ri to be a number in the interval in (T.5.6).
Moreover, for each i ∈ I define βi(δ) = (1− δ)ri. Notice that, given ri, as δ grows towards one, clearly βi(δ)
∈ (0, 1).
Definition T.5.3. Beginning-of-Period Beliefs: The beginning-of-period beliefs of all players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉 are
trivial. Of course, all players believe that all other players have received the null message m0i .
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The beginning-of-period beliefs ΦtBi (m
t
i) of any other player 〈i, t〉, depending on the message he receives
from player 〈i, t− 1〉 are as follows
if mti = m
∗ then mt−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability 1
if mti = m
A then mt−i = (m
A, . . . ,mA) with probability 1
if mti = m
B then
{
mt−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability βi(δ)
mt−i = (m
B , . . . ,mB) with probability 1− βi(δ)
(T.5.7)
Definition T.5.4. End-of-Period Beliefs: For ease of notation, we divide our description of the end-of-period
beliefs of player 〈i, t〉 into two cases: xt = x(1), and xt = x(`) with ` ≥ 2.T.4
For any player 〈i, t〉, whenever xt = x(1), let ΦtEi (mti, x(1), at, yt) be as followsT.5
if at = (a′j , a
∗
−j) and y
t = y(0) then mt+1−i = (m
A, . . . ,mA) with probability 1
if mti = m
A, at = (a∗j , a
′
−j) and y
t = y(0) then mt+1−i = (m
A, . . . ,mA) with probability 1
if mti = m
A, at = a′ and yt = y(0) then mt+1−i = (m
A, . . . ,mA) with probability 1
if mti = m
B and at = a′ then mt+1−i = (m
B , . . . ,mB) with probability 1
if mti = m
B and at = (a∗j , a
′
−j) then m
t+1
−i = (m
B , . . . ,mB) with probability 1
if atj 6∈ {a∗j , a′j} for some j ∈ I then mt+1−i = (mB , . . . ,mB) with probability 1
in all other cases mt+1−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability 1
(T.5.8)
For any player 〈i, t〉, whenever xt = x(`) with ` ≥ 2 let ΦtEi (mti, x(`), at, yt) be as follows
if at = x(`), mti = m
A and yt = y(0) then mt+1−i = (m
A, . . . ,mA) with probability 1
if at 6= x(`) then mt+1−i = (mB , . . . ,mB) with probability 1
if at = x(`) and mti = m
∗ then mt+1−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability 1
if at = x(`), mti = m
A and yt = y(1) then mt+1−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability 1
if at = x(`) and mt−1i = m
B then
{
mt+1−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) prob. βi(δ)
mt+1−i = (m
B , . . . ,mB) prob. 1− βi(δ)
(T.5.9)
T.6. Proof of Theorem 2: Sequential Rationality
We begin by checking the sequential rationality of the message strategies we have defined.
T.4In the interest of brevity, we avoid writing down the end-of-period beliefs for players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉 separately. Equations (T.5.8)
and (T.5.9) that follow can be interpreted as defining the end-of-period beliefs of the time 0 players by re-defining m0i to be
equal to m∗ for all players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉.
T.5Using a short-hand version of notation established in Definition A.6, when, for instance, we write at = (a∗j , a
′
−j), we mean
that this is the case for some j ∈ I.
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Definition T.6.1: Let I tEi denote the end-of-period-t collection of information sets that belong to player
〈i, t〉, with typical element ItEi .
It is convenient to partition I tEi into four mutually disjoint exhaustive subsets on the basis of the asso-
ciated beliefs of player 〈i, t〉.
Let I tEi (∗) ⊂ I tEi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt+1−i is equal
to (m∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtEi (∗). Notice that these information
sets are those in the last case of (T.5.8) and the third and fourth case of (T.5.9).
Let I tEi (A) ⊂ I tEi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt+1−i is equal to
(mA, . . . ,mA) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtEi (A). Notice that these information
sets are those in the first three cases of (T.5.8) and the first case of (T.5.9).
Let I tEi (B) ⊂ I tEi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt+1−i is equal to
(mB , . . . ,mB) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtEi (B). Notice that these information
sets are those in fourth, fifth and sixth cases of (T.5.8), and the second case of (T.5.9).
Finally, let I tEi (∗B) ⊂ I tEi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt+1−i
is equal to (m∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability βi(δ) and to (mB , . . . ,mB) with probability 1−βi(δ). These beliefs
will be denoted by ΦtEi (∗B). Notice that these information sets are those in the last case of (T.5.9).
Definition T.6.2: Given the strategy profile (g, µ) that we defined in Section A.2 and given Definition T.6.1,
we can appeal to the stationarity of the game and of (g, µ) to define the following.
With a slight abuse of notation, for any pair of messages m and mˆ both in {m∗,mA,mB}, we denote by
vi(m, mˆ, δ) the end-of-period-t (discounted as of the beginning of period t + 1) payoff to player 〈i, t〉, if he
sends message m, and all other players send message mˆ.
Lemma T.6.1: Let the assessment (g, µ,Φ) described in Section A.2 be given. Then the end-of-period
continuation payoffs for any player 〈i, t〉 at information sets Iti ∈ {I tEi (∗)∪I tEi (A)∪I tEi (B)} are as follows.T.6
vti(g, µ|ΦtEi (∗)) = vi(m∗,m∗, δ) = v∗i (T.6.1)
vti(g, µ|ΦtEi (A)) = vi(mA,mA, δ) = αv′i + (1− α)v∗i (T.6.2)
vti(g, µ|ΦtEi (B)) = vi(mB ,mB , δ) = v′i (T.6.3)
Proof: The first equalities in equations (T.6.1), (T.6.2) and (T.6.3) are obvious from Definitions T.6.1 and
T.6.2.
Equations (T.6.1), (T.6.3) are a direct consequence of the way we have defined strategies and beliefs in
Section A.2, and we omit the details. To see that (T.6.2) holds notice that we can write this continuation
payoff recursively as
vi(mA,mA, δ) = (1− δ)v′i + δ
[
γ(δ)vi(m∗,m∗, δ) + (1− γ(δ))vi(mA,mA, δ)
]
(T.6.4)
Substituting the definition of γ(δ) given in (A.4), substituting (T.6.1), and solving for vi(mA,mA, δ) yields
(T.6.2).
Lemma T.6.2: Given the beliefs described in Definition T.5.4, for δ sufficiently close to one, no player 〈i, t〉
has an incentive to deviate from the message strategy described in Definition A.6 at any information set ItEi
∈ I tEi (∗).
T.6See our Point of Notation T.1.1 above.
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Proof: From Lemma T.6.1, if player 〈i, t〉 follows the equilibrium message strategy µti, then his continuation
payoff is as in (T.6.1). If he deviates and sends mA instead of m∗, we can write his payoff recursively as
follows
vi(mA,m∗, δ) =
q
{
(1− δ)ui(a′i, a∗−i) + δ
[
γ(δ)vi(m∗,m∗, δ) + (1− γ(δ))vi(mA,mA, δ)
]}
+
(1− q){(1− δ)vˆi + δ [γ(δ)vi(m∗,m∗, δ) + (1− γ(δ))vi(mA,m∗, δ)]}
(T.6.5)
Substituting (T.6.1) and (T.6.2) and solving for vi(mA,m∗, δ) yields
vi(mA,m∗, δ) =
1
1− (1− q)δ(1− (1− δ)(1− α)
αδ
)
{
(1− δ)[qui(a′i, a∗−i) + (1− q)vˆi] + (1− δ)(1− α)
v∗i
α
+
qδ(1− (1− δ)(1− α)
αδ
)(αv′i + (1− α)v∗i )
}
(T.6.6)
From (T.6.6) we get directly that
lim
δ→1
vi(mA,m∗, δ) = αv′i + (1− α)v∗i (T.6.7)
and since the right-hand side of (T.6.7) is obviously less than vi(m∗,m∗, δ) = v∗i , we can conclude that player
〈i, t〉 cannot gain by deviating to sending message mA instead of m∗ when δ is large enough.
If player 〈i, t〉 deviates and sends message mB instead of m∗ we can write his payoff recursively as follows
vi(mB ,m∗, δ) =
q
{
(1− δ)ui(a′i, a∗−i) + δ
[
γ(δ)vi(m∗,m∗, δ) + (1− γ(δ))vi(mA,mA, δ)
]}
+
(1− q){(1− δ)vˆi + δvi(mB ,m∗, δ)}
(T.6.8)
Substituting (T.6.1) and (T.6.2) and solving for vi(mB ,m∗, δ) yields
vi(mB ,m∗, δ) =
1
1− (1− q)δ{
(1− δ)[qui(a′i, a∗−i) + (1− q)vˆi] + (1− δ)(1− α)
qv∗i
α
+
qδ(1− (1− δ)(1− α)
αδ
)(αv′i + (1− α)v∗i )
}
(T.6.9)
As for the previous case, if δ is sufficiently large, the deviation does not pay since from (T.6.9) we get directly
that
lim
δ→1
vi(mB ,m∗, δ) = αv′i + (1− α)v∗i (T.6.10)
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Hence the lemma is proved.
Lemma T.6.3: Given the beliefs described in Definition T.5.4, for δ sufficiently close to one, no player 〈i, t〉
has an incentive to deviate from the message strategy described in Definition A.6 at any information set ItEi
∈ I tEi (A).
Proof: From Lemma T.6.1, if player 〈i, t〉 follows the equilibrium message strategy µti, then his continuation
payoff is as in (T.6.2). If he deviates and sends m∗ instead of mA, we can write his payoff recursively as
follows
vi(m∗,mA, δ) =
q
{
(1− δ)ui(a∗i , a′−i) + δ
[
γ(δ)vi(m∗,m∗, δ) + (1− γ(δ))vi(m∗,mA, δ)
]}
+
(1− q){(1− δ)vˆi + δ [γ(δ)vi(m∗,m∗, δ) + (1− γ(δ))vi(m∗,mA, δ)]}
(T.6.11)
Substituting (T.6.1) and solving for vi(m∗,mA, δ) yields
vi(m∗,mA, δ) = α
[
qui(a∗i , a
′
−i) + (1− q)vˆi
]
+ (1− α)v∗i (T.6.12)
and since the right-hand side of (T.6.12) is obviously less than vi(mA,mA, δ) = αv′i + (1 − α)v∗i , we can
conclude that player 〈i, t〉 cannot gain by deviating to sending message m∗ instead of mA when δ is large
enough.
If player 〈i, t〉 deviates and sends message mB instead of mA we can write his payoff recursively as follows
vi(mB ,mA, δ) = (1− δ)v′i + δ
[
γ(δ)vi(mB ,m∗, δ) + (1− γ(δ))vi(mB ,mA, δ)
]
(T.6.13)
Solving for vi(mB ,mA, δ), using the definition of γ(δ) given in (A.4) yields
vi(mB ,mA, δ) = αv′i + (1− α)vi(mB ,m∗, δ) (T.6.14)
Using (T.6.10) this is clearly enough to show that for δ high enough player 〈i, t〉 cannot gain by deviating in
this way. Hence the lemma is proved.
Lemma T.6.4: Given the beliefs described in Definition T.5.4 no player 〈i, t〉 has an incentive to deviate
from the message strategy described in Definition A.6 at any information set ItEi ∈ I tEi (B).
Proof: From Lemma T.6.1, if player 〈i, t〉 follows the equilibrium message strategy µti, then his continuation
payoff is as in (T.6.3). If he deviates and sends m∗ instead of mB , we can write his payoff recursively as
follows
vi(m∗,mB , δ) = (1− δ)
[
qui(a∗i , a
′
−i) + (1− q)vˆi
]
+ δvi(m∗,mB , δ) (T.6.15)
Solving for vi(m∗,mB , δ) yields
vi(m∗,mB , δ) = qui(a∗i , a
′
−i) + (1− q)vˆi (T.6.16)
Since the right-hand side of (T.6.16) is strictly less than vi(mB ,mB , δ), this is clearly enough to show that
for δ high enough player 〈i, i〉 cannot gain by deviating in this way.
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Now suppose that player 〈i, t〉 deviates and send message mA instead of mB . Then we can write his
continuation payoff recursively as
vi(mA,mB , δ) =
(1− δ) [qui(a′) + (1− q)vˆi] + δ
[
γ(δ)vi(m∗,mB , δ) + (1− γ(δ))vi(mA,mB , δ)
] (T.6.17)
Solving for vi(mA,mB , δ) gives us
vi(mA,mB , δ) = αv′i + (1− α)vi(m∗,mB , δ) (T.6.18)
Since the right-hand side of (T.6.18) is strictly less than vi(mB ,mB , δ), this is clearly enough to show that
player 〈i, i〉 cannot gain by deviating in this way. Hence the lemma is proved.
Lemma T.6.5: Given the beliefs described in Definition T.5.4, for δ sufficiently close to one, no player 〈i, t〉
has an incentive to deviate from the message strategy described in Definition A.6 at any information set ItEi
∈ I tEi (∗B).
Proof: From Lemma T.6.1, and the last case in (T.5.9) if player 〈i, t〉 follows the equilibrium message strategy
µti, then his continuation payoff is
(1− βi(δ))vi(mB ,mB , δ) + βi(δ)vi(mB ,m∗, δ) (T.6.19)
From Definition T.5.2 it is clear that limδ→1 βi(δ) = 0. Hence, using (T.6.3) we can write
lim
δ→1
(1− βi(δ))vi(mB ,mB , δ) + βi(δ)vi(mB ,m∗, δ) = v′i (T.6.20)
If he deviates and sends message m∗ instead of mB , we can write his continuation payoff as
(1− βi(δ))vi(m∗,mB , δ) + βi(δ)vi(m∗,m∗, δ) (T.6.21)
Using again the fact that limδ→1 βi(δ) = 0 and (T.6.15) we can write
lim
δ→1
(1− βi(δ))vi(m∗,mB , δ) + βi(δ)vi(m∗,m∗, δ) = qui(a∗i , a′−i) + (1− q)vˆi (T.6.22)
Since the quantity on the right-hand side of (T.6.20) is clearly greater than the quantity on the right-hand
side of (T.6.22) we can then conclude that, for δ close enough to one, player 〈i, t〉 cannot gain by deviating
in this way.
Suppose now that player 〈i, t〉 deviates to sending message mA instead of mB . Then we can write his
continuation payoff as
(1− βi(δ))vi(mA,mB , δ) + βi(δ)vi(mA,m∗, δ) (T.6.23)
Using once more the fact that limδ→1 βi(δ) = 0, (T.6.18) and (T.6.16) we can write
lim
δ→1
(1− βi(δ))vi(mA,mB , δ) + βi(δ)vi(mA,m∗, δ) = αv′i + (1− α)
[
qui(a∗i , a
′
−i) + (1− q)vˆi
]
(T.6.24)
Since the quantity on the right-hand side of (T.6.20) is clearly greater than the quantity on the right-hand
side of (T.6.24) we can then conclude that, for δ close enough to one, player 〈i, t〉 cannot gain by deviating
in this way. Hence the lemma is proved.
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Remark T.6.1: From Lemmas T.6.2, T.6.3, T.6.4 and T.6.5 it is clear that there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such
that whenever δ > δ the message strategies of Definition A.6 are sequentially rational given the beliefs of
Definition T.5.4.
We now turn to the sequential rationality of the action strategies we have defined in Section A.2.
Definition T.6.3: Recall that at the action stage, player 〈i, t〉 chooses an action after having received a
message mti and having observed a realization x
t of the randomization device x˜t.
Let I tBi denote period-t action-stage collection of information sets that belong to player 〈i, t〉, with typical
element ItBi . Clearly, each element of I tBi is identified by a pair (mti, xt).
It is convenient to partition I tBi into three mutually disjoint exhaustive subsets on the basis of the
message mti received by player 〈i, t〉.T.7
Let I tBi (∗) ⊂ I tBi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 receives message m∗. Notice
that using Definition T.5.3 we know that in this case player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt−i is equal to (m∗, . . . ,m∗)
with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtBi (∗).
Let I tBi (A) ⊂ I tBi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 receives message mA. Notice
that using Definition T.5.3 we know that in this case player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt−i is equal to (mA, . . . ,mA)
with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtBi (A).
Finally, let I tBi (B) ⊂ I tBi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 receives message
mB . Notice that using Definition T.5.3 we know that in this case player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt−i is equal to
(m∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability βi(δ) and to (mB , . . . ,mB) with probability 1 − βi(δ). These beliefs will be
denoted by ΦtBi (∗B).
Lemma T.6.6: Given the beliefs described in Definition T.5.3, for δ sufficiently close to one, no player 〈i, t〉
has an incentive to deviate from the action strategy described in Definition A.5 at any information set ItBi ∈
I tBi (∗).
Proof: Given any xt ∈ X, if player 〈i, t〉 follows the equilibrium action strategy he achieves a payoff is that
bounded below by
(1− δ)ui + δv∗i (T.6.25)
Given any xt ∈ X, (using the notation of Definition T.6.2) following any possible deviation player 〈i, t〉
achieves a payoff that is bounded above by
(1− δ)ui + δ
[
γ(δ)vi(m∗,m∗, δ) + (1− γ(δ))vi(mA,mA, δ)
]
(T.6.26)
Using (T.6.1), (T.6.2) and the definition of γ(δ) given in (A.4), we can re-write (T.6.26) as
(1− δ)ui + δαv′i
[
1− (1− δ)(1− α)
δα
]
+ δv∗i
{
1− α
[
1− (1− δ)(1− α)
δα
]}
(T.6.27)
Taking the limit of (T.6.25) as δ → 1 gives v∗i . Taking the limit of (T.6.27) as δ → 1 gives αv′i + (1− α)v∗i .
Since v∗i > αv
′
i + (1− α)v∗i this is clearly enough to prove the claim.
Lemma T.6.7: Given the beliefs described in Definition T.5.3, for δ sufficiently close to one, no player 〈i, t〉
has an incentive to deviate from the action strategy described in Definition A.5 at any information set ItBi ∈
I tBi (A).
T.7In the interest of brevity, we avoid an explicit distinction between the t = 0 players and all others. What follows can be
interpreted as applying to all players re-defining m0i to be equal to m
∗ for players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉.
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Proof: We distinguish between the information set in I tBi (A) that has xt = x(1) and those that have xt 6=
x(1). We begin with the information set in which xt = x(1).
After having observed the pair (mA, x(1)), if he follows the equilibrium strategy, player 〈i, t〉 achieves a
continuation payoff of
(1− δ)ui(a′) + δ
[
γ(δ)vi(m∗,m∗, δ) + (1− γ(δ))vi(mA,mA, δ)
]
(T.6.28)
Now consider a deviation to action a∗i . In this case the continuation payoff is
(1− δ)ui(a∗i , a′−i) + δ
[
γ(δ)vi(m∗,m∗, δ) + (1− γ(δ))vi(mA,mA, δ)
]
(T.6.29)
Clearly this deviation is not profitable since ui(a∗i , a
′
−i) < ui(a
′).
A deviation to an action ai 6∈ {a′i, a∗i } yields a continuation payoff that is bounded above by
(1− δ)ui + δv′i (T.6.30)
Taking the limit of (T.6.28) as δ → 1 yields αv′i + (1 − α)v∗i . Hence, for δ large enough, the quantity in
(T.6.28) is greater that the quantity in (T.6.30). Therefore, for δ close enough to one, this deviation is not
profitable either.
Now consider any information set in I tBi (A) with xt 6= x(1). The continuation payoff to player 〈i, t〉 from
following the equilibrium strategy is bounded below by
(1− δ)ui + δ
[
γ(δ)vi(m∗,m∗, δ) + (1− γ(δ))vi(mA,mA, δ)
]
(T.6.31)
The continuation payoff to player 〈i, t〉 following any deviation is bounded above by
(1− δ)ui + δv′i (T.6.32)
Taking the limit of (T.6.31) as δ → 1 yields αv′i + (1 − α)v∗i . Hence, for δ large enough, the quantity
in (T.6.31) is greater that the quantity in (T.6.32). Therefore, for δ close enough to one, no deviation is
profitable at any information set in I tBi (A) with xt 6= x(1).
Lemma T.6.8: Given the beliefs described in Definition T.5.3, for δ sufficiently close to one, no player 〈i, t〉
has an incentive to deviate from the action strategy described in Definition A.5 at any information set ItBi ∈
I tBi (B).
Proof: We distinguish between the information set in I tBi (B) that has xt = x(1) and those that have xt 6=
x(1). We begin with the information set in which xt = x(1).
After having observed the pair (mB , x(1)), if he follows the equilibrium strategy, player 〈i, t〉 achieves a
continuation payoff of
βi(δ)
[
(1− δ)ui(a′i, a∗−i) + δ(γ(δ)vi(m∗,m∗, δ) + (1− γ(δ))vi(mA,mA, δ))
]
+
(1− βi(δ))
[
(1− δ)ui(a′) + δvi(mB ,mB , δ)
] (T.6.33)
If on the other hand he deviates to action a∗i his continuation payoff is
βi(δ) [(1− δ)ui(a∗) + δvi(m∗,m∗, δ)] + (1− βi(δ))
[
(1− δ)ui(a∗i , a′−i) + δvi(mB ,mB , δ)
]
(T.6.34)
Using (T.6.1) (T.6.2) (T.6.3) and Definition T.5.2, we can now write the equilibrium continuation payoff in
(T.6.33) minus the deviation continuation payoff in (T.6.34) as
(1− δ){ri(1− δ) [ui(a′i, a∗−i)− ui(a∗)]+
riδ(1− γ(δ))α(v′i − v∗i ) + (1− (1− δ)ri)
[
ui(a′)− ui(a∗i , a′−i)
]} (T.6.35)
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Dividing (T.6.35) by 1− δ, taking the limit as δ → 1 and using (A.4), yields that (up to a factor 1− δ) this
difference in payoffs in the limit is equal to
riα(v′i − v∗i ) + ui(a′)− ui(a∗i , a′−i) (T.6.36)
Notice now that using the (upper) bound on ri given in (T.5.6) we can verify that the quantity in (T.6.36)
is positive. Hence we can conclude that deviating to a∗i is in fact not profitable for player 〈i, t〉.
Next, consider a deviation to an action ai 6∈ {a′i, a∗i }. Following this deviation, the continuation payoff to
player 〈i, t〉 is bounded above by
(1− δ)ui + δvi(mB ,mB , δ) (T.6.37)
Using (T.6.1), (T.6.2), (T.6.3) and Definition T.5.2, we can now write the equilibrium continuation payoff in
(T.6.33) minus the deviation continuation payoff in (T.6.37) as
(1− δ){δri(1− α(1− γ(δ)))(v∗i − v′i) + (1− δ)riui(a′i, a∗−i) + (1− (1− δ)ri)ui(a′)− ui} (T.6.38)
Dividing (T.6.38) by 1 − δ, taking the limit as δ → 1 and using (A.4) and the fact that βi(δ) = (1 − δ)ri,
yields that (up to a factor 1− δ) this difference in payoffs in the limit is equal to
ri(1− α)(v∗i − v′i) + ui(a′)− ui (T.6.39)
Notice now that using the (lower) bound on ri given in (T.5.6) we can verify that the quantity in (T.6.39) is
positive. Hence we can conclude that deviating to ai 6∈ {a′i, a∗i } is in fact not profitable for player 〈i, t〉.
Now consider an information set in I tBi (B) that has xt 6= x(1). If he follows his equilibrium strategy,
player 〈i, t〉 achieves a continuation payoff that is bounded below by
(1− δ)ui + δ[βi(δ)vi(mB ,m∗, δ) + (1− βi(δ))vi(mB ,mB , δ)] (T.6.40)
His continuation payoff following any deviation is bounded above by
(1− δ)ui + δvi(mB ,mB , δ) (T.6.41)
Using (T.6.3) and Definition T.5.2, we can now write the equilibrium continuation payoff in (T.6.40) minus
the deviation continuation payoff in (T.6.41) as
(1− δ){ui − ui + δri[vi(mB ,m∗, δ)− v′i]} (T.6.42)
Dividing (T.6.42) by 1 − δ, taking the limit as δ → 1 and using (T.6.10), yields that (up to a factor 1 − δ)
this difference in payoffs in the limit is equal to
ui − ui + ri(1− α)(v∗i − v′i) (T.6.43)
Notice now that using the (lower) bound on ri given in (T.5.6) we can verify that the quantity in (T.6.43)
is positive. Hence we can conclude that deviating from the equilibrium strategy at any information set in
I tBi (B) that has xt 6= x(1) is in fact not profitable for player 〈i, t〉. Therefore, the proof is now complete.
Remark T.6.2: From Lemmas T.6.6, T.6.7 and T.6.8 it is clear that there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
whenever δ > δ the action strategies of Definition A.5 are sequentially rational given the beliefs of Definition
T.5.3.
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T.7. Proof of Theorem 2: Consistency of Beliefs
Definition T.7.1: For every i ∈ I, let
ψi(δ) =
(1− δ)ri
∑
j∈I(||Aj || − 1− q)
1− (1− δ)ri (T.7.1)
where q is as in Definition A.1, and ri is as in Definition T.5.2.
Remark T.7.1: For δ sufficiently close to 1, it is clear that the ψi(δ) of equation (T.7.1) is in (0, 1).
Remark T.7.2: Let (gε, µε) be a completely mixed strategy profile of Definitions A.8 and A.9. It is then
straightforward to check that as ε → 0 the profile (gε, µε) converges pointwise to the equilibrium strategy
profile described in Definitions A.5 and A.6, as required.
Lemma T.7.1: Let (gε, µε) be the completely mixed strategy profile of Definitions A.8 and A.9. Let any
t ≥ 2 and any quadruple of the type (mti, xt, at, yt) be given.T.8
ThenT.9
lim
ε→0
Pr [mt−1 = (m∗, . . . ,m∗) |mti, xt, at, yt, gε, µε] = 1 (T.7.2)
Proof: In order for mt−1 6= (m∗, . . . ,m∗) to occur it is necessary that at least one player has deviated from
the equilibrium strategy in some period τ ≤ t−2, either at the action or at the message stage (or both). Given
the completely mixed strategy profile of Definitions A.8 and A.9 and given that from (A.10) we know that
trembles become more likely as t increases, we then know that the probability of event mt−1 6= (m∗, . . . ,m∗)
is an infinitesimal in εt−2 of order no lower than 1/2.T.10 Hence, using (A.10) the probability of mt−1 6=
(m∗, . . . ,m∗) is an infinitesimal in ε of order no lower than 1/2n2(t−2).
The probability of mt−1 6= (m∗, . . . ,m∗) needs to be compared with the probability of the quadruple
(mti, x
t, at, yt). Depending on the particular quadruple (mti, x
t, at, yt), it is possible that many paths of play
could have generated this outcome. However, a lower bound on this probability can be computed as follows.
Assume no deviations up to and including period t − 2. From Definition A.9 the probability that message
mti is sent by player 〈i, t〉 is at least (if a deviation is required) an infinitesimal in εt−1 of order 2. From
Definition A.8, the probability of any profile at (depending on the number of deviations required; clearly no
more than n) is at least an infinitesimal in εt of order n. Hence, using (A.10), the probability of the quadruple
(mti, x
t, at, yt) is no smaller than an infinitesimal in ε of order 2/n2(t−1) + 1/n2t−1.
Since n ≥ 3 it is straightforward to check that 1/2n2(t−2) > 2/n2(t−1) + 1/n2t−1. Hence equation (T.7.2)
now follows and the proof is complete.T.11
Lemma T.7.2: Let (gε, µε) be the completely mixed strategy profile of Definitions A.8 and A.9. Let any
t ≥ 2 and any quadruple of the type (mti, xt, at, yt) be given.T.12 Fix also any array mˆ−i = (mˆ1, . . . ,
mˆi−1, mˆi+1, . . . , mˆn).
T.8The reason we require that t ≥ 2 in (T.7.2) below is that of course all players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉 receive message m0i for sure.
T.9See our point of notation T.1.3 above.
T.10See footnote T.2 for an explicit statement of our (standard) terminology concerning infinitesimals.
T.11It is worth pointing out that the bounds on probabilities that we have used in this argument are not “tight.” We have
used the ones above simply because they facilitate the exposition. Any tight bounds would necessarily involve a case-by-case
treatment according to what the equilibrium strategies prescribe, the particular message vector mt−1 6= (m∗, . . . ,m∗) and the
particular quadruple (mti, x
t, at, yt).
T.12The reason we require that t ≥ 2 in (T.7.2) below is that of course all players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉 receive message m0i for sure.
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Then
lim
ε→0
Pr [mt−i = mˆ−i |mti, xt, at, yt, gε, µε] =
lim
ε→0
Pr [mt−i = mˆ−i |mti, xt, at, yt,mt−1 = (m∗, . . . ,m∗), gε, µε]
(T.7.3)
Proof: A routine application of Bayes’ rule yields
Pr [mt−i = mˆ−i |mti, xt, at, yt, gε, µε] =
Pr [mt−i = mˆ−i |mti, xt, at, yt,mt−1 = (m∗, . . . ,m∗), gε, µε]
Pr [mt−1 = (m∗, . . . ,m∗) |mti, xt, at, yt, gε, µε]+∑
m6=(m∗,...,m∗)
Pr [mt−i = mˆ−i |mti, xt, at, yt,mt−1 = m, gε, µε]Pr (mt−1 = m |mti, xt, at, yt, gε, µε)
(T.7.4)
Now take the limit as ε → 0 on both sides of (T.7.4). Next, observe that by Lemma T.7.1 all terms in the
summation sign must converge to zero and the second term on the right-hand-side of (T.7.4) must converge
to one. Hence (T.7.3) follows and the proof is now complete.
Lemma T.7.3: The strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions A.5 and A.6 and the beginning-of-period
beliefs described in Definition T.5.3 are consistent.
Proof: For the players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉 there is nothing to prove. When t = 1, clearly all players 〈i ∈ I, 1〉 believe
that all preceding players received their respective m0i . When t ≥ 2, given Lemma T.7.2 we can reason taking
it as given that all players 〈i ∈ I, t〉 believe that all players 〈i ∈ I, t − 1〉 received message m∗. Given this
observation the claim for period t follows easily by a case-by-case examination, comparing the likelihood of
deviations in period t−1 (orders of infinitesimals in εt−1). We omit the details entirely for the first two cases
of (T.5.7) (in which messages m∗ and mA are received).
To see the consistency of the beliefs postulated in the third case of (T.5.7) (when message mB is received)
observe the following. According to Definition A.8 deviations at the action stage of period t−1 after receiving
message m∗ have probability εt−1. Moreover, according to Definition A.9, after receiving message m∗ player
〈i, t − 1〉 sends message mB with probability ψi(δ) εt−1 when the equilibrium strategy prescribes to send
message m∗. Using Lemma T.7.2, (T.7.1) and Definition T.5.2 it is then immediate to see that Definitions
A.8 and A.9 yield
lim
ε→0
ΦtBi [m
t
−i = (m
∗
i , . . . ,m
∗
i ) |mti = mB , gε, µε] =
ψi(δ)
ψi(δ) +
∑
j∈I(||Aj || − 1− q)
= (1− δ)ri = βi(δ) (T.7.5)
and
lim
ε→0
ΦtBi [m
t
−i = (m
B
i , . . . ,m
B
i ) |mti = mB , gε, µε] =∑
j∈I(||Aj || − 1− q)
ψi(δ) +
∑
j∈I(||Aj || − 1− q)
= 1− (1− δ)ri = 1− βi(δ)
(T.7.6)
as required.
Lemma T.7.4: The strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions A.5 and A.6 and the end-of-period beliefs
described in Definition T.5.4 are consistent, as required for an SE.
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Proof:When t = 0 all players receive message m0i . When t = 1 the beliefs of the players about the messages
received by the previous cohort are trivial. When t ≥ 2, given Lemma T.7.2 we can reason taking it as given
that all players 〈i ∈ I, t〉 believe that all players 〈i ∈ I, t−1〉 received message m∗. Given this observation the
claim for period t follows easily by a case-by-case examination, comparing the likelihood of possible deviations
in periods t − 1 and t (orders of infinitesimals in εt−1 and εt). For the sake of brevity we omit most of the
details, and we simply draw attention to the following facts.
The beliefs of player 〈i, t〉 after any realization xt = x(`) with ` ≥ 2 can be seen to be consistent in the
following way. In period t, either no deviation from the prescription of the action-stage equilibrium strategies
is observed or some deviation is observed. When there are no deviations, the revised end-of-period beliefs ΦtRi
of player 〈i, t〉 are of course the same as the beginning of period beliefs ΦtBi . Therefore, using Lemma T.7.2
the claim in this case can be verified simply checking that the beliefs described in (T.5.9) correspond to the
prescriptions of the strategies described in (A.9) in the appropriate way. In the case in which some deviations
occur, observe that the strategies in (A.9) prescribe that all players should send message mB , regardless of
the message they received, which corresponds to the beliefs described in (T.5.9) as required.
Now consider the case in which the realization of the action-stage randomization device is xt = x(1).
Next distinguish further between two cases. First, the action profile at is neither equal to a′ nor is of the type
(a∗j , a
′
−j) for some j ∈ I. In this case, from the strategies described in (A.8) it is immediate to check that
the message sent by any player 〈i, t〉 does not depend on the message mti he received. Therefore, the claim in
this case follows immediately from the message-stage strategies described in (A.8).
On the other hand, from the strategies described in (A.8) it is immediate to check that when at is either
equal to a′ or is of the type (a∗j , a
′
−j) for some j ∈ I the message sent by player 〈i, t〉 does depend on the
message mti he received.
Using the completely mixed strategies described in Definition A.8 it is easy to check that for all m ∈
{m∗,mA,mB} and for all yt ∈ Y , whenever at is either equal to a′ or is of the type (a∗j , a′−j) for some j ∈ I
it must be that
lim
ε→0
ΦtRi [m
t
−i = (m, . . . ,m) |mti = m,x(1), at, yt, gε, µε] = 1 (T.7.7)
Given (T.7.7), the claim in this case can now be verified simply checking that the beliefs described in
(T.5.8) correspond to the prescriptions of the strategies described in (A.8) in the appropriate way.
T.8. Proof of Theorem 2
Given any v∗ ∈ int(V ) and any δ ∈ (0, 1), the strategies and randomization devices described in Definitions
A.2, A.4, A.5 and A.6 clearly implement the payoff vector v∗.
From Remarks T.6.1 and T.6.2, we know that there exists a δ such that whenever δ > δ each strategy
in the profile described in Definitions A.5 and A.6 is sequentially rational given the beliefs described in
Definitions T.5.3 and T.5.4.
From Lemmas T.7.3 and T.7.4 we know that the strategy profile described in Definitions A.5 and A.6
and the beliefs described in Definitions T.5.3 and T.5.4 are consistent, as required by Definition 1 of SE.
Hence, using Lemma T.2.1, the proof of Theorem 2 is now complete.
T.9. Proof of Theorem 3: Beliefs
Definition T.9.1. Beginning-of-Period Beliefs: Let k be any element of I, and j be any element of I not
equal to i.
The beginning-of-period beliefs of all players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉 are trivial. Of course, all players believe that all
other players have received the null message m0i = ∅.
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The beginning-of-period beliefs ΦtBi (m
t
i) of any other player 〈i, t〉, depending on the message he receives
from player 〈i, t− 1〉 are as followsT.13
if mti = m
∗ then mt−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability 1
if mti = m˘
j then

mt−i−j= (m˘
j , . . . , m˘j) with pr. 1
mtj ∈M(j, t) with pr. 1
Pr(mtj = m
j,τ ) > 0 ∀mj,τ ∈M(j, t)
if mti = m
j,τ then mt−i = (m
j,τ , . . . ,mj,τ ) with probability 1
if mti = m
i,τ then mt−i = (m˘
i, . . . , m˘i) with probability 1
if mti = m
k then mt−i = (m
k, . . . ,mk) with probability 1
(T.9.1)
Definition T.9.2. End-of-Period Beliefs: Let k be any element of I, and j be any element of I not equal
to i.
We begin with period t = 0. Recall that m0i = ∅ for all i ∈ I. As before, let also g0(m0, x0) =
(g01(m
0
1, x
0), . . . , g0n(m
0
n, x
0)), and define g0−k(m
0, x0) in the obvious way.
Let Φ0Ei (m
0
i , x
0, a0, y0) be as follows
if a0 = g0(m0, x0) and y0 = y(j) then m1−i−j = (m˘
j , . . . , m˘j),m1j = m
j,T with pr. 1
if a0 = g0(m0, x0) and y0 = y(i) then m1−i = (m˘
i, . . . , m˘i) with probability 1
if a0−k = g
0
−k(m
0, x0) and a0k 6= g0k(m0k, x0) then m1−i = (mk,T , . . . ,mk,T ) with prob. 1
otherwise m1−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability 1
(T.9.2)
Our next case is t ≥ 1 and xt = x(κ) with κ > κ. Let x(`00, `∗) denote the realization of xt. For any
player 〈i, t〉, let ΦtEi (mti, x(`00, `∗), at, yt) be as followsT.14
if at = a(`∗) and mti = m˘
j then

mt+1−i−j= (m˘
j , . . . , m˘j) with pr. 1
mt+1j ∈M(j, t) with pr. 1
Pr(mt+1j = m
j,τ ) > 0 ∀mj,τ ∈M(j, t)
if at = a(`∗) and mti = m
j,τ then mt+1−i = (m
j,τ , . . . ,mj,τ ) with probability 1
if at = a(`∗) and mti = m
i,τ then mt+1−i = (m˘
i, . . . , m˘i) with probability 1
if at = a(`∗) and mti = m
k then mt+1−i = (m
k, . . . ,mk) with probability 1
if at−k = a−k(`
∗) and atk 6= ak(`∗) then mt+1−i = (mk,T , . . . ,mk,T ) with probability 1
otherwise mt+1−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability 1
(T.9.3)
We divide the case of t ≥ 1 and xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ into several subcases, according to which message
player 〈i, t〉 has received. We begin with mti = m∗. Let x(·, ˆ`, · · ·) denote the realization of xt. For any player
〈i, t〉, with the understanding that mj,τ is a generic element of M(j, t + 1), let ΦtEi (m∗, x(·, ˆ`, · · ·), at, yt) be
T.13Notice that the second line of (T.9.1) does not fully specify the probability distribution over the component mtj of the beliefs
of player 〈i, t〉. For the rest of the argument, what matters is only that all elements of M(j, t) have positive probability, and that
no message outside this set has positive probability. The distribution can be computed using Bayes’ rule from the equilibrium
strategies described in Definitions B.8 and B.9 above. We omit the details for the sake of brevity.
T.14Similarly to (T.9.1), the first line of (T.9.3) does not fully specify the probability distribution over the component mt+1j of
the beliefs of player 〈i, t〉. For the rest of the argument, what matters is only that all elements ofM(j, t) have positive probability,
and that no message outside this set has positive probability. The distribution can be computed using Bayes’ rule from the
equilibrium strategies described in Definitions B.8 and B.9 above. We omit the details for the sake of brevity.
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as follows
if at = a(ˆ`) and yt = y(j) then
{
mt+1−i−j= (m˘
j , . . . , m˘j)
mt+1j = m
j,τ with pr.
1
||M(j, t+ 1)||
if at = a(ˆ`) and yt = y(i) then mt+1−i = (m˘
i, . . . , m˘i) with probability 1
if at−k = a−k(ˆ`) and a
t
k 6= ak(ˆ`) then mt+1−i = (mk,T , . . . ,mk,T ) with probability 1
otherwise mt+1−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability 1
(T.9.4)
The next subcase is that of mti = m˘
j . Let x(· · ·, j`, · · ·) denote the realization of xt. With the understanding
that j′ is an element of I not equal to i and that mj
′,τ is a generic element of M(j′, t+ 1), let ΦtEi (m˘
j , x(· ·
·, j`, · · ·), at, yt) be as follows
if at = a˘j(j`) and yt = y(j′) then
{
mt+1−i−j= (m˘
j′ , . . . , m˘j
′
)
mt+1j′ = m
j′,τ with pr.
1
||M(j′, t+ 1)||
if at = a˘j(j`) and yt = y(i) then mt+1−i = (m˘
i, . . . , m˘i) with probability 1
if at−k = a˘
j
−k(j`) and a
t
k 6= a˘jk(j`) then mt+1−i = (mk,T , . . . ,mk,T ) with probability 1
otherwise mt+1−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability 1
(T.9.5)
The next subcase is that of mti = m
i,τ ∈ M(i, t). Let x(· · ·, i`, · · ·) denote the realization of xt. With the
understanding that mj,τ is a generic element of M(j, t+ 1), let ΦtEi (m
i,τ , x(· · ·, i`, · · ·), at, yt) be as follows
if at = a˘i(i`) and yt = y(j) then
{
mt+1−i−j= (m˘
j , . . . , m˘j)
mt+1j = m
j,τ with pr.
1
||M(j, t+ 1)||
if at = a˘i(i`) and yt = y(i) then mt+1−i = (m˘
i, . . . , m˘i) with probability 1
if at−k = a˘
i
−k(i`) and a
t
k 6= a˘ik(i`) then mt+1−i = (mk,T , . . . ,mk,T ) with probability 1
if at−k = a−k(i`) and a
t
k 6= ak(i`) then mt+1−i = (mk,T , . . . ,mk,T ) with probability 1
if at = a(i`) then mt+1−i = (m
i,τ−1, . . . ,mi,τ−1) with probability 1
otherwise mt+1−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability 1
(T.9.6)
where we set mi,0 = mi.
The next subcase of t ≥ 1 and xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ that we consider is that of mti = mj,τ ∈ M(j, t).
Let x(· · ·, j`, · · ·) denote the realization of xt. Let ΦtEi (mj,τ , x(· · ·, j`, · · ·), at, yt) be as follows
if at = a(j`) then mt+1−i = (m
j,τ−1, . . . ,mj,τ−1) with probability 1
if at−k = a−k(j`) and a
t
k 6= ak(j`) then mt+1−i = (mk,T , . . . ,mk,T ) with probability 1
otherwise mt+1−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability 1
(T.9.7)
where we set mj,0 = mj .
The final subcase to consider is that of mti = m
k′ for some k′ ∈ I. Let x(· · ·, `k′ , · · ·) denote the realization
of xt. Let ΦtEi (m
k′ , x(· · ·, `k′ , · · ·), at, yt) be as follows
if at = a(`k′) then mt+1−i = (m
k′ , . . .mk
′
) with probability 1
if at−k = a−k(`k′) and a
t
k 6= ak(`k′) then mt+1−i = (mk,T , . . . ,mk,T ) with probability 1
otherwise mt+1−i = (m
∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability 1
(T.9.8)
T.10. Proof of Theorem 3: Sequential Rationality
Definition T.10.1: Let I tEi denote the end-of-period-t collection of information sets that belong to player
〈i, t〉, with typical element ItEi .
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It is convenient to partition I tEi into mutually disjoint exhaustive subsets on the basis of the associated
beliefs of player 〈i, t〉. The fact that they exhaust I tEi can be checked directly from Definition T.9.2 above.
Let I tEi (∗) ⊂ I tEi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt+1−i is equal
to (m∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtEi (∗).
Let I tEi (˘i) ⊂ I tEi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt+1−i is equal
to (m˘i, . . . , m˘i) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtEi (˘i).
For every j ∈ I not equal to i, let I tEi (˘ j, t) ⊂ I tEi be the collection of information sets in which
player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt+1−i−j is equal to (m˘j , . . . , m˘j) with probability one, that Pr(mt+1j = mj,τ ) > 0 ∀
mj,τ ∈M(j, t), and that Pr(mt+1j ∈M(j, t)) = 1.T.15 These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtEi (˘j, t).
For every j ∈ I not equal to i, let I tEi (˘j, t + 1) ⊂ I tEi be the collection of information sets in which
player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt+1−i−j is equal to (m˘j , . . . , m˘j) with probability one, that Pr(mt+1j = mj,τ ) =
||M(j, t+ 1)||−1 ∀ mj,τ ∈M(j, t+ 1). These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtEi (˘j, t+ 1).
For every k ∈ I, let I tEi (k) ⊂ I tEi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 believes that
mt+1−i is equal to (m
k, . . . ,mk) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtEi (k).
For every k ∈ I, and every τ = max{T − t, 1}, . . . , T let I tEi (k, τ) ⊂ I tEi be the collection of information
sets in which player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt+1−i is equal to (mk,τ , . . . ,mk,τ ) with probability one. These beliefs
will be denoted by ΦtEi (k, τ).
Definition T.10.2: Let the strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions B.8 and B.9 be given. Fix a
period t and an n-tuple of messages mt+1 = (mt+11 , . . . ,m
t+1
n ), with m
t+1
k ∈M t+1k for every k ∈ I.
Clearly, the profile (g, µ) together with mt+1 uniquely determine a probability distribution over action
profiles over all future periods, beginning with t+ 1.
Therefore, we can define the expected discounted (from the beginning of period t + 1) payoff to player
〈i, t〉, given (g, µ) and mt+1 in the obvious way. This will be denoted by v¨ti(mt+1). Moreover, since they play
a special role in some of the computations that follow, we reserve two pieces of notation for two particular
instances of mt+1. The expression v¨ti(∗) stands for v¨ti(mt+1) when mt+1 = (m∗, . . . ,m∗). Moreover, for any
k ∈ I, the expression v¨ti(k, τ) stands for v¨ti(mt+1) when mt+1−k = (m˘k, . . . m˘k) and mt+1k = mk,τ ∈ M(k, t+1).
Lemma T.10.1: For any i ∈ I, any k ∈ I, any t, and any τ = max{T − t, 1}, . . . , T , we have that
v¨ti(∗) =
(1− δ)
[
q ˆˆv i + (1− q) zi
]
+ δ q v∗i
1 − δ (1 − q) (T.10.1)
and
v¨ti(k, τ) =
(1− δ) [q u˘ki + (1− q) zi] + δ q v∗i
1 − δ (1 − q) (T.10.2)
where v¨ti(∗) and v¨ti(k, τ) are as in Definition T.10.2, ˆˆv i is as in (B.6), zi is as in Remark B.4, v∗i is as in the
statement of the Theorem, and u˘ki is as in (B.3).
T.15See footnote T.14 above.
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Proof: Assume first that t ≥ T . Using Definitions B.8 and B.9 we can write v¨ti(∗) and v¨ti(k, τ) recursively as
v¨ti(∗) = q
{
(1− δ)ˆˆv i + δ
[
(1− η)v¨t+1i (∗) +
η
n
∑
k′∈I
T∑
τ=1
v¨t+1i (k
′, τ)
T
]}
+
(1− q) [(1− δ)zi + δv¨t+1i (∗)]
(T.10.3)
and
v¨ti(k, τ) = q
{
(1− δ)u˘ki + δ
[
(1− η)v¨t+1i (∗) +
η
n
∑
k′∈I
T∑
τ=1
v¨t+1i (k
′, τ)
T
]}
+
(1− q) [(1− δ)zi + δv¨t+1i (k, τ)]
(T.10.4)
Since the strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions B.8 and B.9 is stationary for t ≥ T , we immediately
have that v¨ti(∗) = v¨t+1i (∗) and, for any k ∈ I and any τ = 1, . . . , T , v¨ti(k, τ) = v¨t+1i (k, τ). Hence we can solve
(T.10.3) and (T.10.4) simultaneously for the NT + 1 variables v¨ti(∗) and v¨ti(k, τ) (k ∈ I and τ = 1, . . . , T ).
Using (B.7) this immediately gives (T.10.1) and (T.10.2), as required.
Proceeding by induction backwards from t = T , it is also immediate to verify that the statement holds
for any t < T . The details are omitted for the sake of brevity.
Lemma T.10.2: Let the strategy profile (g, µ) and system of beliefs Φ described in Definitions B.8, B.9,
T.9.1 and T.9.2 be given. Then the end-of-period continuation payoffs for any player 〈i, t〉 (discounted as of
the beginning of period t + 1) at any information set Iti ∈ I tEi (as categorized in Definition T.10.1) are as
follows.T.16
vti(g, µ|ΦtEi (∗)) =
(1− δ)
[
q ˆˆv i + (1− q) zi
]
+ δ q v∗i
1 − δ (1 − q) (T.10.5)
vti(g, µ|ΦtEi (˘i)) =
(1− δ) [q u˘ii + (1− q) zi] + δ q v∗i
1 − δ (1 − q) (T.10.6)
vti(g, µ|ΦtEi (˘j, t)) = vti(g, µ|ΦtEi (˘j, t+ 1)) =
(1− δ)
[
q u˘ji + (1− q) zi
]
+ δ q v∗i
1 − δ (1 − q) ∀j 6= i (T.10.7)
vti(g, µ|ΦtEi (k)) = q vki + (1− q)zi ∀ k ∈ I (T.10.8)
vti(g, µ|ΦtEi (k, τ)) =
[
1−
(
δq
1− δ(1− q)
)τ] [
qωki + (1− q)zi
]
+(
δq
1− δ(1− q)
)τ [
qvki + (1− q)zi
] ∀ k ∈ I ∀ τ = max{T − t, 1}, . . . , T (T.10.9)
where ˆˆv i is as in (B.6), zi is as in Remark B.4, v∗i is as in the statement of the Theorem, u˘
k
i is as in (B.3),
and ωki is as in (B.2).
T.16See our Point of Notation T.1.1 above.
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Proof: Equations (T.10.5), (T.10.6) and (T.10.7) are a direct consequence of Definition T.10.1 and Lemma
T.10.1.
Equation (T.10.8) follows directly from Definition T.10.1 and the description of the profile (g, µ) in
Definitions B.8 and B.9.
Using the notation established in Definition T.10.2, consider the quantity v¨ti(m
k,τ , . . . ,mk,τ ). Given the
strategies described in Definitions B.8 and B.9 it is evident that this quantity does not depend on t. Therefore,
for any k ∈ I and τ = max{T − t, 1}, . . . , T , we can let v¨i(k, τ) = v¨ti(mk,τ , . . . ,mk,τ ), for all t. Clearly, using
Definition T.10.1, we have that for all k, τ and t, vti(g, µ|ΦtEi (k, τ)) = v¨i(k, τ).
From the description of (g, µ) in Definitions B.8 and B.9, for any k ∈ I and for any τ = 2, . . . , T , the
quantity v¨i(k, τ) obeys a difference equation as follows.
v¨i(k, τ) = q
[
(1− δ)ωki + δv¨i(k, τ − 1)
]
+ (1− q) [(1− δ)zi + δv¨i(k, τ)] (T.10.10)
Using again Definitions B.8 and B.9, the terminal condition for (T.10.10) is
v¨i(k, 1) = q
[
(1− δ)ωki + δ[qvki + (1− q)zi]
]
+ (1− q) [(1− δ)zi + δv¨i(k, 1)] (T.10.11)
Solving (T.10.10) and imposing the terminal condition (T.10.11) now yields (T.10.9), as required.
Purely for expositional convenience, before completing the proof of sequential rationality at the message
stage, we now proceed with the argument that establishes sequential rationality at the action stage.
Definition T.10.3: Recall that at the action stage, player 〈i, t〉 chooses an action after having received a
message mti and having observed a realization x
t of the randomization device x˜t.
Let I tBi denote period-t action-stage collection of information sets that belong to player 〈i, t〉, with typical
element ItBi . Clearly, each element of I tBi is identified by a pair (mti, xt).
It is convenient to partition I tBi into mutually disjoint exhaustive subsets. The fact that they exhaust
I tBi can be checked directly from Definition T.9.1 above.
Let I tBi (∗) ⊂ I tBi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt−i is equal
to (m∗, . . . ,m∗) with probability one.T.17 These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtBi (∗).
Let I tBi (˘i) ⊂ I tBi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt−i is equal
to (m˘i, . . . , m˘i) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtBi (˘i).
For every j ∈ I not equal to i, let I tBi (˘j) ⊂ I tBi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉
believes that mt−i−j is equal to (m˘
j , . . . , m˘j) with probability one, that Pr(mtj = m
j,τ ) > 0 ∀ mj,τ ∈M(j, t),
and that Pr(mtj ∈M(j, t)) = 1.T.18 These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtBi (˘j).
For every j ∈ I not equal to i, and every τ = max{T−t+1, 1}, . . . , T let I tBi (j, τ) ⊂ I tBi be the collection
of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 believes that mt−i is equal to (mj,τ , . . . ,mj,τ ) with probability one.
These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtBi (j, τ).
For every k ∈ I, let I tBi (k) ⊂ I tBi be the collection of information sets in which player 〈i, t〉 believes that
mt−i is equal to (m
k, . . . ,mk) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtEi (k).
Lemma T.10.3: There exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that whenever δ > δ the action-stage strategies described
in Definition B.8 are sequentially rational given the beliefs described in Definition T.9.1 for every player
〈i, t〉.T.19
T.17In the interest of brevity, we avoid an explicit distinction between the t = 0 players and all others. What follows can be
interpreted as applying to all players re-defining m0i to be equal to m
∗ for players 〈i ∈ I, 0〉.
T.18See footnote T.13.
T.19It should be understood that we are, for now, taking it as given that each player 〈i, t〉 follows the prescriptions of the
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Proof: Consider any information set ItBi ∈ {I tBi (∗) ∪ I tBi (˘i) ∪ I tBi (˘j)}.T.20
Using Definition B.8, Lemma T.10.2 and Definition T.10.3, it is immediate to check that, as δ → 1,
the limit expected continuation payoff to player 〈i, t〉 from following the action-stage strategies described in
Definition B.8 at any of these information sets is
v∗i = qvˆi + (1− q)zi (T.10.12)
In the same way, it can be checked that, as δ → 1, the limit expected continuation payoff to player 〈i, t〉 from
deviating at any of these information sets is
qvii + (1− q)zi (T.10.13)
Since by assumption vˆi > vii this is of course sufficient to prove our claim for any information set ItBi ∈
{I tBi (∗) ∪ I tBi (˘i) ∪ I tBi (˘j)}.
Now consider any information set ItBi either in I tBi (j, τ) or in I tBi (j) (with j 6= i).
Using Definition B.8, Lemma T.10.2 and Definition T.10.3, it is immediate to check that, as δ → 1,
the limit expected continuation payoff to player 〈i, t〉 from following the action-stage strategies described in
Definition B.8 at any of these information sets is
qvji + (1− q)zi (T.10.14)
In the same way, it can be checked that, as δ → 1, the limit expected continuation payoff to player 〈i, t〉 from
deviating at any of these information sets is exactly as in (T.10.13).
Since by assumption for any j 6= i we have that vji > vii this is of course sufficient to prove our claim for
any of these information sets.
To conclude the proof of the lemma, we now consider any information set ItBi ∈ I tBi (i). Using Definition
B.8, Lemma T.10.2 and Definition T.10.3, it can be checked that the expected continuation payoff to player
〈i, t〉 from following the action-stage strategies described in Definition B.8 at any of these information sets is
bounded below by
(1− δ)ui + δ
[
qvii + (1− q)zi
]
(T.10.15)
In the same way it can be readily seen that the expected continuation payoff to player 〈i, t〉 from deviating
at any of these information sets is bounded above by
(1− δ)ui + δ
{[
1−
(
δq
1− δ (1− q)
)T] [
qωii + (1− q) zi
]
+(
δq
1− δ (1− q)
)T [
qvii + (1− q) zi
]} (T.10.16)
message-stage strategies described in Definition B.9. Of course, we have not demonstrated yet that this is in fact sequentially
rational given the beliefs described in Definition T.9.2. We will come back to this immediately after the current lemma is proved.
T.20See Definition T.10.3.
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The difference given by (T.10.15) minus (T.10.16) can be written as
(1− δ)

δq
[
1−
(
δq
1− δ (1− q)
)T] (
vii − ωii
)
(1− δ) − (ui − ui)
 (T.10.17)
Consider now the term inside the curly brackets in (T.10.17). We have that
lim
δ→1
δq
[
1−
(
δq
1− δ (1− q)
)T] (
vii − ωii
)
(1− δ) − (ui − ui) = T (v
i
i − ωii)− (ui − ui) (T.10.18)
Using (B.11), we know that the quantity on the right-hand side of (T.10.18) is strictly positive. Hence we
can conclude our claim is valid at any information set ItBi ∈ I tBi (i).
Lemma T.10.4: Consider the notation we established in Definition T.10.2. For any given t and τ =max{T−
t, 1}, . . . , T let v¨ti(m,mi,τ ) denote v¨ti(mt+1) when the vector mt+1 has the i-th component equal to a generic
m ∈ M t+1i and mt+1−i = (mi,τ , . . . ,mi,τ ). As in the proof of Lemma T.10.2, let v¨i(i, τ) = v¨ti(mi,τ , . . . ,mi,τ ).
Then there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that whenever δ > δ for every player 〈i, t〉, for every m ∈ M t+1i , and
for every τ = max{T − t, 1}, . . . , T
v¨i(i, τ) ≥ v¨ti(m,mi,τ ) (T.10.19)
Proof: We prove the claim for the case t ≥ T . The treatment of t < T has some completely non-essential
complications due to the fact that the players’ message spaces increase in size for the first T periods. The
details are are omitted for the sake of brevity.
We now introduce a new random random variable w˜, independent of x˜ and y˜ (see Definitions B.4 and B.5),
and uniformly distributed over the finite set {1, . . . , T}. This will be used in the rest of the proof of the lemma
to keep track of the “private” randomization across messages that members of dynasty i may be required
to perform (see Definition B.9). Just as we did for the action-stage and the message-stage randomization
devices, we consider countably many independent “copies” of w˜, one for each time period, denoted by w˜t,
with typical realization wt.
To keep track of all “future randomness” looking ahead for t′ = 1, 2, . . . periods from t, it will also be
convenient to define the random vectors s˜t,t
′
s˜t,t
′
= [(x˜t+1, y˜t+1, w˜t+1), . . . , (x˜t+t
′
, y˜t+t
′
, w˜t+t
′
)] (T.10.20)
A typical realization of s˜t,t
′
will be denoted by st,t
′
= [(xt+1, yt+1, wt+1), . . . , (xt+t
′
, yt+t
′
, wt+t
′
)]. The set of
all possible realizations of s˜t,t
′
(which obviously does not depend on t) is denoted by St
′
.
Recall that the profile (g, µ) described in Definitions B.8 and B.9 is taken as given throughout. Now
suppose that in period t, player 〈i, t〉 sends a generic message m ∈ M t+1i and that mt+1−i = (mi,τ , . . . ,mi,τ ).
Then, given any realization st,t
′
we can compute the actual action profile played by all players 〈k ∈ I, t+ t′〉.
This will be denoted by at+t
′
(m,mi,τ , st,t
′
). Similarly, we can compute the profile of messages mt+t
′
−i received
by all players 〈j 6= i, t+ t′〉. This n− 1-tuple will be denoted by mt+t′(m,mi,τ , st,t′).
Recall that the messages received by all time-t + t′ players are the result of choices and random draws
that take place on or before period t + t′ − 1. Therefore it is clear that if we are given two realizations sˆt,t′
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= [st,t
′−1, (xˆt+t
′
, yˆt+t
′
, wˆt+t
′
)] and ˆˆs
t,t′
= [st,t
′−1, (ˆˆx
t+t′
, ˆˆy
t+t′
, ˆˆw
t+t′
)], then it must be that
mt+t
′
(m,mi,τ , sˆt,t
′
) =mt+t
′
(m,mi,τ , ˆˆs
t,t′
) (T.10.21)
Notice next that from the description of the profile (g, µ) in Definitions B.8 and B.9 it is also immediate
to check that for any t′, any m ∈ M t+1i and any realization st,t
′
the message profile mt+t
′
(m,mi,τ , st,t
′
) can
only take one out of two possible forms. Either we have mt+t
′
(m,mi,τ , st,t
′
) = (mi, . . . ,mi) or it must be
that mt+t
′
(m,mi,τ , st,t
′
) = (mi,τ
′
, . . . ,mi,τ
′
) for some τ ′ = 1, . . . , T .
Lastly, notice that, given an arbitrary message m ∈M t+1i we can write
v¨ti(m,m
i,τ ) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t′=1
δt
′−1 ∑
st,t′∈St′
Pr(s˜t,t
′
= st,t
′
)ui[at+t
′
(m,mi,τ , st,t
′
)] (T.10.22)
Since the strategies described in Definitions B.8 and B.9 are stationary for t ≥ T , and the distribution of
s˜t,t
′
is independent of t, it is evident from (T.10.22) that v¨ti(m,m
i,τ ) does not depend on t. From now on we
drop the superscript and write v¨i(m,mi,τ ).
We now proceed with the proof of inequality (T.10.19) of the statement of the lemma. In order to do so,
from now on we fix a particular t = tˆ, m = mˆ and τ = τˆ , and we prove (T.10.19) for these fixed values of
t, m and τ . Since the lower bound on δ that we will find will clearly not depend on t, and since there are
finitely many values that m and τ can take, this will be sufficient to prove the claim.
Inequality (T.10.19) in the statement of the lemma is trivially satisfied (as an equality) if m = mi,τ .
From now on assume that mˆ and τˆ are such that mˆ 6= mi,τˆ .
Given any t′ = 1, 2, . . ., we now partition the set of realizations St
′
into five disjoint exhaustive subsets;
St
′
1 , S
t′
2 , S
t′
3 , S
t′
4 and S
t′
5 . This will allow us to decompose the right-hand side of (T.10.22) in a way that will
make possible the comparison with (a similar decomposition of) the left-hand side of (T.10.19) as required
to prove the lemma.
Let
St
′
1 = {stˆ,t
′ |mtˆ+t′(mi,τˆ ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t′) = (mi,τ ′ , . . . ,mi,τ ′) for some τ ′ = 1, . . . , τˆ} (T.10.23)
and notice that if t′ ≤ τˆ then St′1 = St
′
.
Assume now that t′ > τˆ and let
St
′
2 = {stˆ,t
′ |mtˆ+t′(mˆ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t′) = (mi, . . . ,mi) and
ui(atˆ+t
′
(mˆ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′
)) ≤ ui(atˆ+t′(mi,τˆ ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t′))}
(T.10.24)
and
St
′
3 = {stˆ,t
′ |mtˆ+t′(mˆ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t′) = (mi, . . . ,mi) and
ui(atˆ+t
′
(mˆ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′
)) > ui(atˆ+t
′
(mi,τˆ ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′
))} (T.10.25)
Notice that if the first condition in (T.10.24) holds, then mtˆ+t
′
(mi,τˆ ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′
) = (mi, . . . , mi). Therefore,
St
′
1 and S
t′
2 and S
t′
3 are disjoint.
Next, let any stˆ,t
′′ ∈ St′′3 with t′′ < t′ be given and define
St
′
4 (s
tˆ,t′′) = {stˆ,t′ | stˆ,t′ = (stˆ,t′′ , st′′,t′) for some st′′,t′ and
||{t ∈ (t′′ + 1, . . . , t′ − 1) | xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ}|| ≤ T − 1} (T.10.26)
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Now let
St
′
4 =
⋃
t′′<t′
stˆ,t
′′∈St′′3
St
′
4 (s
tˆ,t′′) (T.10.27)
From the strategies described in Definitions B.8 and B.9 it can be checked that if stˆ,t
′ ∈ St′4 then mtˆ+t
′
(mˆ,
mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′
) = (mi,τ
′
, . . . , mi,τ
′
) for some τ ′ and mtˆ+t
′
(mi,τˆ ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′
) = (mi, . . . , mi). Therefore, it is clear
that St
′
4 is disjoint from S
t′
1 , S
t′
2 and S
t′
3 .
The last set in the partition of St
′
is defined as the residual of the previous four.
St
′
5 = S
t′/{St′1 ∪ St
′
2 ∪ St
′
3 ∪ St
′
4 } (T.10.28)
Using (T.10.22), we can now proceed to compare the two sides of inequality (T.10.19) of the statement
of the lemma for the five distinct (conditional) cases stˆ,t
′ ∈ St′1 through stˆ,t
′ ∈ St′5 . Notice first of all that
when stˆ,t
′ ∈ St′2 , we know immediately from (T.10.24) that there is nothing to prove.
We begin with stˆ,t
′ ∈ St′1 . Notice first of all that if we fix any stˆ,t
′ ∈ St′1 , then it follows from (T.10.21)
and (T.10.23) that any stˆ,t
′
of the form [stˆ,t
′−1, st
′−1,t′ ] (where stˆ,t
′−1 are the first t′ − 1 triples of stˆ,t′) is in
fact in St
′
1 .
Using, (T.10.23) and Definitions 3, B.8 and B.9 we get∑
st′−1,t′∈S1
Pr(s˜t
′−1,t′ =st
′−1,t′)ui(atˆ+t
′
(mi,τˆ ,mi,τˆ , [stˆ,t
′−1, st
′−1,t′ ])) = qωii + (1− q)zi ≥∑
st′−1,t′∈S1
Pr(s˜t
′−1,t′ =st
′−1,t′)ui(atˆ+t
′
(mˆ,mi,τˆ , [stˆ,t
′−1, st
′−1,t′ ]))
(T.10.29)
Therefore, since the stˆ,t
′
that we fixed is an arbitrary element of St
′
1 , we can now conclude that∑
stˆ,t′∈St′1
Pr(s˜tˆ,t
′
= stˆ,t
′
)ui(atˆ,t
′
(mi,τˆ ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′
)) ≥
∑
stˆ,t′∈St′1
Pr(s˜tˆ,t
′
= stˆ,t
′
)ui(atˆ,t
′
(mˆ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′
)) (T.10.30)
Now fix any stˆ,t
′ ∈ St′3 . Using, (T.10.25), (T.10.26) and (T.10.27), and Definitions B.8 and B.9 we get
that the difference given by
Pr(s˜tˆ,t
′
= stˆ,t
′
)ui(atˆ+t
′
(mi,τˆ ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′
))+
∞∑
t′′=t′+1
δ(t
′′−t′) ∑
stˆ,t′′∈St′′4 (stˆ,t′ )
Pr(s˜tˆ,t
′′
= stˆ,t
′′
)ui(atˆ+t
′′
(mi,τˆ ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′′
)) (T.10.31)
minus
Pr(s˜tˆ,t
′
= stˆ,t
′
)ui(atˆ+t
′
(mˆ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′
))+
∞∑
t′′=t′+1
δ(t
′′−t′) ∑
stˆ,t′′∈St′′4 (stˆ,t′ )
Pr(s˜tˆ,t
′′
= stˆ,t
′′
)ui(atˆ+t
′′
(mˆ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′′
)) (T.10.32)
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is greater or equal to
Pr(s˜tˆ,t
′
= stˆ,t
′
)

δq
[
1−
(
δq
1− δ (1− q)
)T] (
vii − ωii
)
(1− δ) − (ui − ui)
 (T.10.33)
Notice now that we know that the quantity in (T.10.33) is in fact positive for δ sufficiently close to 1. This
is simply because the term in curly brackets in (T.10.33) is the same as the right-hand side of (T.10.18).
Therefore, we have dealt with any stˆ,t
′ ∈ St′3 and with all its relevant “successors” of the form St
′′
4 (s
tˆ,t′).
Since t′ is arbitrary, by (T.10.27), this exhausts St
′
3 and S
t′
4 for all possible values of t
′.
Finally, we deal with stˆ,t
′ ∈ St′5 . Notice first of all that if we fix any stˆ,t
′ ∈ St′5 , then it follows from
(T.10.21) and (T.10.28) that any stˆ,t
′
of the form [stˆ,t
′−1, st
′−1,t′ ] (where stˆ,t
′−1 are the first t′ − 1 triples of
stˆ,t
′
) is in fact in St
′
5 .
Using, (T.10.28) and Definitions B.8 and B.9 we get∑
st′−1,t′∈S1
Pr(s˜t
′−1,t′ =st
′−1,t′)ui(atˆ+t
′
(mi,τˆ ,mi,τˆ , [stˆ,t
′−1, st
′−1,t′ ])) = qvii + (1− q)zi >
qωii + (1− q)zi ≥
∑
st′−1,t′∈S1
Pr(s˜t
′−1,t′ =st
′−1,t′)ui(atˆ+t
′
(mˆ,mi,τˆ , [stˆ,t
′−1, st
′−1,t′ ]))
(T.10.34)
Therefore, since the stˆ,t
′
that we fixed is an arbitrary element of St
′
5 , we can now conclude that∑
stˆ,t′∈St′5
Pr(s˜tˆ,t
′
= stˆ,t
′
)ui(atˆ,t
′
(mi,τˆ ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′
)) ≥
∑
stˆ,t′∈St′5
Pr(s˜tˆ,t
′
= stˆ,t
′
)ui(atˆ,t
′
(mˆ,mi,τˆ , stˆ,t
′
)) (T.10.35)
Hence, the proof of the lemma is now complete.
Remark T.10.1: Let the strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions B.8 and B.9 be given. Consider a
player 〈i, t〉, and a realization of future uncertainty st,t′ as defined in the proof of Lemma T.10.4.
Let any message m ∈M t+1i be given, and fix any information set ItEi and associated beliefs ΦtEi (·).
It is then clear from Definitions B.8 and B.9 and T.10.1, that for any t′ the action that player 〈i, t〉 expects
player 〈i, t+ t′〉 to take is uniquely determined by m, st,t′ and ItEi .
For the rest of the argument we will denote this by at+t
′
i (m, s
t,t′ , ItEi ).
Lemma T.10.5: There exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that whenever δ > δ the message-stage strategies described
in Definition B.9 are sequentially rational given the beliefs described in Definition T.9.2 for every player 〈i, t〉.
Proof: Consider any information set ItEi ∈ I tEi (i, τ), where I tEi (i, τ) is as in Definition T.10.1. It is then
evident from Lemma T.10.4 and from the beliefs ΦtEi (i, τ) described in Definition T.10.1 that for δ sufficiently
close to 1, the message strategies described in Definition B.9 are sequentially rational at any such information
set.
From now on, consider any information set ItEi 6∈ I tEi (i, τ). Let m ∈ M t+1i be the message that player
〈i, t〉 should send according to the strategy µti, and let mˆ be any other message inM t+1i . Consider a particular
realization st,t
′
, and for any t′′ ∈ {1, . . . , t′ − 1}, let st,t′′ denote the first t′′ triples of st,t′ .
Next, assume that at+t
′
i (m, s
t,t′ , ItEi ) 6= at+t
′
i (mˆ, s
t,t′ , ItEi ), and that either t′ = 1, or alternatively that
at+t
′′
i (m, s
t,t′′ , ItEi ) = at+t
′′
i (mˆ, s
t,t′′ , ItEi ) for every t′′ ∈ {1, . . . , t′ − 1}.
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Clearly, in periods {t + 1, . . . , t′ − 1}, conditional on st,t′ , the payoff to player 〈i, t〉 is unaffected by the
deviation to mˆ. Now consider the payoff to player 〈i, t〉, conditional on st,t′ , from the beginning of period t′
on, for simplicity discounted from the beginning of period t′. If player 〈i, t〉 sends message m as prescribed
by µti, and δ is close enough to 1, the payoff in question is bounded below by
(1− δ)ui + δ(qvii + (1− q)zi) (T.10.36)
Now consider the payoff to player 〈i, t〉 if he sends message mˆ, conditional on st,t′ , from the beginning of
period t′ on, for simplicity discounted from the beginning of period t′. In period t′ the action played cannot
yield him more than ui. From Lemma T.10.4, we know that, for δ close enough to 1, from the beginning of
period t′+1 the payoff is bounded above by v¨i(i, T ). Hence, for δ close enough to 1, using (T.10.9) the payoff
in question is bounded above by
δui + (1− δ)
{[
1−
(
δq
1− δ(1− q)
)T][
qωii + (1− q)zi
]
+
(
δq
1− δ(1− q)
)T[
qvii + (1− q)zi
]}
(T.10.37)
Notice now that the quantity in (T.10.36) is the same as the quantity in (T.10.15), and the quantity in
(T.10.37) is in fact the same as the quantity in (T.10.16). Hence, exactly as in the proof of Lemma T.10.3,
we know that, for δ sufficiently close to 1, the quantity in (T.10.36) is greater than the quantity in (T.10.37).
This is clearly enough to conclude the proof.
T.11. Proof of Theorem 3: Consistency of Beliefs
Remark T.11.1: Let (gε, µε) be the completely mixed strategy profile of Definitions B.11 and B.12. It is
then straightforward to check that as ε→ 0 the profile (gε, µε) converges pointwise (in fact uniformly) to the
equilibrium strategy profile described in Definitions B.8 and B.9, as required.
Lemma T.11.1: The strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions B.8 and B.9 and the beginning-of-period
beliefs described in Definition T.9.1 are consistent.
Proof: When t = 0, there is nothing to prove. Assume t ≥ 1. We consider two cases. First assume that
player 〈i, t〉 receives message m ∈ {m∗}∪ M˘−i∪M(i, t). Clearly, this is on the equilibrium path generated by
the profile of strategies (g, µ) described in Definitions B.8 and B.9. Therefore, consistency in this case simply
requires checking that the beginning-of-period beliefs described in Definition T.9.1 are obtained via Bayes’
rule from the profile (g, µ). This is a routine exercise, and we omit the details.
Now assume that player 〈i, t〉 receives message m 6∈ {m∗} ∪ M˘−i ∪M(i, t). From Definition T.9.1 it is
immediate to check that in this case player 〈i, t〉 assigns probability one to the event that mt−i = (m, . . . ,m).
Given (g, µ), this event may of course have been generated by several possible histories. Notice however, that
the profile (g, µ) is such that a single deviation by one player at the action stage is sufficient to generate the
message profile mt = (m, . . . ,m). Therefore, upon observing m 6∈ {m∗} ∪ M˘−i ∪M(i, t) the probability that
mt−i = (m, . . . ,m) is an infinitesimal in ε of order no higher than 2.
T.21 This needs to be compared with the
probability that mt−i 6= (m, . . . ,m) and mti = m. The latter event is impossible given the profile (g, µ) unless
a deviation at the message stage has occurred at some point. Therefore its probability is an infinitesimal in
ε of order no lower than 2n+ 1. This is obviously enough to prove the claim.
Lemma T.11.2: The strategy profile (g, µ) described in Definitions B.8 and B.9 and the end-of-period beliefs
described in Definition T.9.2 are consistent.
T.21See footnote T.2 above for a specification of our (standard) use of terminology concerning the orders of infinitesimals.
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Proof: The case t = 0 is trivial. Assume t ≥ 1, and consider any player 〈i, t〉 after having observed
(mti, x
t, at, yt).
We deal first with the case in which xt = x(κ) with κ > κ. Let x(`00, `∗) denote the realization xt. In this
case, the action-stage strategies described in Definition B.8 prescribe that every player 〈k ∈ I, t〉 should play
atk(`
∗). Therefore, if the observed action profile at is equal to a(`∗), player 〈i, t〉 does not revise his beginning-
of-period beliefs during period t. Hence consistency in this case follows immediately from the profile µ and
from the consistency of beginning-of-period beliefs, which of course was proved in Lemma T.11.1. Notice now
that if at 6= a(`∗), then the message strategies described in Definition B.9 prescribe that each player 〈k ∈ I, t〉
should send a message that does not depend on the message mtk he received. Hence, in this case consistency
is immediate from Definition T.9.2 and the profile µ.
We now turn to the case in which xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ. Here, it is necessary to consider several subcases,
depending on the message m received by player 〈i, t〉. Assume first that m 6∈ M˘−i ∪M(i, t). Then for any
possible triple (xt, at, yt) we have that
lim
ε→0
Pr(mt−i = (m, . . . ,m) | mti = m,xt, at, gε, µε) = 1 (T.11.1)
To see this consider two sets of possibilities. First, m = m∗, xt = x(·, ˆ`, · · ·), and at = (a1(ˆ`), . . . , an(ˆ`)).
Then play is as prescribed by the equilibrium path generated by the profile (g, µ), and from Definitions B.8
and B.9 there is nothing more to prove. For all other possibilities, notice that the event mt = (m, . . . ,m) is
consistent with any at together with n deviations at the action stage of the second type described in Definition
B.11. Therefore, for any at, the probability of mt = (m, . . . ,m) and at is an infinitesimal in ε of order no
higher than 2n. On the other hand, from Definition B.12 it is immediate that the probability that mt−i 6=
(m, . . . ,m) (since it requires at least one deviation at the message stage) is an infinitesimal in ε of order no
lower than 2n + 1. Hence (T.11.1) follows. From (T.11.1) it is a matter of routine to check the consistency
of end-of-period beliefs from using the profile (g, µ). We omit the details.
Still assuming that xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ, now consider the case m = m˘j ∈ M˘−i. In this case we can
show that
lim
ε→0
Pr(mt−i−j = (m˘j , . . . , m˘j) and m
t
j ∈M(j, t) | mti = m˘j , xt, at, gε, µε) = 1 (T.11.2)
using an argument completely analogous to the one we used for (T.11.1). The details are omitted. As in the
previous case, from (T.11.2) it is a matter of routine to check the consistency of end-of-period beliefs from
using the profile (g, µ).
The last case remaining is xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ and m = mi,τ . In this case we have that
lim
ε→0
Pr(mt−i = (m˘i, . . . , m˘i) | mti = mi,τ , xt, at, gε, µε)+
lim
ε→0
Pr(mt−i = (m
i,τ , . . . ,mi,τ ) | mti = mi,τ , xt, at, gε, µε) = 1
(T.11.3)
Again, the argument is completely analogous to the one used for (T.11.1) and (T.11.2), and the details are
omitted. Now take (T.11.3) as given and let xt = x(· · ·, i`, · · ·).
Suppose next that at−i = a˘
i
−i(i`). Then player 〈i, t〉 does not revise his beginning-of-period beliefs, and
hence, using the profile µ and Lemma T.11.1 it is immediate to check that his end-of-period beliefs are
consistent in this case.
Now suppose that for some j 6= i we have that atj 6= a˘ij(i`) and at−i−j = a˘i−i−j(i`). Consistency of beliefs in
this case requires showing that the first element in the sum in (T.11.3) is equal to 1. Of course given (T.11.3)
it suffices to compare the probabilities of the two events mt−i = (m˘i, . . . , m˘i) and m
t
−i = (m
i,τ , . . . ,mi,τ ).
The first is compatible with a single deviation at the action stage on the part of player 〈j, t〉. Therefore its
probability is an infinitesimal in ε of order no higher than 2. The latter requires an action-stage deviation
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in some period t′ < t (order 2 in ε), and n − 2 action-stage deviations in period t (order 1 each). Hence,
player 〈i, t〉 has consistent beliefs if he assigns probability 1 to mt−i = (m˘i, . . . , m˘i). The consistency of his
end-of-period beliefs can then be checked from the profile µ.
Now suppose that for some j 6= i we have that atj 6= aij(i`) and at−i−j = ai−i−j(i`). Consistency of
beliefs in this case requires showing that the second element in the sum in (T.11.3) is equal to 1. Of course
given (T.11.3) it suffices to compare the probabilities of the two events mt−i = (m˘i, . . . , m˘i) and m
t
−i =
(mi,τ , . . . ,mi,τ ). The first requires (n − 2) deviations at the action-stage of period t, each of order 2 in ε.
Since n ≥ 4, this is therefore an infinitesimal in ε of order no lower than 4. The second is consistent with a
deviation of order 2 in ε at the action-stage of some period t′ < t, together with a deviation of order 1 in ε at
the action stage of period t. Therefore its probability is an infinitesimal in ε of order no higher than 3. Hence,
player 〈i, t〉 has consistent beliefs if he assigns probability 1 to mt−i = (mi,τ , . . . ,mi,τ ). The consistency of
his end-of-period beliefs can then be checked from the profile µ. The same argument applies to show the
consistency of his end-of-period beliefs when at−i = a
i
−i(i`). We omit the details.
In all other possible cases for at, the messages sent by all players 〈j 6= i, t〉 do not in fact depend on at,
provided that mtj is either m˘i or m
i,τ . Given (T.11.3), the consistency of the end-of-period beliefs of player
〈i, t〉 can then be checked directly from the profile µ.
T.12. Proof of Theorem 3
Given any v∗ ∈ int(V ) and any δ ∈ (0, 1), using (B.8), (B.7) and the strategies and randomization devices
described in Definitions B.4, B.5, B.8 and B.9 clearly implement the payoff vector v∗.
From Lemmas T.10.3 and T.10.5 we know that there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that whenever δ > δ each
strategy in the profile described in Definitions B.8 and B.9 is sequentially rational given the beliefs described
in Definitions T.9.1 and T.9.2.
From Lemmas T.11.1 and T.11.2 we know that the strategy profile described in Definitions B.8 and B.9
and the beliefs described in Definitions T.9.1 and T.9.2 are consistent.
Hence, using Lemma T.2.1, the proof of Theorem 3 is now complete.
